

REFERENCE BOOK
INTERNATIONAL SERIES, No. 3

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REFERENCE BOOK
TACTICAL STUDIES

ON THE

Battles Around Plevna,

By THILO VON TROTHA,

Captain of the Grenadier Regiment Frederick William IV. (Attached).

WITH ONE MAP.

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1896.

HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY,
1014-1016 WYANDOTTE STREET,
KANSAS CITY, MO.

LONDON:

W. H. ALLEN & CO., (LIMITED),
13 WATERLOO PLACE, S. W.
PUBLISHERS TO THE INDIA OFFICE.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1896,
By HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO.,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C.



EDITOR'S PREFACE.

Among the many books on the Turko-Russian war of 1877-8, two works stand out prominently; namely, Greene's "Russian Campaigns in Turkey," which is universally recognized as a military classic, and Von Trotha's able work, which, though long and favorably known in Germany, is here presented in English for the first time. Of the latter work it is perhaps sufficient to say that, in its full and careful consideration of tactical matters, it forms a worthy supplement to the former, and as such it will doubtless prove welcome to American and English readers.

U. S. INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1, 1896.

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1877
The Danube Campaign



PART I.

INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE DANUBE
CAMPAIGN.

The army designated to operate against European Turkey, and called the Army of the South, was commanded by the Grand Duke Nicholas and consisted of the VIII., IX., XI., and XII. Corps of two infantry and one cavalry division each, of the 4th Rifle Brigade, a combined Cossack division, and a number of separate Cossack regiments attached to the corps and divisions. On April 24th the Army began to cross the Roumanian frontier, and completed its strategic deployment along the Danube during the ensuing month, mostly by marching and to a smaller extent by the use of the railroad, which was largely occupied by the transport of the heavy artillery, the pontoon parks, and other stores of munitions and provisions.

While the greater part of the cavalry held the line of the Danube from the mouth of the Aluta downward, the main body of the army stood toward the end of May in the vicinity of Bucharest, the right wing at Slatina on the Aluta, the left wing at Oltenitza on the Danube. On the lower Danube was one division of the XI. Corps, strengthened by a detachment of the VII. Corps, which latter, together with the X. Corps, constituted the Coast Army for the protection of the northern shores of the Black Sea.

Of three other corps also mobilized and assigned to the field army, the XIV. Corps was directed to advance to the lower Danube and relieve there the division of the XI. Corps which was to rejoin the main army, while the IV. and XIII. Corps were to join the main army directly. Political reasons prevented the Roumanian Army from active participation in the campaign. This force consisted of four divisions posted in Lesser Wallachia, and in a certain sense constituted the right flank guard of the Russian deployment in Greater Wallachia.

On account of the complete absence of any fixed organization of the Turkish army, and on account of the unsettled state of the Turkish Empire, the strength, distribution, and special formation of the Turkish troops can not be given with complete accuracy, although the following round figures may be approximately correct. At the time of the Russian passage of the Danube there were:

1. In the quadrilateral Shumla—Varna—Silistria—Rustchuk, the main (East) army under Kerim Pasha, 100,000 strong, of which about 60,000 men may be considered available for field operations;
2. In the Dobrudja, about 10,000 to 15,000 men;
3. In Nikopolis, Sistova, and Tirnova, about 10,000 men;
4. At Widdin, the Western Army under Osman Pasha, 50,000 strong, of which about 40,000 men probably marched toward Plevna at the end of June;
5. At Sophia, about 20,000 men, a sort of reserve army,

for the most part also marching to Plevna to join Osman Pasha;

6. South of the Balkans, on the line Philippopolis—Adrianople, some 10,000 to 15,000 men under Reuf Pasha, who did not assume actual command until after the first passage of the Balkans by the Russians;

7. About 30,000 men under Suleiman Pasha, which had been put in motion toward Roumelia from the theater of war in Montenegro;

8. The reinforcements of regular troops from Constantinople, from distant provinces, and from new organizations which had been formed with considerable zeal and skill, are estimated at not less than 40,000 men. Most of these were sent to Suleiman Pasha's army.

The Tcherkesses, an irregular but excellent light cavalry, numbering about 20,000 men, are included in the above data. The Mustahafiz or National Guard are not included, as their military value is doubtful and has not yet been tested in actual conflict with Russian troops.

On the side of the Russians the infantry divisions may be put down at 10,000 men, the cavalry divisions at 2,500 horses, the Cossack regiments at 500 horses; the entire field army of seven corps is therefore to be estimated at about 150,000 infantry, 25,000 cavalry, 20,000 special troops, and 800 field guns; in addition there was a siege park of 350 heavy and medium guns.

The Roumanian Army, so far as fit for the field, may be estimated at 40,000 men.

Active operations suffered a further postponement of four weeks through the unusually high and long-continued rise of the Danube; the delay in the arrival of the large masses of bridging material required, due to defective organization of the Roumanian railways; and the necessity of rendering the Turkish monitor flotilla on the Danube harmless by the use of batteries and torpedoes.

On the 21st of June General Zimmermann crossed the Danube at Galatz with the head of his (XIV.) corps, and established himself on the opposite bank after a brisk engagement. The remainder of his corps followed during the next few days, and was subsequently joined by a part of the VII. Corps; the whole constituted the so-called "Column of the Lower Danube," which advanced through the Dobrudja, meeting insignificant resistance on the part of the enemy, and reached Kustendje and Trajan's Wall about the middle of July. None but small reconnoitering parties crossed this line. Unfavorable sanitary conditions, difficulties of supply and the duty of guarding the shore line, caused the larger portion of the column of 30,000 men to remain inactive in the Dobrudja and to exercise no influence whatever on the operations in Bulgaria beyond. The opposing Turkish troops appear to have been greatly inferior.

We now turn to the main army. On the 27th of June the VIII. Corps crossed the Danube at Zimnitsa under a sharp engagement with a Turkish brigade posted at Sistova; by the 5th of July the IX. and XIII. Corps, the 4th Rifle Brigade, the Bulgarian Legion, and the combined Cossack

division had also completed their passage at this point. Anticipating somewhat, we note here that by the middle of July the XI., XII., and IV. Corps were also brought to the right bank.

The Yantra bridge at Biela having fallen into the hands of the Russians on the 3d of July, General Gourko occupied Tirnova on the 8th of July with a mixed advance guard, crossed the Balkans from here by the trail to the east of the Shipka pass, reached the village of Hankioi at the southern foot of the mountains on the 14th, and turned westward, took Kazaulyk on July 17th, where he found himself in the rear of the Shipka pass, which was unsuccessfully attacked on the same day by a detachment of the VIII. Corps coming from Gabrova. The appearance of Gourko in rear of their position caused the weak Turkish garrison to evacuate the pass on the 19th without resistance, and to retreat by side paths. One of the principal Balkan passes was thus in Russian hands.

Grand Headquarters was moved from Sistova to Biela on the 8th of July, and thence to Tirnova on the 17th.

The passage of the Balkans divided the Russian army of operation in Bulgaria into three separate groups: the center, consisting of the VIII. Corps and Gourko's mixed advance guard, operated in the Balkans and for some time also to the south of them; the left wing, consisting of the XII. and XIII. Corps, charged with the investment and siege of Rustchuk and placed under the orders of the Czarowitz, extended along the Lom from the Danube to Osman-Bazar,

with headquarters at Kadikioi. The right wing, consisting of the IX. Corps, under General Krüdener, was charged in the first place with taking Nikopolis, guarding the line Nikopolis—Plevna—Lovtcha, and establishing communication from the latter place with the center in the Balkans. The IV. and XI. Corps were at this time in the act of crossing the Danube.

Meanwhile General Krüdener with the IX. Corps had moved on Nikopolis. On the 15th of July the commanding and strongly fortified positions in front of the place were taken by assault, and on the 16th the garrison capitulated.

Osman Pasha, who marched from Widdin with his corps about the end of June, had in the meantime reached Plevna without being discovered by the Russians. A weak detachment of the IX. Corps dispatched against this place on the 20th of July was repulsed with considerable loss.

The unexpected appearance of this strong Turkish army in the space between the Vid and the Osma caused a complete change in the situation.

Krüdener, with the IX. Corps reinforced by a brigade of the XI. and a division of the IV. Corps, attacked Plevna on the 30th of July and suffered a heavy defeat.

Osman Pasha was prevented, probably by the deficient character of his army, from acting on the offensive and reaping the fruits of his victory, and the Russian communications by way of Sistova, seriously menaced at first, remained undisturbed. Nevertheless the Russian offensive had not only been checked for the present, but the Russians were

obliged to make retrograde movements in the center and on both flanks.

On the left the Czarowitz, whose forces had been augmented by a part of the XI. Corps, raised the investment of Rustchuk and took a defensive position along the Black Lom against the Turkish army assembling in his front. After his successful passage of the Balkans, Gourko extended his troops in the Tundja valley, called the Bulgarians to arms, spread terror and confusion as far as Philippopolis and Adrianople. He was defeated at Eski-Zagra on the 31st of July and compelled to retreat to Kazanlyk, by Suleiman Pasha, who had brought his corps, heretofore employed against Montenegro, by water from Antivari to Dedeag at the mouth of the Maritza, thence by rail to Adrianople, and had advanced from the latter place northward by forced marches. The VIII. Corps, originally designated to follow Gourko across the Balkans, could no longer be employed in the latter's support, on account of the unfavorable situation north of the Balkans. He therefore evacuated Kazanlyk on the 6th of August and withdrew into the Balkan passes, where he entrenched himself.

Grand Headquarters was moved back from Tirnova to Biela. The unfavorable situation had demonstrated to the Russian leaders that the forces employed were unequal to the task, and the attempt was made to remedy this evil in two ways: first, reinforcements of ten infantry divisions (five Line, three Guard, two Grenadier) and two cavalry divisions (Guard) were ordered from Russia; second, a

treaty (heretofore refused by Russia) was concluded with Roumania, which made the Roumanian army available for use in active operations. The West Army, consisting of the IV. and IX. Corps, was augmented by the entire Roumanian army and the Guards and Grenadiers which arrived later, and the command was conferred on Prince Charles of Roumania. The remaining three Russian infantry divisions were assigned to the East Army under the Czarowitz, as also those parts of the XI. Corps not heretofore so assigned. General Radetzki, with part of the former advance guard and the VIII. Corps, formed the center in the Balkans and connected the two flank armies, which were posted with their backs toward each other.

For the present the West Army left one Roumanian division, and the East Army left several Russian bodies, on the north bank of the Danube opposite the Turkish fortresses.

The reinforcements ordered had not arrived when at the beginning of August the three Turkish armies—the West Army under Osman Pasha at Plevna, the South Army under Suleiman Pasha at Kazanlyk, the East Army under Mehemed Ali Pasha on the line Razgrad—Osman-Bazar—were in readiness to advance to a concentric attack. The Russian Army, which was posted between the Osma, the Lom, and the Balkans in the triangle Nikopolis—Gabrova—Rustchuk, was shaken by its reverses, and in an undoubted critical position, having to rely for weeks, until the arrival of considerable reinforcements, on its own strength, which had been recognized as insufficient.

Even the splendid bravery manifested by the Russian troops on every occasion would hardly have saved the army from heavy reverses, had not a certain unwieldiness of the Turkish Army in offensive movements, as well as lack of harmony, and even open enmity, between the Turkish leaders, acted in favor of the Russians.

Instead of utilizing the open passes to the east of Shipka and advancing with the main body of his army, consisting of battle-*tried elite* battalions, against the line Osman-Bazar—Timova in coöperation with the East Army, Suleiman Pasha wasted his strength for six days in heroic but useless attacks against the position in the Shipka pass, which was defended by an opponent equally heroic, though much inferior in strength. His heavy losses (more than 15,000 men, according to Turkish statements) rendered Suleiman's army unfit for active operations, at least for the present. It was not until September 17th, and after complete reorganization of his troops and considerable accessions of reinforcements, that he undertook another unexpected attack on the Shipka pass, which, though successful at first, was repulsed in the end.

During this time Mehemed Ali advanced from Razgrad against the Russian position on the Kara Lom.

After several small engagements, a detachment of the Russian center was defeated at Kara-Hassankioi on the right bank of the Kara Lom on the 31st of August, another was beaten at Kazeljewo on the 5th of September and pushed over the Lom, whose right bank was completely in the hands

of the Turks on September 7th. To defend the line of the Jantra, the Russian East Army took position on the right bank of the stream on the plateau between the Jantra and the Banizka Lom (left branch of the Kara Lom). On the 13th of September Mehemed Ali crossed to the left bank of the Kara Lom, defeated a Russian detachment at Sinankioi on the 14th, and on September 21st made an unsuccessful attempt to force a passage over the Banizka Lom at Tschirkowna. Repulsed with considerable loss, Mehemed Ali recrossed the Kara Lom, whose passages from Kazeljewo downward as far as Pyrgos were reoccupied by the Russians by the middle of October.

Osman Pasha's inactivity throughout is surprising. By his unexpected approach from Widdin and his tactical skill in the defensive actions during July he had made his appearance on the field of war in splendid manner, and decisive action might have been expected on his part. An insignificant advance from Plevna westward on the 14th of August and another feeble unsuccessful attack from Lovtcha against Selvi on the 21st and 22d of August are not to be taken for seriously contemplated aggressive movements. Still the coincidence in time of the latter attack with the beginning of the great attack on the Shipka pass by Suleiman Pasha, as well as with the advance of Mehemed Ali against the upper Lom, is worth noting. More seriously contemplated and more vigorously carried out was Osman Pasha's attack against the Russian positions at Zgalevitza and Pelishat on the 31st of August; but this attack was likewise

undertaken with but half of the available forces, and is not to be considered as a last struggle for final decision. Coincident again with Osman's attack was Mehemed Ali's advance against the middle Lom, while Suleiman was still engaged in reorganizing his army, which was shattered and unable to coöperate with the aggressive movements of the two flank armies.

While the Russians were restricting themselves in the Balkans and on the Lom to the defense of their partly maintained and reoccupied positions, the West Army, reinforced by two Russian infantry divisions and the Roumanians, proceeded to the serious attack on Plevna.

After the capture of Lovtcha on the 3d of September, the great artillery attack against Plevna opened on the 7th, and continued for some time after the great assault on the 11th of September, which, though in part successful, must be accounted a failure.

The attempt to deprive the Army of Plevna of its communications with Widdin and Sophia by posting a strong cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid was without result for a time. Reinforcements with considerable supplies of provisions and munitions repeatedly broke through the weak line of investment on the left bank, and succeeded in getting into Plevna. The investment of Plevna did not become effective and make itself felt until after General Gourko assumed command of the corps of investment on the left bank of the Vid with troops of the Guard, and had established himself on the line of communication and retreat

of the Army of Plevna. After the capture by assault of the fortified station of Gorni Dubnik, provisions and ammunition ran short in Plevna.

Russian detachments which were pushed into the mountains along the Isker and Vid cut off Mehemed Ali's reserve army assembling at Sophia and compelled it to be more solicitous of its own defense than of the relief of Plevna.

Deprived of hope of assistance from without and pressed by the daily increasing difficulties of his position, Osman Pasha attempted to break through the Russian line of investment westward on the 10th of December; the attempt failed, and Osman Pasha and his entire army surrendered as prisoners of war.

It remains to cast a brief glance at the coincident events on the Lom, where the Russian East Army, after reoccupying the line of the Kara Lom, remained strictly on the defensive.

Suleiman Pasha, who had assumed command of the Turkish East Army about the middle of October, in place of Mehemed Ali Pasha, attempted to draw the attention of the Russians to their own left flank by attacking the lower Lom on the 19th and 26th of November, and seriously and unexpectedly attacked the extreme right of the Russian position in the mountains at Maren and Elena, on the 4th of December, with 30,000 men. The feeble Russian detachment was driven back with severe loss in men and guns, but in rear of Elena the Turkish advance came to a stop, and on receipt

of the news of the surrender of Plevna the Turkish corps withdrew toward Achmedli on the 14th of December. On December 12th the Turks suffered a bloody repulse at Met-schka on the lower Lom, where they made a vigorous attack. With the fall of Plevna, almost coincident with the end of the year, the campaign on the Danube terminated; all subsequent events on the various portions of the theater of war pertain to a new period, the campaign of Adrianople.

PART II.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS AROUND PLEVNA.

The operations of the IX. Corps, which constituted the nucleus of the subsequently formed West Army, began July 15th with the assault on the heights commanding Nikopolis and the surrender of the fortress on the 16th.

During the struggle at Nikopolis the Caucasian Cossack Brigade was pushed into the space between the Osma and Vid, to cover the IX. Corps against any hostile enterprises from Rahova and Plevna; according to the statements of prisoners, the garrison of Nikopolis did in fact expect relief from the west.

During the night of the 15th-16th the Cossack Brigade had an action with a detachment of Turkish infantry which seemed to belong to the garrison of Nikopolis and to have escaped from the impending capitulation. No hostile bodies made their appearance from the west in these days.

But on the 17th one of the reconnoitering parties dispatched to the south encountered at Selvi a detachment of about 1,000 men, consisting of Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks with some infantry, which retired on Lovtcha. On the evening of the same day reports arrived at Grand Headquarters, from the Cossack patrols scouting along the Vid, of the approach of strong hostile detachments from the

west, marching in the direction of Plevna. It seems that the commander-in-chief placed little importance on these reports, and certainly did not believe in the presence of strong masses of the enemy in that direction; the only measure taken in this respect was an order to the commander of the IX. Corps to occupy Plevna* with a detachment and to clear the vicinity of such bodies of the enemy as might be there.

The fact that the Headquarters rested in such false security as regards the danger threatening from West Bulgaria does not throw favorable light on the organization and direction of the service of information. An entire army was assembled at Plevna by this time.

The date when Osman Pasha started from Widdin with the main body of the West Bulgarian Army can not be accurately ascertained. Supposing the movement from Widdin to have begun when the passage of the Danube by the Russians became known, Osman Pasha's army would have consumed about twenty days in traversing the distance of about 125 miles from Widdin to Plevna. The heads of these columns were the troops whose presence on the Vid was reported on the 17th of July by the Cossacks scouting there. In addition, a part of the reserve army at Sophia was ordered to join Osman, and it is probable that this corps took the great road through Orkhanie, and thence either the road leading from Telis to Plevna or from Jabloniza along the northern foot of the Balkans to Plevna; in the former case the troops with whom the Russians came in touch at Selvi

on the 17th may be considered as the right flank guard, and in the latter case as the advance guard of the corps approaching from Sophia.

Nothing is known with certainty of the plan on which Osman's march was originally based; had he arrived on the banks of the Vid a few days earlier, the capture of Nikopolis by the Russian IX. Corps would hardly have been possible.

We now again turn to the operations of the Russian Army.

Pursuant to instructions from the Headquarters, General Krüdener on the 18th of July ordered the commander of the 5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, to move with the 1st Brigade of his division, 4 batteries, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment from Nikopolis to Plevna, and to occupy the place. The troops already beyond the Osma and along the highroad from Bulgareni to Plevna—the Kostroma Regiment of the 5th Division with a battery and the Caucasian Cossack Brigade—were ordered to coöperate in the enterprise and placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner.

The latter permitted the two detachments to advance separately from north and east against Plevna, where meanwhile a large part of Osman's army, probably not less than 20,000 to 25,000 men, had arrived, and he suffered a bloody defeat on the 20th of July, the three infantry regiments losing 3,000 men, one-third of their proper strength.

The vigorous sign of life given by the hitherto neglected army of Osman made a very unpleasant impression at Head-

quarters, occupied at this moment by Gourko's surprisingly successful passage of the Balkans, and probably engaged in plans of an immediate advance on Adrianople. The unfavorable impression produced by the defeat at Plevna was to be wiped out as quickly as possible by overpowering the troublesome opponent. General Krüdener received considerable reinforcements from the corps recently brought to the right bank of the Danube, and was enjoined to attack Plevna vigorously.

General Krüdener had meanwhile been concentrating his IX. Corps at Bresljäniza; but one regiment was left at Nikopolis, which place received a Roumanian garrison in addition.

Up to July 26th Krüdener received the following reinforcements: the 1st Brigade of the 32d Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, both of the XI. Corps and under the personal command of Prince Shalkofskoi, the corps commander; also the 30th Infantry Division of the IV. Corps.

Lovtcha, temporarily occupied by a Russian detachment, was recovered by the Turks on July 26th, who at this point were distant 50 miles from the headquarters at Tirnova and 37 from Gabrova at the northern issue of the Shipka pass.

Krüdener's total strength, including the reinforcements and deducting losses, amounted to about 30,000 men with 176 guns. He had some hesitation in attacking the enemy at Plevna, finding his own forces insufficient in

view of the enemy's strong position and large force, for by the end of July Osman Pasha must have had more than 40,000 men with about 80 guns at Plevna. Reiterated orders from Headquarters prompted him finally to proceed to the attack on the 30th of July. The battle was contested on both sides with great bravery, but terminated in a heavy defeat of the Russians, who lost 7,500 men in killed and wounded, which was one-fourth of their effectives.

Strange to say, there was no pursuit on the part of the Turks; thereby the Russian troops, which were much demoralized immediately after the unsuccessful termination of the struggle, gained time to make front in good condition on the line Trestenik—Poradim, barely 13 miles from the battle-field.

A pause now ensued in front of Plevna. Prevented by some cause—probably by the defective character of his army—from turning his victory to full account by a vigorous attack on the Russian communications, Osman Pasha occupied himself with strengthening his position by means of fortifications and converted it into a spacious, extremely strong, entrenched camp, to which it seems a number of heavy guns of position were *en route* from Widdin. The only sign of life given by the Turkish army at Plevna was a feeble reconnoissance westward on the 14th of August, which was driven back by the fire of Russian guns, and a movement from Lovtcha on Selvi, which was undertaken on the 21st and 22d of August with small forces, without energy, and therefore without result.

The Russians passed the entire month of August in a waiting attitude; the arrival of the reinforcements ordered was awaited with impatience, and it was a matter of gratification that the Turks did not proceed from Plevna to the attack of the line of the Jantra. The portion of the XI. Corps which had been present before Plevna since the end of July was detached from the West Army and employed farther to the east; in its place the entire IV. Corps and the 4th Roumanian Division were assigned to this army, now commanded by General Zotoff, the commander of the IV. Corps and senior general present; the 4th Roumanian Division, which rested on the Vid at Riben, formed the right wing, the IX. Corps north of the highroad to Bulgareni formed the center, and the IV. Corps south of the highroad formed the left wing of the position.

After the completion of the diplomatic formalities and military agreements, the main body of the Roumanian Army (*i. e.*, the 2d and 3d Divisions) crossed the Danube at Korabia (22 miles above Nikopolis) during the last days of August. The 1st Division remained opposite Widdin. The selection of the point of crossing raises the presumption that the Roumanians were to operate on the left bank of the Vid and to invest Plevna from the west, but after a few days the two Roumanian divisions were brought to the right bank of the Vid. The Roumanian Army of three divisions now constituted the right wing of the West Army, over which Prince Charles of Roumania assumed command, the previous commander, General Zotoff, becoming his chief of staff.

On the 31st of August, previous to the arrival of the Roumanian Army on the right bank of the Vid, Osman Pasha made a vigorous attack, south of the Bulgareni road, with some 25,000 men, against the left of the Russian positions at Zgalevitza and Pelishat. He was repulsed after a long and doubtful struggle, with a loss of several thousand killed and wounded; the Russians lost 1,000 men.

The period from the beginning of August to the beginning of September, which, aside from the action of Pelishat, was broken by no noteworthy event, was utilized by the Russians for various preparations for the great attack contemplated upon the arrival of reinforcements.

The first of these measures was a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, which was very much broken and well covered by the fire of the Turks. But an accurate survey on the scale of three inches to the mile was nevertheless made, and the resulting map was manifolded and distributed among the troops.

Fascines, gabions, and scaling ladders were also prepared, and the troops practiced in escalade; approaches to the enemy's position as well as lateral communications were built; many large and small bridges were repaired or newly constructed; the existing wells were cleaned and a number of new ones sunk, particularly at such points as were designed to serve as future dressing stations; lastly, a number of siege guns were brought up, partly in order to employ heavy calibers against the Turkish position, partly to give a moral support to the troops, which had lost confi-

dence in the field artillery in the action against the Turkish works.

At the beginning of September the long-expected reinforcements arrived. They consisted of the main body of the Roumanian Army, which was posted on the right; part of the cavalry of Gourko's former advance guard, two Dragoon regiments, one Hussar regiment, and two Don Cossack regiments; the siege artillery of 20 twenty-four-pounders; lastly, on the 5th of September General Prince Imeretinski, with the 2d Infantry Division and the 3d Rifle Brigade, arrived from Lovtcha, which he had taken by assault on September 3d, after an obstinate and bloody struggle, which severed the communications of Plevna to the southeast; his detachment for the present took position in rear of the left of the IV. Corps.

The Russian army before Plevna now numbered five infantry divisions and one rifle brigade, a total of sixty-four battalions. But it may be safely assumed that the battalions crossed the Danube with not more than 800 effectives, and it is not probable that the ranks could have been filled with recruits by the beginning of September. The losses of the 15th, 20th, and 30th of July and 31st of August and at Lovtcha amounted to some 12,000 men, while the loss from sickness during July and August must at a moderate calculation be placed at several thousand men, so that the number of effectives of the Russian infantry before Plevna could hardly have been more than 35,000 and certainly not more than 40,000 men. If we add the artillery, cavalry, and

engineer troops, the total of the Russian West Army was at the most 50,000 effectives, to which some 25,000 Roumanians should be added.

The number of effectives of the Turkish army assembled at Plevna was probably about 50,000 men, after making allowance for the losses suffered in July and August and counting reinforcements.

During the night of the 6th-7th of September the Russian troops approached in deep silence within gun-shot of the Turkish works and threw up entrenchments for their artillery and cover for part of the infantry. On the morning of the 7th fire was opened on the Turkish positions and continued until noon of the 11th—almost without any effect whatever, as will be seen later on. On the left General Skobelev began his assault on the "Green Hills" on the 8th, and made himself master of the southern portion of that important point in a bloody struggle of three days. At 3 p. m. on the 11th of September a general assault was made; on the right by the Roumanians and the IX. Corps against the Grivitza works, in the center by the IV. Corps against the Radischevo works, on the left by Skobelev's combined corps against the Krishin works.

The attack in the center was repulsed; on the right the most advanced Grivitza redoubt, on the left the northern portion of the "Green Hills" and two redoubts of the Krishin works, fell into the hands of the Russians.

The Grivitza redoubt was the only one, however, that remained in Russian hands; after a furious struggle and

under great losses on both sides, the Turks made a counter-stroke in force, regained the redoubts on the left, and also drove the Russians from the "Green Hills."

As it soon became clear that the captured redoubt, which had been considered the key point of the hostile position, was completely overlooked by the works lying farther to the rear, the assault, which cost the Russians about 12,500 and the Roumanians about 3,000 men, may be considered a total failure.

Upon the unsuccessful and costly issue of this assault the Russians abandoned the idea of taking Plevna by assault, and decided upon the conquest of Osman Pasha's army by means of investment and starvation. The center of gravity of the events was thus shifted from the right to the left bank of the Vid.

On the 8th of September General Loshkareff crossed to the left bank with eight regiments of Russian and Roumanian cavalry and made several scouting expeditions. On the 19th General Kryloff took command of all cavalry corps on the left bank, but was unable to effectually check the march of Turkish trains and reinforcements from Sophia on the road Orkhanie—Telis—Gorni Dubnik, and the whole attempt to invest Plevna from the west is to be accounted a complete failure.

In this quarter the investment did not become effective until the arrival of the Guards and Grenadiers, which for the greater part were assigned to the operations on the west side. On the 24th of October General Gourko with greatly

superior forces assaulted and took Gorni Dubnik, a strongly fortified point on the line of communications which was bravely defended by a few thousand men. Telis fell into the hands of the Russians on October 28th, after a slight engagement, and Dolni Dubnik on November 1st, without resistance. The line of investment on the west of Plevna was then completed by the building of a series of strong entrenchments.

All communications of the army in Plevna were now severed; moreover, to deprive it of any hope of relief by Mehemed Ali's army, which was assembling at Sophia and whose advance guard had reached Orkhanie, strong Russian detachments were pushed to the west and south.

Toward the west Vratza was taken on the 9th of November, Rahova on the 22d, and Lom-Palanka on the 30th. On December 1st, flying detachments advanced toward the direct line of communication with the Servians.

Toward the south Teteven (on the upper Vid) was occupied on the 2d and the Rosalita pass (on the upper Osma) on the 17th of November; on the 23d strong detachments took Prawez, between Orkhanie and Etropol, and on the 24th the latter place itself, whereupon the Turkish advance guard at Orkhanie fell back on the main body at Sophia.

Reverting now to the events on the east front of Plevna, we have stated above that no decisive importance attaches to them after the middle of September; the question here for the Russians was partly one of holding their positions, partly of gradually advancing the line of investment so as to shorten it somewhat.

On the 17th of September an attempt on the part of the Turks to retake the "first" Grivitzza redoubt was repulsed; on the following day an attempt on the part of the Roumanians to take the so-called "second" Grivitzza redoubt also failed, whereupon trenches were resorted to for the approach on the Turkish positions, the artillery meanwhile maintaining a slow fire, which failed to elicit any reply from the Turks.

After pushing their trenches to within thirty yards of the enemy's redoubt, the Roumanians made a dash at it on the 19th of October, but were flung back with great loss.

On the left General Skobelev occupied the village of Brestovetz on the night of November 4th-5th, seized the "first knoll" of the "Green Hills" on November 9th, and maintained himself in the rapidly entrenched position against two hostile assaults launched against it by the Turks on the 12th and 15th of November. The complete investment of Plevna meanwhile made itself felt; munitions and provisions began to fail, and disease made great ravages among the troops, which were poorly fed, clothed, and housed. The hope of relief from without diminished more and more, and Osman Pasha was at last compelled to relinquish his stout and protracted resistance.

The attempt undertaken with great bravery on December 10th, of breaking through the Russian line of investment on the west where it was held by two Grenadier divisions, seemed to be without hope of success and merely for the sake of saving the honor of the Turkish arms. On the failure of the attack, and after the loss of the partly aban-

done and weakly held works on the east, Osman Pasha surrendered unconditionally with his entire army, whose effectives may still have numbered some 40,000 men, not counting some 20,000 sick and wounded.

For nearly five months Osman Pasha and his army maintained themselves against a constantly increasing opponent and under the apparently overwhelming fire of a formidable artillery. The entire situation was altered by this obstinate resistance, and the decision of the campaign, which at one time seemed to become ripe during the year of 1877, was staved off until 1878. The results gained by Osman Pasha and his army may therefore be justly regarded as surpassing their own expectations.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the repeated reverses suffered at Plevna helped toward the Russian final success. Timely attention was called to the defective character of the whole Russian plan of operation, and much greater forces than originally contemplated were brought to the theater of war, which rendered a subsequent successful and decisive conduct of the war possible.

Had the Russian Army succeeded in reaching Adrianople in August, 1877, without the interlude of Plevna, peace might have been made under stipulations much more acceptable to Turkey than those now to be expected.

PART III.

PLEVNA.

1. Geographical Conditions.

Plevna is situated in the center of a great agricultural district on the great road from *Sophia* to *Rustchuk*, in the valley of the *Tutchenitza* brook, a right branch of the *Vid*. From here radiate important roads to *Nikopolis* in the north, *Widdin* in the west, to *Orkhanie* and *Sophia* in the southwest, to *Lovtcha* and *Trojan* in the south, to *Selvi* and *Tirnova* in the southeast, and lastly, as previously stated, to *Biela* and *Rustchuk* in the east.

Appreciating the importance of *Plevna* as an industrial and commercial center, *Midhat Pasha*, the former Governor-General of the Danube Province (*Tuna-Vilajet*), decided to connect the town with the Danube by railway.

Nikopolis was at first intended to be the terminus of the road; but closer examination showed this place unsuited for a commercial depot and the requisite harbor construction, and *Midhat* decided to establish a new commercial center, to be named "*Port Sultanie*," at the mouth of the *Osma*, west of *Nikopolis*. From this latter place the road was to ascend the valley of the *Osma* for some distance and reach *Plevna* by way of *Metchka*, *Kojulowza*, and *Grivitza*. For the construction of the road-bed, which consisted

for the most part of fillings, Midhat Pasha collected some 20,000 Bulgarian laborers; the requisite timber was taken from the forests at the foot of the Balkans.

Soon afterward Midhat was recalled from his position, the enterprise was allowed to lapse, and few vestiges of the work remain.

We will now examine the communications radiating from Plevna:

(a) *From Plevna to Nikopolis*, 25 miles, by way of Calysovatz and Bresljäniza.

(b) *From Plevna to Widdin*.—The road from Plevna to Rahova is 35 miles across the deep valleys of the Isker and its branches.

Rahova is a Bulgarian commercial town, situated in a narrow, level valley between receding mountains. The Turks had constructed some redoubts on the surrounding heights in order to make it serve as a post on the communications between Plevna and Widdin. The distance from Rahova to Lom-Palanka on the Danube is 35 miles, and from there to Widdin is also 35 miles.

A good road leads southward from Rahova to Vratza (40 miles); from Vratza there is a direct road to Plevna (60 miles), which crosses to the left bank of the Isker and follows that stream in its further course. All the roads named, except the high road Rahova—Vratza, are country roads which cross the deep-cut valleys of the Ogost, Isker, and Skit at various points.

(c) *The Great Road from Plevna to Orkhanie and Sophia*

was built during Midhat Pasha's governorship, and surpasses most of the Turkish roads in being well paved and wide enough to permit two four-horse wagons to pass each other at any point; a telegraph line follows the road throughout its length.

From Plevna the road runs westward, crosses the Vid (3 miles), runs southwesterly across undulating ground to Dolni (Lower) Dubnik (6 miles) and Telis (10 miles), southward to Lukovitza (9 miles) and Jablonitza (12 miles), westward to Orkhanie (20 miles), then southward to the Balkan pass of Babakonak (12 miles), and from here westward to Sophia (30 miles).

(d) *From Plevna to Lovtcha and Trojan.*—From Plevna to Lovtcha (elevation 600 feet) 20 miles, from here upstream along the left bank of the Osma to Trojan (elevation 1,100 feet) also 20 miles. Trojan is situated at the junction of the Balabanka with the Osma and numbers 600 houses with 3,500 inhabitants in a district almost exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians. South of Trojan is the wealthy Bulgarian monastery which was the center of the Bulgarian insurrection of 1867. From Trojan the road leads to the pass of Trojan, which has an elevation of 5,000 feet.

(e) *From Plevna to Lovtcha and Tirnova.*—A highroad runs the entire distance: from Plevna to Lovtcha on the Osma 20 miles, from there to Selvi on the Rusitza (left branch of the Jantra) 20 miles, thence to Tirnova on the Jantra 25 miles. From Selvi a road leads southward to the Rosalita pass, which has an elevation of 1,400 feet and is distant

from Selvi 30 miles, and 6 miles north of Kalifer. The Rosalita pass is 25 miles to the west of the Shipka pass.

(f) *From Plevna to Rustchuk.*—From Plevna the great road (prolongation of the Sophia road) leads to Bulgareni on the Osma (25 miles), thence to Biela on the Jantra (30 miles), and lastly to Rustchuk (25 miles).

2. *Topographical Conditions.*

Plevna was a well-built town of 17,000 inhabitants, one-half of whom were Mohammedans, with 3,100 houses, 18 mosques, and 2 Christian churches. It is situated on the Tutchenitza brook, 3 miles above its junction with the river Vid. Higher up on the brook lies the village of Tutchenitza, from which the brook derives its name.

Just below Plevna the Tutchenitza brook is joined by the Grivitza brook, which comes from the east and is so called from the village of Grivitza on its upper course.

The entire country surrounding Plevna on the east may be divided into three sections: the section north of the Grivitza brook, the middle section between Grivitza and Tutchenitza brooks, the section between Tutchenitza brook and the Vid river.

The heights skirting the right bank of the Vid closely approach the river at Bivolar and Opanetz in the northern and at Oltschages in the southern section; above Plevna the valley of the Tutchenitza is a steep, narrow ravine, but expands below the town and forms a broad plain enclosed by mountains on the north and south.

In the northern section the great road Plevna—Bul-

gareni—Biela follows the northern bank of the Grivitza. The heights which form the northern edge of the Grivitza and Tutschenitza brooks, and whose southern slopes are very abrupt, are divided by the ravine of Bukova into a western and eastern portion, the former lying between the ravine named and the Vid river, the latter between the ravine of Bukova and another ravine extending northward from Grivitza.

The plateau forming the section between the Grivitza and Tutschenitza brooks is furrowed by three smaller ravines: from Grivitza southward extends the "southern Grivitza ravine," from the Tutschenitza valley eastward the "Radischevo ravine," and, between the two, from Plevna southeastward, the "middle ravine." The eastern edge of the southern Grivitza ravine and the northern edge of the Radischevo ravine were covered with brush and groups of trees; the slopes of the steep and deep Tutschenitza ravine were covered for the most part with vineyards.

The southern portion of the southern section has become known as the "Green Hills," and was thickly covered with trees, vines, and high corn-fields; to the east it forms three sharply separated knolls, which are designated from south to north as "first," "second," and "third" knoll; the two depressions intervening between the knolls open into the Tutschenitza ravine. The Lovtcha road follows the western edge of the latter ravine and crosses the "Green Hills." The northern part of this section between Plevna and the Vid river, and separated from the "Green Hills" by

a depression running east and west, seems to overtop the entire country around Plevna.

From Plevna the great road to Sophia follows the left bank of the Tutchenitza to the Vid and crosses that river on a well-constructed wooden bridge, which is 140 paces in length and rests on stone piers.

3. *Fortifications.*

At the beginning of July Plevna was without any fortification whatever; about the middle of July, at the time of the first attack, probably but few points of the town itself were prepared for defense, as the monastery at the eastern exit of the town. Toward the end of July the construction of works on the surrounding heights was taken in hand with great energy; at the time of the great attack on July 30th most of the commanding points in the vicinity were entrenched, and subsequently the whole position was thoroughly fortified, partly by the erection of new works, partly by completing and strengthening those already in existence. To the west of the Bukova ravine was the Bukova redoubt (*a*); east of the Bukova ravine the so-called second Grivitza redoubt (*b*); close in front of Grivitza the first Grivitza redoubt, also called Abdul Kerim Tabia (*c*); to the southwest of the last was the eastern Radischevo redoubt, also called Central redoubt or Hafiz Bey Tabia (*d*); further to the west on the edge of the Tutchenitza ravine the western Radischevo redoubt or Tutchenitza redoubt (*e*); lastly, north of the "Green Hills" the Krishin redoubt (*f*). All these works were very large, of very

strong profile, and provided in the interior with large hollow traverses prepared for artillery defense; in front and on the sides of the redoubts were several lines of rifle-trenches, which, partly by the use of the natural slopes and partly by artificial construction, rendered a defense by tiers of rifle fire possible on a large scale.

In second line were a number of smaller works to guard communication between those works and with the town.

Between the Krishin redoubt and the town two redoubts were subsequently built, which were taken and again lost by Skobeleff on the 11th and 12th of September; in rear of the Krishin redoubt was the camp of the Turkish reserves, protected by a number of works.

On the west bank of the Vid a sort of bridge-head was constructed in front of the bridge; the space from there northward to the mouth of the Netropolie brook was covered by two additional works.

Lastly let us quote here a brief description of the external aspect of the Turkish works as given by an eye-witness at the beginning of September:

"As viewed from the Russian batteries, the surroundings of Plevna appeared as a hilly plateau about 5 miles in width, bounded on the right and left by continuous ridges (the Grivitza heights and the "Green Hills"); in the background, hidden in a depression, was Plevna. On first sight the entire plateau offered nothing unusual to the eye; on closer observation, however, a series of entrenchments might be seen which looked like yellowish bands on the gen-

eral green ground. Even with the aid of the field-glass, details could not be distinguished; most conspicuous were the three foremost redoubts—on the right the Grivitza Redoubt, on the left the Radischevo works, and farther in rear an entrenched camp.”

PART IV.

THE ACTION AT PLEVNA ON JULY 20TH.

1. *Advance on Plevna on July 19th.*

On July 18th Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner, commander of the V. Infantry Division, received orders from General Krüdener to advance with two regiments (Archangel, No. 17, and Wologda, No. 18) of his division, four batteries, and the 9th Don Cossacks, from Nikopolis on Plevna and to take possession of that place. Additional troops from beyond the Osma were also placed under his orders; at Bulgareni, 25 miles from Nikopolis, ten sotnias* of the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with a battery, also one battalion of the Kostroma Regiment, number 19; at Poradim, 12 miles nearer Plevna, the remainder of the 19th Regiment, a battery, and two sotnias of Cossacks.

General Schilder-Schuldner gave directions to the Kostroma Regiment to assemble at Poradim, and then to march to Zgalevitza, arriving at 2 p. m. July 19th. The Cossack Brigade was ordered to march to Tutchenitza.

During the night of July 18th-19th Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner bivouacked with the infantry brigade and artillery at the mouth of the Osma, and arrived on the

*The sotnia is the squadron of the Cossacks. The word means "a hundred," but the sotnia varies from 100 to 200 men.—A. L. W.

afternoon of the 19th before Plevna (21 miles). Finding the place occupied by the Turks, he opened fire from his guns and continued the cannonade until dark, and then went into bivouac in front of the town.

The 9th Don Cossacks had started toward Plevna separately from the infantry, bivouacked at Riben on the night of the 18th-19th, and seem to have remained there during the forenoon of the 19th. While they were cooking, the sound of guns was heard from Plevna (10 miles) about 3 p.m. The camp-kettles were emptied at once, and the regiment marched to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Plevna, where a small Turkish infantry detachment was encountered. Half a sotnia dismounted and began a fight, which lasted until dark. Covered by a chain of outposts consisting of two sotnias, the regiment bivouacked in view of Plevna.

The Kostroma Regiment with the battery and the two attached sotnias reached Zgalevitza at the designated hour and sent both sotnias forward to reconnoiter toward Plevna. In rear of the village of Grivitza a hostile camp was discovered, from which about three hundred men, one infantry battalion, and two guns started to meet the Cossacks, who fell back on their infantry.

On the evening of the 19th the troops of Schilder-Schuldner were posted in four separate groups as follows:

The 9th Don Cossacks—6 sotnias—on the extreme right north of Plevna.

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division—6 battalions, 32 guns—to the northeast of Plevna.

The Kostroma Regiment—3 battalions, 2 sotnias, 8 guns—southeast of Plevna at Zgalevitza.

The Coſsack Brigade—10 sotnias, 6 guns—south of Plevna at Tutchenitza.

The whole detachment, which did not number more than 9,000 men, was in a crescent-shaped position 10 miles in extent, facing a concentrated enemy at least twice its strength. Late in the evening Schilder-Schuldner issued orders for the attack at 5 o'clock on the next morning; the Kostroma Regiment received the order at 2 a. m.

2. The Attack on Plevna on July 20th.

At 4 a. m. Turkish troops advanced from Plevna against the 9th Cossacks and opened fire with artillery. The outposts of the Cossacks were assembled, dismounted, and occupied the edge of a wood on the extreme right. As the Turkish infantry and artillery advanced against this position, a report of the situation was dispatched to General Schilder-Schuldner, who sent two infantry companies and a battery to support the regiment. The shrapnel fire of this battery soon caused the Turks to seek cover. Without further engagement both sides remained facing each other until noon, when the Cossack regiment was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The regiment, which had for the most part dismounted to fight on foot, mounted and moved to the left to interpose itself between the withdrawing infantry and the enemy; a Turkish cavalry detachment advancing in pursuit was driven back. At 6 p. m. the regiment was at Bryslan.

The main body, posted along the road from Nikopolis to Plevna, brought three batteries into action at 4:45 a. m. against two Turkish batteries; soon afterward the brigade deployed on the west of the road in the following order: to the left of the batteries one battalion of the Archangel Regiment, to the right two battalions of the Archangel and two battalions of the Wologda Regiment—all five battalions in two lines of company columns. The rifle company (fifth company of each battalion) was deployed in front as skirmishers; one Wologda battalion with a battery formed the reserve, from which the battery and two companies were soon afterward dispatched to the extreme right to support the Cossacks.

In front of the Russian position was a ravine which opened into the Vid valley at Riben; the further edge of the ravine was covered with bushes and held by hostile riflemen; in rear of the ravine were the heights on which the so-called second Grivitza redoubt and the Bukova redoubts were subsequently built.

At 5:30 a. m. the Russians advanced to the attack all along the line; the Archangel Regiment on the left encountered obstinate resistance and did not make much headway; the Wologda Regiment on the right and the nearest companies of the Archangel Regiment drove the hostile skirmishers back and reached the town itself, where furious street-fighting began. The Turks brought forward reinforcement after reinforcement and the losses of the Russians increased at an alarming rate. The brigade commander

was wounded, the commander of the Wologda Regiment was killed, and the commander of the 5th Artillery Brigade, as the senior officer present, assumed command; the position was held for the present.

Up to 9:30 a. m. General Schilder-Schuldner was without any information of the doings of the Kostroma Regiment; at that time he received a report that the commander of the Kostroma Regiment had been killed, and that the attack of the regiment was not making headway. Receiving reports, from several sides, of the total exhaustion and great losses of the troops, and having no reserves at hand, he ordered the infantry to retire at 11:30 a. m., the 9th Cossack Regiment to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.

Upon the withdrawal of the Archangel and Wologda Regiments, seventeen ammunition carts fell into the hands of the Turks, partly because they were shot to pieces, partly because the teams were killed. The retreating brigade was relieved by the Galitz Regiment (of same division), which was coming up from Nikopolis, and in the evening both bivouacked at Bryslan.

At 5 a. m., after a brief preparation by artillery fire, the Kostroma Regiment advanced to the attack, along the high-road from Plevna to Bulgareni, against the height on which subsequently the first Grivitza redoubt (Abdul Kerim Tabia) was built. The regiment deployed the 2d and 3d battalions in two lines of company columns, the two rifle companies in front as skirmishers, the 1st battalion in reserve; the two sotnias were on the right flank.

Three lines of rifle-trenches were taken by the regiment one after the other, and finally also the intrenchments on the height of the subsequent Abdul Kerim Tabia; the assailants here captured a gun which had been dismounted by the fire of the Russian artillery.

Thrown back to the town, the Turks offered furious resistance from behind hedges and walls. The losses of the Kostroma Regiment increased from minute to minute; the regimental commander, three field officers, most of the other officers, and a large part of the men were dead or wounded. The ammunition of the infantry and the artillery, which had followed the assaulting infantry to within effective infantry fire, began to run short. For these reasons the regiment fell back at 9 a. m., when the Turks were bringing forward fresh reserves to the counter-attack. In order to approach the main body, the retreat was made in a different direction from that of the attack, and the men's packs which had been taken off before the assault, fell into the enemy's hands.

As the action began, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade moved from Tutchenitza to Radischevo.

Since the ground impeded the movements of the cavalry and as the mountain battery attached to the brigade could produce no effect on the hostile position, owing to its small caliber, the brigade moved more to the right to connect with the Kostroma Regiment. At 10 a. m., when the brigade reached Grivitza, the Kostroma Regiment was in retreat, in which the Cossack Brigade joined.

The Turkish pursuit did not extend beyond the original foremost Turkish positions.

3. Losses.

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost 1 general, 51 field and company officers, and 1,878 men; it is to be noted here that in the assault on Nikopolis, a few days before, the Archangel Regiment lost 12 men, the Wologda Regiment 6 officers and 256 men; the loss of the brigade, whose effective strength can hardly have been more than 5,000 men, therefore amounts to almost 2,000 men for the two days of the 15th and 20th of July.

On July 20th the Kostroma Regiment (which suffered no losses at Nikopolis) lost at Plevna 7 officers and 359 men killed, and 15 officers and 534 men wounded.

The losses of the Cossacks and of the artillery are not stated, but they can not have amounted to much.

The Turks claim to have captured a Russian gun on that day; nothing reliable is known about it; it may have been a gun of the 5th Battery of the 31st Brigade, since this battery accompanied the assaulting Kostroma Regiment to within range of infantry fire.

Comments.

1. That the supreme command attached so little importance to the reports which reached Tirnova on the 17th of July about hostile columns approaching the Vid from the west, and that it treated the occupation of Plevna as of inferior importance, are matters which can be commented on

only with a full knowledge of the idea entertained of the whole situation at that time. Why was not a strong body of cavalry, a division, or at least a brigade, dispatched to Plevna in the middle of July during the struggle around Nikopolis? Being an important junction point of roads, 25 miles from Nikopolis and barely 43 from the point of passage at Sistova, Plevna was well worth that much attention.

2. The advance of General Schilder-Schuldner's weak detachment in two widely separated columns against an enemy of unknown strength was imprudent; although, in view of the actual positions of the troops, a separation could not be avoided, an attempt should have been made to unite the two detachments before proceeding to the attack.

The march of the Nikopolis column under General Schilder-Schuldner, when considered by itself, invites unfavorable criticism. Instead of sending his Cossack Regiment forward at once to cover his march, the general led his infantry directly on Plevna, without caring for the whereabouts of his cavalry and without having given it specific instructions. On arrival before the town on the afternoon of the 19th he had no cavalry to reconnoiter the ground in front or to establish communication with the other column; he was unable, on the one hand, to learn anything of matters in and around Plevna, and, on the other hand, he seems to have been uncertain of the whereabouts of the other detachments. The cannonade opened on Plevna appears to have been a cover behind which he hid his painful perplexity, but it had the good effect of informing the other detachments of the whereabouts of the main column.

Some time after the beginning of the cannonade, the 9th Cossack Regiment made its appearance; not only had it not preceded the infantry on the march to Plevna, but it had remained far in rear. On the night of July 18th-19th the bivouac of the Cossack Regiment at Riben was but 10 miles from Plevna, while the bivouac of the infantry on the same night was 22 miles from that place. By proper management the Cossacks would have had plenty of time to thoroughly reconnoiter the vicinity of Plevna before the arrival of the infantry; but at the moment when the infantry arrived and the artillery opened, the Cossacks were still quietly resting at Riben and in the act of cooking. This can be explained in no other way except that the commander of the Cossack Regiment was not properly informed of the contemplated movement; and the fact that this infantry, marching at random toward the enemy, did not suffer a heavy defeat on the 19th, is probably due to the incredible clumsiness of the Turkish troops in offensive movements.

Turning to the march of the other column, we find the infantry provided with two sotnias of Cossacks, which were properly employed in reconnaissance. However, the employment of the Cossack Brigade, which was also attached to this column, can not be considered proper.

The brigade marched 25 miles, from Bulgareni to Tutchenitza, while the infantry column, which marched from Bulgareni to Zgalevitza, covered almost an equal distance. It is true that small patrols were sent out from Tutchenitza, but complete information of the situation was not gained.

According to recent ideas on the employment of advanced bodies of cavalry in the Russian Army, one would expect the Cossack Brigade to move rapidly on Plevna, reach there about noon, make a feint against the town from the south under coöperation of the horse artillery, and endeavor to advance with several sotnias between the town and the river against the bridge over the Vid. Whether Plevna was occupied feebly or not at all, in any event sufficient information would have been gathered without exposing the brigade to great risk.

3. The attack of the two regiments of Archangel and Wologda on the morning of July 20th was made without sufficient reconnoissance of the enemy's position and without any preparation by the fire of skirmishers; the preparation of the attack by artillery did not last more than half an hour. From the very beginning five of the six available battalions were led to the attack against the wholly unknown position of the enemy; the only battalion kept in reserve was very soon called upon to detach two companies to the right to support the Cossacks, so that there was no real reserve at the disposal of the leader for use in emergencies or after clearer knowledge of the situation.

The same may be stated of the attack of the Kostroma Regiment; although one-third of the troops was nominally set aside as reserve, it was almost as soon engaged in the conflict as the two other battalions.

4. The expenditure of ammunition in the six hours of this action seems to have been very great, since almost all

the ammunition-carts were brought up and emptied. The Russian infantry carried 60 rounds in the pouches, and in addition each company was provided with a three-horse ammunition-cart. More than one-half of the ammunition-carts of the 1st Brigade fell into the hands of the Turks.

PART V.

THE BATTLE OF PLEVNA ON JULY 30TH.

1. *Position of the troops on the Evening of July 29th.*

At *Bryslan*, 9th Lancers, 9th Don Cossacks, 2d Don Cossack Battery—10 squadrons and 6 guns.

At *Koioulortsy*, 31st Infantry Division (less the Woronesh (124) Regiment and 1 battery at *Sistova*)—9 battalions and 40 guns.

At *Tristenik*, 5th Infantry Division (less *Kostroma* Regiment, No. 19, and 1 battery at *Nikopolis*)—9 battalions and 40 guns.

At *Karagutch*, 2d Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, with 3 batteries—6 battalions and 24 guns.

At *Poradim*, 1st Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 32d Infantry Division, 6 foot batteries, 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, and 1 horse battery—12 battalions, 8 squadrons, 54 guns.

At *Bogot*, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with the 8th Don Cossacks and the mountain horse battery—12 sotnias and 12 guns.

Total, 36 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 176 guns, among which were 80 nine-pounders, 72 four-pounders, 18 horse, and 6 mountain guns.

The line *Bryslan—Poradim—Bogot* was about 25 miles

long and formed an arc of a circle whose radius was about 12 miles and whose center was at Plevna. The left at Bogot was 12 miles from Lovtcha, which was held by the Turks; the right at Bryslan was the same distance from Nikopolis. The distance from the center of the position at Poradim to the Osma bridge in rear at Bulgareni was also 12 miles.

2. Dispositions for the Battle.

(a) *Right flank cavalry detachment*, under General Loshkareff, to start at 6 a. m. from Bryslan, covered the right flank and observed as far as the Vid.

(b) *Right wing*, under Lieutenant-General Wilhelminoff (31st and 5th Infantry Divisions), to attack the enemy's position north of the highroad—the 5th Infantry Division in reserve.

(c) *Left wing*, under Lieutenant-General Prince Shakofskoi (1st Brigade of the 30th Division and 1st Brigade of the 32d Division), to march at 5 a. m. from Poradim and attack the position between Grivitza and Radischevo.

(d) *Left flank cavalry detachment*, under Major-General Skobelev, to march at 5 a. m. from Bogot, take position on the Lovtcha road and watch the country, particularly in the direction of Lovtcha. The detachment was reinforced from Prince Shakofskoi's command by the 3d Battalion of the Kursk Regiment, No. 125, and 4 guns.

Both cavalry detachments had orders, in case of the enemy's retreat, to cross to the left bank of the Vid and bar the enemy's road to Sophia if possible.

(e) *General reserve*, under personal command of Lieuten-

ant-General Krüdener (2d Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 2 squadrons each of the 11th Dragoons, and 11th Lancers, 1 horse battery; total, 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 30 guns), was posted with the infantry at Poradim and the cavalry at Pelishat.

3. *Deployment for Battle and the Artillery Combat up to*
2:30 p. m.

The *right wing* completed its deployment by 7 a. m. The first line consisting of the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division with 6 battalions and 24 guns, in second line the Kosloff Regiment, No. 123, with 3 battalions and 16 guns.

About 10 o'clock the 5th Infantry Division, consisting of 9 battalions and 24 guns, was posted in third line.

At 8:15 a. m. the first gun was fired by the Turks; the 24 Russian guns in first line directed their fire on the flashes of the enemy's guns, the fog being so dense that the enemy's position could not be seen; all that could be observed in front was a wide ravine densely covered with brush and hostile skirmishers and 2 guns at its further edge.

By 9 a. m. the fog had settled so far that the large Grivitza redoubt became visible, against which the Russian guns, reinforced by the batteries in second line, now directed their fire. The ground did not permit of placing more than 40 guns in battery. The artillery combat thus opened was continued until 2:40 p. m.

The *left wing* occupied the village of Radischevo by 9 a. m. without firing a shot; the 1st Brigade (numbering 5 battalions and 28 guns after reinforcing Skobelev) of the

32d Division deployed on the heights to the east and north of the village; the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division was kept in reserve and posted at first on the road from Pelishat to Radischevo, subsequently nearer to Radischevo.

At 10 a. m. the Turks opened the artillery combat, which was taken up by the Russians and continued until 2:30 p. m.; the infantry meanwhile not firing a shot. In the course of the cannonade two Turkish batteries ceased firing, the redoubt north of Radischevo (Hafiz Bey Tabia) had suffered severely, three Russian guns were rendered unserviceable and the battery had to be relieved from the reserve.

4. Attack of the Russian Right Wing.

At 2:40 p. m. Lieutenant-General Krüdener ordered Lieutenant-General Wilhelminoff to proceed to the attack of the Grivitza redoubt in two columns: one from the north and one from the east. The north column consisted of the Penza Regiment and 2d and 3d Battalions of the Kozloff Regiment; on the east General Wilhelminoff himself with the Tamboff Regiment and 1st Battalion of the Kozloff Regiment; the right column was followed by a reserve of 6 battalions (Archangel and Wologda Regiments), the left by 3 battalions (Galitz Regiment).

The 1st Penza Battalion, which led the *right* column, took the first line of trenches on the near side of the ravine, but was brought to a halt by the murderous fire from a second line just behind it. The 2d Penza Battalion advanced on the left of the first, carried the second line of rifle-trenches, crossed the ravine with the retreating Turks, and

approached the redoubt. The third line of trenches in front of the redoubt was also taken, the assailants ensconced themselves in it, and a part of them rushed for the redoubt. After the commander of the 2d Battalion, who had placed himself at the head of the assailants, was killed on the parapet, the attack was repulsed; the efforts of the rest of the regiment to take the redoubt were equally fruitless. After losing 29 officers and 1,000 men by the murderous infantry fire from the redoubt and flanking rifle-trenches, the Penza Regiment retreated in considerable disorder.

The two Kozloff Battalions of this column then advanced to the attack, penetrated to the redoubt, and a part reached the ditch, where the regimental commander fell pierced by three bullets. The assailants did not succeed in taking the breastwork, but maintained themselves in the ditch, both sides keeping up a murderous fire at short range.

At this time Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner brought up from the right the last reserves of the column consisting of the Archangel and Wologda Regiments; he crossed the ravine and took the trenches on the side from whence up to this time the Kozloff Regiment had received flanking fire; but the attack of these six fresh battalions on the redoubt itself also failed.

The *left* column of four battalions under Lieutenant-General Wilhelminoff, which moved from the east and more in the direction of the highroad, came under such severe fire that the attack was stopped without reaching the redoubt,

the men opening what seemed to be a very ineffective rapid fire.

The Galitz Regiment, which formed the reserve of this column, having also been brought up, the attack was renewed and again repulsed.

At 6 p. m., after the infantry attack had lasted over three hours, the situation of the right wing was as follows: the three battalions of the Penza Regiment, almost destroyed by its losses, seem to have withdrawn from the fighting line altogether; the remnants of fifteen battalions, shot to pieces and badly intermixed, maintained themselves in the space between the redoubt and ravine, partly to the east, partly to the north of the former.

As early as 4 p. m. the whole Koloma Regiment had been drawn from the general reserve to support the left wing. At 6 p. m. one battalion of the Serpuchoff Regiment, with some cavalry and artillery, was dispatched to the extreme right to check the retrograde movement beginning there, leaving but two fresh battalions, two squadrons, and some artillery as general reserve.

Toward sundown General Krüdener ordered a renewed attack, to support which he sent forward three companies of the reserve, followed subsequently by three more companies. Three successive assaults were repulsed; in the last the commander of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division was wounded within 100 paces of the redoubt.

Darkness had meanwhile settled down, but in the vicinity of the redoubt a wild and disorderly conflict was con-

tinued with uninterrupted firing and cheering. Under these circumstances, Krüdener abandoned all hope of a favorable turn of the struggle and gave the order to retreat. The last Serpuchoff Battalion of the reserve, the Galitz Regiment of the left column, which had suffered least, and the Woronesh Regiment, which had just arrived on the field from Sistova, were ordered to cover the retreat. These troops took up the action, under cover of which the wounded were collected by means of the available transportation.

The conflict raged around the redoubt during the whole night; at daybreak the last detachments retreated and it was not until 11 a. m. on July 31st that the troops of the right wing were assembled at Tristenik and Karagatch.

No pursuit took place.

5. *The Attack of the Russian Left Wing.*

At 2:30 p. m. Prince Shakofskoi sent forward the Kursk and Rylsk Regiments (five battalions) on the two redoubts between the highroads to Lovtcha and Bulgareni. In front of the redoubts three and four lines of trenches had been constructed. The trenches were taken after a furious struggle and the Turks thrown back on the redoubts, whereupon the Rylsk Regiment moved on the eastern, the Kursk Regiment on the western redoubt. The eastern redoubt was carried after a brief struggle; two guns fell into the hands of the assailants, the Turks succeeding in removing ten other guns from the fortification in good time.

The assault on the western redoubt presented greater difficulties. On advancing against this redoubt the Kursk

Regiment was taken in left flank by the fire of a battery and skirmishers in action on the edge of the Tutchenitzza ravine, while in front on both sides of the redoubt dense lines of closed infantry appeared to receive the assailants with a murderous fire at a range of 200 to 300 paces. To support the attack, some companies of the Rylsk Regiment advanced at this critical moment from the captured eastern redoubt and the 1st Shuja Battalion from the reserve came up on the left, while the artillery of the left wing, reinforced by fresh batteries from the reserve, advanced at the same time. The attack was successful and the western redoubt was also taken, but the losses were very heavy. The commander of the Rylsk Regiment, although wounded, retained command of his regiment; the commander of the Shuja Regiment, leading his first battalion in person, fell mortally wounded, but ordered the soldiers, who wanted to carry him off, to leave him, and encouraged his men to advance. Matters had reached this stage at 5 p. m.

Prince Shakofskoi received from General Krüdener the information that the Koloma Regiment and a battery from the general reserve had been dispatched in support of the left wing. In fact, however, the regiment did not reach its destination, but became embroiled in the general conflict on the extreme right of the left wing without producing a visible effect on the course of the action.

As the Turks were proceeding to the counter-attack with fresh forces, Shakofskoi, in the hope of using the Koloma Regiment as reserve, brought the 2d and 3d Shuja Battalions

from his own reserve to the support of his right, which left him but three fresh battalions of the Jaroslof Regiment in reserve; two batteries were brought forward from the right of the artillery position and posted to the right of the eastern redoubt. Soon afterward the 1st Jaroslof Battalion was ordered forward to support the left.

With the beginning of darkness the Turks made a new counter-attack, this time with considerable bodies of cavalry on both flanks, endeavoring to turn the Russian position. To support the hard-pressed left, another Jaroslof battalion came forward from the reserve, while a battery advanced boldly into action almost on the flank of the Turkish attack and took it under effective fire.

Shakofskoi decided to retreat, although the Turkish attack was repulsed; ten of his eleven battalions were in action and reduced by severe losses; all the troops were completely exhausted and no reinforcements were at hand or in prospect to oppose the frequently renewed attacks of the Turks. The retreat was begun in good order, the two captured guns having to be left behind; the troops at first took up the position on the heights close in front of Radischevo which they had in the morning, and passed the night there. Next morning they withdrew to Poradim unmolested.

6. Attack of the Left Flank Detachment.

Meanwhile General Skobelev was making his last attack, presently to be described, thereby rendering the position of Shakofskoi's left less difficult.

Under cover of the dense fog, Skobelev had moved from

Bogot unmolested to Krishin, where he halted his main body and advanced in person with two sotnias and four guns to within 650 yards of the edge of the western suburb of Plevna. From this point he observed some 20,000 infantry in close reserve formation between the heights of the Grivitza redoubt and the town, while cavalry was seen in rear toward the Vid.

At 10 a. m. Shakofskoi's guns were heard, and Skobelev ordered his four guns to open fire, which was at once replied to by six Turkish guns. Shortly afterward quite a number of Turkish guns took up the fire, and infantry columns with skirmishers in front and cavalry on the flanks moved to the attack of Skobelev.

Before this overwhelming attack Skobelev withdrew to his main position at Krishin and made the following dispositions:

1. Colonel Tutolmin with three sotnias and twelve horse guns remained on the height of Krishin, fronting toward Lovtcha with strong Cossack posts pushed out beyond.

2. One sotnia was sent to the left toward the Vid in observation, and twenty volunteers under an officer were charged with discovering a ford for use in case the detachment should have to cross to the left bank to move on the enemy's communications. The detachment of volunteers accomplished its object to Skobelev's complete satisfaction.

3. One sotnia was detached to the right, with orders to keep up communication with Shakofskoi, from whose position Skobelev was separated by the steep and rocky

Tutchenitza ravine; throughout the day it reported all that took place on Shakofskoi's side.

Skobelev advanced with four remaining sotnias, the 3d Kursk Battalion, and the four foot guns toward Plevna to reoccupy the position he had held before and from which the Turks might direct an effective fire against the flank of Shakofskoi's troops.

Skobelev at first moved to the attack with one and a half companies, two sotnias, and the four guns, keeping the rest of his detachment in reserve in case he should be attacked from the direction of Lovtcha. This small detachment occupied the commanding height close in front of Plevna and maintained itself there from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. against eight Turkish battalions supported by artillery, which made repeated attacks against the Russian position. By 4 p. m. Skobelev had become convinced that no danger was impending from Lovtcha; and he was informed that Shakofskoi was making a decisive attack. On receipt of this information he left but half a company in reserve and led three companies forward to support his hard-pressed detachment. When within a few paces of the guns the Turks were driven back as far as the edge of the town by a sudden bayonet charge.

Supported by the four guns, the Kursk Battalion withstood for two hours the repeated attacks of the Turks. It was only at dusk that Skobelev ordered the retreat. To cover the withdrawal of the infantry and guns and the removal of the wounded, the Cossacks advanced repeatedly to the at-

tack, mounted and dismounted. Upon the arrival of the detachment at Krishin at 10 p. m. Skobelev received Shakofskoi's order to withdraw to Bogot and Pelishat.

7. *Losses.*

The Russian losses in killed, wounded, and missing are given as 169 officers and 7,136 men.

Some details of the official tables of losses are interesting.

The regiments of the 30th Division lost in killed and wounded:

Jaroslof, No. 117.....	238 men.
Shuja, No. 118.....	114 men.
Koloma, No. 119.....	85 men.
Serpuchoff, No. 120.....	214 men.

Details of the losses of the regiments of the 5th and 31st Divisions (IX. Corps) cannot be ascertained, since the losses at Nikopolis and in the two battles of Plevna are not separately given.

The losses of the two regiments of the XI. Corps on the left of the first line, which captured the two redoubts north of Radischevo, were quite severe.

Kursk Regiment, No. 125 (part of the regiment was in action under Skobelev)....

.....336 men killed.

Rylsk Regiment, No. 126..725 men killed.

8. *The Panic at Sistova.*

The following events, although very slightly connected

with the battle of Plevna, are here stated as forming an interesting contribution to the history of confusion created by a false alarm.

At noon on July 31st the first wounded from the battle-field of Plevna reached Sistova from Bulgareni, saying that the battle was lost and that it was rumored that a transport of wounded while *en route* had been attacked by Turkish cavalry and cut down. The statement created consternation among the inhabitants of Sistova and among the men of new Bulgarian druschinas which were being formed there; a large portion of these men started for the pontoon bridge below the town with the cry, "The Turks are coming!" Here a large number of empty provision-wagons were halting on the Bulgarian bank, their destination being Zimnitsa. A drunken Cossack on an unsaddled horse, preceding the swarm of fugitives, galloped toward the bridge crying, "The Turks are in Sistova!" whereupon a terrible confusion ensued in the train, all the wagons trying to gain the bridge; the swarm of fugitives from Sistova also rushed upon the bridge.

The commander of the bridge (General Richter, of the Engineers), who happened to be on the north bank at the time, ordered the small detachments at his disposal to close the bridge by force of arms if necessary; through his energetic intervention he succeeded in restoring order; meanwhile word came from the commander of Sistova that the report was false and that no Turks were in sight at all. To allay the uneasiness of the inhabitants the Russian detachments stationed in the town had meanwhile taken a defensive position in front of the town.

The bridge being closed, swarms of fugitives crossed the Danube by boat (in which operation several persons were drowned); they soon spread the false alarm in Zimmitza: "The Turks have taken the bridge! The Turks are marching on Zimmitza! The Turks are crossing from the right to the left bank on four steamers!"

The entire population and a large part of the wounded in the hospitals began to fly; after much trouble, Cossack patrols succeeded in bringing the fugitives back to town. The confusion was increased by the fact that at the time of the arrival of the first alarming news a detachment of Turks, captured in former engagements, happened to be conducted through Zimmitza.

Comments.

1. General Krüdener, although nominally commander-in-chief, seems to have occupied himself chiefly with his own (IX.) corps, which formed the right wing, and to have left the conduct of the left wing without reservation to Prince Shakofskoi, commander of the XI. Corps. This fact became evident in the dispositions made by Krüdener for the position and attack of the IX. Corps (although that corps had an acting commander in the person of General Wilhelminof), while he left these details on the other wing to General Shakofskoi. Moreover, Krüdener ordered the right wing (with which he remained exclusively) to attack at 2:40 p. m., *after* Shakofskoi had begun the attack of the left wing at 2:30 p. m. on his own responsibility. In uniform conduct

of the battle by a common superior, General Krüdener is therefore out of the question.

2. A striking point in the disposition is the weakness of the general reserve consisting of one-sixth of the available battalions. The disruption of the unity of the 30th Infantry Division is also surprising; one of its brigades was combined with a brigade of another division to form the left wing, while the other brigade of the former division was held in reserve; the reason may have been a desire of placing under Prince Shakofskoi's orders the only infantry brigade of his corps present (1st of the 32d Division).

The brigades and divisions being posted in lines in rear of each other instead of abreast caused a complete disruption of the larger tactical units in the course of the battle. This was particularly noticeable in the IX. Corps, where it would have been far more appropriate to have formed each of the great wing columns of an entire division.

3. General Krüdener is said to have reconnoitered the enemy's position in person on the day preceding the battle; the same was done by Colonel Biskupski, chief of staff of the XI. Corps, in the portion south of the highroad Bulgareni—Plevna, which was assigned to the left wing as its field of attack. Both reconnaissances seem to have been conducted in a very general way. For several days the Russians had been in comparatively close proximity to the enemy, yet a *thorough* reconnaissance of the enemy's position does not seem to have taken place; sufficient information had not been gained about the details of the terrain in front,

or about the fortifications of the Turks. Had this been done, the dense fog which covered the field during the first hours of the artillery combat, and which was not favorable to the efficacy of the Russian artillery fire, might have been turned to good account by the Russians in masking the advance of strong skirmish lines against the Turkish position. It would have been possible, for instance, to capture the great ravine in front of the Grivitza redoubt without much difficulty and with comparatively small loss, thus securing from the beginning an intermediate position favorable to subsequent attack on the redoubt.

Skobelev's bold and skillful mode of proceeding on the extreme left demonstrates that the fog *could* be taken advantage of for reconnaissance and attack of the enemy's position.

4. Nowhere was the Russian attack ushered in by the fire of skirmishers. After the cannonade, whose effect seems to have been small, the Russian infantry, which up to this time had not fired a shot, moved in dense masses to the attack, which was frontal throughout and unaccompanied by any attempt to turn the enemy's flank.

The chief strength of the Turkish position did not lie in the redoubts which have attracted the most attention, but in the tiers of rifle-trenches in front and flank of the redoubts. In order to capture a position entrenched in this manner it is evidently not so important to penetrate into the redoubts as to carry the trenches on the flanks, in which case the redoubt would be isolated and unable to hold out for any length of time.

But the method of the right wing in its attack is not based on such an idea. The nine battalions in the first line were formed in two columns and moved from north and east against the great redoubt in rear of the village of Grivitza; the entire second line was attached to these two columns from the beginning and moved off with them, so that, properly speaking, all of the eighteen battalions of the right wing were out of hand of the leaders from the very beginning of the attack.

If we examine the details of the action, we find the two columns advancing against the redoubt on a narrow front and under effective flank fire from some rifle-trenches at the side.

Of the right column, five battalions advanced successively on the redoubt; each battalion reached the enemy when the preceding battalion had been used up; each battalion lost a large part of its men under the fire from the rifle-trenches which swept the approaches to the redoubt; of each battalion only fragments got into the ditch of the redoubt, where they maintained a hopeless and desperate struggle, in which a large part of the officers and the bravest of the men found their death; further tactical availability of these five battalions was out of the question.

The six battalions of the Archangel and Wologda Regiments, brought up from the reserve to support the attack, at last turned on the rifle-trenches, the gauntlet of whose murderous fire the preceding assailants of the redoubt had run. These rifle-trenches were taken after a furious struggle, but

now these six battalions were also expended, for it should be borne in mind that these battalions, whose strength at the beginning of July was probably less than 5,000 men, had lost more than 2,000 men and the greater part of their officers in the bloody actions of the 15th and 20th of July. Attempts made by fractions of the battalions to take the redoubt failed and added to the losses, and henceforth these battalions were likewise no longer to be regarded as tactical bodies, but as a disorganized mass of more or less brave men on which the higher leaders could no longer exert any influence, since most of the officers were dead or wounded. The conditions with the left (east) column were similar. Here also the battalions of the second line became early involved in the action; all frontal attacks against the redoubt were repulsed with great loss, *chiefly by the fire from the rifle-trenches*, which, on this part of the field, were not captured at all.

All available troops of the right wing (18 battalions) were expended and out of hand before the Turkish reserves moved to the counter-attack.

On the whole, the attack of the Russian left wing was conducted more correctly, and therefore with more success. The five battalions of the first line made their attack without preparation by fire, but simultaneously on a broad front, and supported by one battalion from the reserve and the fire of several batteries also advancing upon the enemy's position. The battalions of the first line succeeded in capturing both redoubts and the rifle-trenches in front and on the flank,

while five fresh battalions of the second line remained available.

The Turkish counter-attack, effectively supported by artillery and swarms of skirmishers in a flanking position along the Tutehenitza ravine, was repulsed with the aid of three battalions* gradually brought forward from the second line.

At dusk the Turks began the second counter-attack with fresh forces; it was repulsed, it is true, with the assistance of another battalion from the second line, but having a single fresh battalion left to him, and having learned of the complete failure of the attack on the right, Shakofskoi did not wait for the third counter-attack of the Turks, and began a well-ordered retreat, covered by his last fresh battalion.

The course of the action was thus very different on the two wings; on the right Krüdener's eighteen battalions failed to gain possession of the enemy's position, and in this wing the Turks were not obliged to use their reserves at all (in consequence of which almost all of them were sent against Shakofskoi), and in order to cover the retreat of the battalions engaged, the last troops of the senselessly squandered general reserve had to be brought forward. On the left Shakofskoi's first line succeeded almost single-handed in capturing the enemy's position, and the second line was only used to repulse two strong counter-attacks of the Turkish reserves; and at the termination of this furious and costly struggle the troops possessed a certain outward cohesion,

which rendered tactical action and leading possible. It can not be denied that the left wing accomplished much more with far inferior means than the right.

In casting a parting glance at the employment of the "general reserve," we find that shortly after the beginning of the infantry attack it was diverted from its proper purpose by direct orders of General Krüdener and distributed among both wings as a kind of special reserve. At 4 p. m. the Koloma Regiment was detached to the left wing (where it became engaged in the general action without plan or effect), and the Superehoff Regiment was retained in support of the right wing. From the moment of this division the all-too-weak reserve was no longer able to exert a decisive influence on the general conflict; how the Superehoff Regiment was subsequently squandered has been stated above.

Had the right wing gained the same results as the left, compelling the Turks to expend part of their reserves against it, then a general advance about dusk by the reserve, *held in hand until the moment*, either in the center along the great highroad or on either flank, might, and probably would, have produced a decisive result of this bloody day in favor of the Russian arms.

5. It becomes evident from the above description that we can hardly speak of a coöperation of the three arms in the course of the battle. The preparation of the attack was left exclusively to the artillery; the attack of the infantry received little assistance from the artillery on the left, and none

at all on the right; the Russian cavalry took no active part in the conflict of the main bodies.

The *possibility* of coöperation of the three arms in unfavorable terrain is demonstrated by the small left flank detachment under General Skobelev.

The conduct of the action by this general shows a rare combination of prudence and rashness. His personal and thorough reconnaissance of the ground; his careful arrangements for guarding the rear of his detachment, and for maintaining communication with the main army; the bold advance of his small detachment close to the enemy's position, attracting disproportionately large forces of the enemy and rendering the attack of the main army correspondingly easier; his stout defensive action, in which infantry, artillery, and cavalry (both mounted and dismounted) supported one another with great skill; lastly, upon learning of the beginning of the main attack on the part of Shakofskoi's troops, his energetic offensive, for which he employed his heretofore carefully husbanded small infantry reserve, and the skillful and successful retreat under difficult circumstances—are certainly worthy of great consideration and thorough study.

PART VI.

SORTIE BATTLE OF ZGALEVITZA AND PELISHAT
ON THE 31ST OF AUGUST.

*1. Position of the West Army on the Morning of the 31st
of August.*

The right of the army was formed by the 4th Roumanian Division, which was posted between the Vid and the highroad to Nikopolis; the IX. Corps formed the center between the Nikopolis and Bulgareni roads; the IV. Corps formed the left between the Bulgareni and Lovtcha roads.

The IV. Corps was commanded by General Kryloff, in the absence of General Zotoff, who was acting as commander-in-chief of the West Army. The following positions were occupied on the morning of the 31st of August:

The outposts stood on the line Bogot—Tutchenitza—Radischevo—Grivitza (10 miles) and were furnished on the left by 2 squadrons of the 4th Lancers, on the right by 2 squadrons of the 4th Hussars.

The corps was posted as follows: On the left at Pelishat, the regiments Susdal, No. 62, Uglitz, No. 63, 2 squadrons of the 4th Lancers, and probably 4 batteries. About 2,000 yards in front of the position there was a lunette, occupied by 2 companies and 2 guns.

At Zgalevitza on the right there were entrenched 2

Shuja battalions, 2 squadrons of the 4th Hussars, 2 foot batteries, 8th Horse Battery of the IV. Corps, the Galitz Regiment, No. 20, with a battery of the IX. Corps; also a sapper company.

The regiments Jaroslof, No. 117, Koloma, No. 119, Serpuchoff, No. 120, and 2 batteries were in reserve.

The following troops of the IV. Corps were absent:

The 4th Dragoons observed the valley of the Osma at Karahassan;

The Vladimir Regiment, No. 61, was on the way from Zimnitza to join its corps and had reached Karagatch (8 miles west of Bulgareni on the great road);

The Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Shuja battalion, No. 118, and a battery were with the corps of Prince Imeretinski operating against Lovtcha;

The position of the 4th Cossack Regiment and 3 batteries at this time cannot be ascertained.

2. Turkish Attack, 6:30 a. m. until 1 p. m.

At 6:30 a. m. the Russian outposts reported that strong Turkish bodies were marching out of the entrenchments south of the highroad and advancing on Pelishat and Zgalevitza with a thick line of cavalry in front.

General Zotoff was at first inclined to consider the reported movement a feint to screen a serious attack against either the IX. Corps or the Roumanians. No changes in the position of the troops were made for the present.

The 2 squadrons of Lancers at Pelishat, the 2 Hussar squadrons, and the horse battery at Zgalevitza advanced to

the support of the hard-pressed outposts. In view of the strength of the Turkish cavalry, which numbered 2,500 horses, the Lancers gradually fell back on Pelishat, and the Hussar Regiment on Zgalevitza.

At 8 a. m. the Turkish cavalry withdrew to the flank, disclosing a strong line of infantry, which moved to the attack on Pelishat. The lunette was taken after a brief but fierce struggle; its garrison fell back on Pelishat, where it was relieved by 5 companies of the Susdal Regiment. After 3 batteries had cannonaded the Turks for some time, detachments of the Susdal Regiment advanced to the attack and recaptured the lunette.

Toward 9 a. m. the Turks brought up considerable reinforcements; their right extended more and more and turned the left of the Russian position; swarms of Bashi-bozouks* penetrated into Pelishat and set fire to the village. A new attack on the lunette was repulsed; opposite the position of Zgalevitza batteries came into action and a cannonade began on both sides.

At 10 a. m., no reports of any hostile movements having been received from the outposts of the IX. Corps and the Roumanian Division, General Zotoff became convinced that the main attack was against his left wing (IV. Corps), and issued the following orders:

(a) One brigade of the IX. Corps to advance at once on the highroad and attack the enemy's left flank.

(b) The reserves of the IX. Corps—3 regiments of the 30th Infantry Division—to take position north of Poradim

*Guerillas or irregular troops.—A. L. W.

and hold themselves at the disposal of the commander-in-chief.

(c) The Vladimir Regiment, No. 61, which had reached Karagatch, to leave train and knapsacks and to march as quickly as possible to Poradim to join the general reserve.

(d) The 4th Roumanian Division to assemble at once at Calysovat.

Opposite the entire Russian position from Pelishat to Zgalevitza the Turks deployed a long line of infantry about noon; in front of the infantry some 40 or 50 guns fired on the Russian position and were replied to by the Russian batteries.

3. Repulse of the Turkish Attack, 1 to 5 p. m.

Toward 1 p. m. the Turkish infantry advanced to a general attack, which was made in three principal directions: against the position of the lunette, against the left flank, and against the center of the Zgalevitza position.

(a) The attack against Pelishat and the lunette in front was repulsed in front by the fire of 4 batteries; the commander of the IV. Corps, General Kryloff, advanced against the extreme right of the assailing Turks with 4 squadrons of Lancers, 2 squadrons of Hussars, and a horse battery. The Turks retired slowly and threw their right well back when it was threatened by the Russian cavalry.

(b) The attack on the left of the Zgalevitza position struck 1 Galitz battalion, No. 20, and 4 guns. This portion of the position was reinforced from the reserve at Poradim by

2 battalions (Serpuchoff, No. 120) and a battery. The attack of the Turks was repulsed.

(c) The attack directed against the center of the Zgalevitza position was carried out with great energy and reached the Russian rifle-trenches, but was repulsed by the counter-attack of the Russian infantry posted there—2 Galitz battalions, No. 20, and 2 Shuja battalions, No. 118; 24 guns covered the Turks with a murderous fire during their advance as well as during their retreat.

During the great infantry attack the cavalry of the Turkish left attempted to turn the right of the Zgalevitza position; the movement was discovered by the 2 Hussar squadrons posted there, and frustrated without difficulty by artillery fire.

Notwithstanding their previous failure and great loss, the Turks undertook a second attack at 3 p. m., well prepared by artillery and infantry fire. The attack was not made with the same energy as the first, and failed also.

On this occasion the regiments Susdal and Uglitz of the left, and 2 battalions each of the regiments Galitz and Shuja of the right wing, made an attempt to take the offensive, but were checked by a Turkish counter-attack undertaken partly by fresh troops and supported by severe fire of heavy artillery, whereupon the Russian battalions fell back to their original positions. At 4:30 p. m. the Turks began their retreat to Plevna under the cover of a heavy artillery fire.

4. Ineffectual Pursuit.

General Kryloff ordered the ten battalions in first line

and the available 8 squadrons of Lancers and Hussars to pursue, which, however, yielded no result.

The 2 cavalry regiments had been on outpost without interruption for two months; and they had not been able either to feed or unsaddle throughout this day. The Dragoon regiment posted on the Osma did not reach the corps until after the termination of the action.

The infantry pursued for three miles and returned without having effected anything particular. The result might have been better if the brigade which was ordered forward to Grivitza by the highroad had been able to take the Turks in flank. Although directed to advance with the utmost speed in the direction indicated, the brigade did not leave its knapsacks behind, but started with them; this circumstance, in connection with the great heat, so delayed the movement that the brigade was too late to act against the enemy's flank.

5. Losses.

The losses of the Russians were:

Killed.....	3 officers, 171 men;
Wounded.....	27 officers, 708 men;
Missing.....	66 men;
Total.....	30 officers, 945 men.

Comments.

1. The outer line of the Russian line of investment, or, better, their line of observation east of Plevna, began on the left at the road to Lovtcha and described from there an arc

of a circle, with Plevna as a center, to the Vid above Riben. The line had an extent of about 20 miles with a radius of about 6 miles. The position of the Russian reserves at Poradim was 12 miles to the east of Plevna and 6 miles in rear of the center of the Russian front.

It may not be out of place here to cast a glance at the strength of the armies opposing each other at Plevna.

At the beginning of August the "West Army" in front of Plevna consisted of the 4 infantry divisions of the IV. and IX. Corps, which, at the time of the passage of the Danube, may have numbered about 40,000 effectives. Deducting 10,000 men for the losses suffered by these divisions in the actions of July, there remain 30,000 infantry, without counting loss from disease. To these may be added about 10,000 cavalry, artillery, and special troops, and as many Roumanians (4th Division), giving a total of some 50,000 men. Deducting losses from disease during the months of July and August, and taking also into account the absence of several bodies included in the above calculation which were attached to the corps operating against Lovtcha, the maximum available strength did not probably exceed 45,000 men present before Plevna toward the end of August.

In calculating the strength of the Turkish Army it is perhaps best to figure backward from the number of men comprised in the surrender. At that time there were in Plevna some 57,000 men, inclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded; it can be proved that reinforcements to the amount of some 12,000 men entered Plevna during the month

of September, which leaves 45,000 men. Estimating the loss from battle or disease from September to December at 5,000 men (probably much too low), we find that toward the end of August the Turkish army at Plevna numbered at least 50,000 effectives, and was at least equal, and probably superior, to the investing army, which, moreover, was scattered over a line 20 miles long.

2. The failure of the pursuit after the repulse of the Turkish attack renders it proper to ask whether such an attempt was right under the circumstances.

It would probably be so only in case it were the intention to enter the entrenchments of the retreating enemy, or in case it seemed practicable to drive a portion of the enemy from the line of retreat before reaching the shelter of the entrenchments. If neither is the case, pursuit under similar circumstances had better be omitted, as it will invariably result in the retreat of the pursuing troops from the works, thus raising the *moral* of the previously defeated enemy.

PART VII.

CAPTURE OF LOVTCHA ON THE 3D OF SEPTEMBER.

1. Advance on Lovtcha.

Early in August General Skobelev was posted at Kakrina, on the road from Selvi to Lovtcha, with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and a mixed detachment from the IV. Corps (Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Shuja battalion, and 1 battery). A portion of the new reinforcements had by this time reached Selvi, consisting of the 2d Infantry Division, the 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division with its artillery, the 3d Rifle Brigade, and a heavy battery made up of 4 guns captured at Nikopolis.

On the 31st of August Prince Imeretinski, commander-in-chief of the forces at Selvi, received orders to attack Lovtcha.

On the 1st of September Skobelev was accordingly pushed forward from Kakrina to Fontana (about 3,000 yards east of Lovtcha), with orders to occupy the heights dominating the approaches to the position of Lovtcha, to reconnoiter the terrain with a view to artillery positions, and to construct rifle-trenches and gun-emplacements.

The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was to cross the Osma at Iglaw (7 miles below Lovtcha) and to reconnoiter the road to Plevna (by which reinforcements might reach Lovtcha

or by which its garrison might withdraw); 2 sotnias of the 30th Don Cossacks were to observe the roads from Trojan to Selvi. A single poor road was available for the march of the main body from Selvi to Lovtcha (33 miles), so that it was started in echelons—the 2d Brigade of the 2d Division on the afternoon of September 1st, the 2d Brigade of the 3d Division at 11 p. m., the 1st Brigade of the 2d Division at 2 o'clock next morning, and at 4 a. m. (September 2d) the 3d Rifle Brigade.

2. Preparatory Arrangements on the 1st and 2d of September.

General Skobelev reached Fontana at 2 p. m. September 1st, reconnoitered the country, and ordered the 1st Kazan Battalion to occupy the height (a) on the left of the road and the remaining troops of his detachment to take post in rear of that height.

Throughout the night the men were at work constructing rifle-trenches and emplacements for 24 guns, and 1 battery was dragged by the infantry to the steep, rocky height (b) north of the road, where it opened fire at 5 a. m. September 2d, sweeping more particularly the ground in front of the height (a).

During the night of the 2d-3d the infantry dragged 5 batteries to the height (b), so that on both sides of the road 48 guns were in position.

Major-General Dobrovolski, who was to form the right wing of the position with the 3d Rifle Brigade, arrived at Prissiaka (3 miles northeast of Lovtcha) on the evening of

September 2d, and entrenched himself on the height in front during the night and the following morning; a field battery and the heavy battery heretofore mentioned were placed in position at this point early on the morning of September 3d.

For the execution of the general attack contemplated for the 3d, Prince Imeretinski directed that, after proper preparation by artillery fire, the left wing under Skobelev attack the "Red Hill," situated close to Lovtcha and forming the key to the enemy's position; that Dobrovolski, with the right wing, attack the heights on the right bank of the Osma. The 2d Infantry Division and the parts of the 3d Division present were to follow in reserve.

3. Action on the Right Bank of the Osma.

At 5:30 a. m. September 3d the artillery opened along the whole Russian line—with 16 four-pounders, 40 nine-pounders, and the 4 heavy guns. On the left the fire was continued without interruption until 2 p. m. According to Russian accounts, the Turkish artillery, the number of whose guns cannot be ascertained, but which certainly was much inferior to the Russian, offered a most obstinate and successful resistance.

At 6:15 a. m. the Turks opened a brisk infantry fire from the trenches on the heights of the right bank of the Osma against Dobrovolski's rifle battalions in front of Prissiaka. The latter must have been in a faulty position—no other explanation can be given of the loss of 8 officers and 150 men

in the 11th Rifle Battalion before the Russian infantry in this wing had fired a shot.

According to the plan, Dobrovolski was not to advance until Skobeleff's attack on the "Red Hill" had succeeded. In view of the great losses which his troops had suffered, and which seemed likely to increase with further delay, General Dobrovolski at 8 a. m. moved against the opposite heights on the right bank, which were defended by two lines of rifle-trenches—one half way up, the other at the crest. The rifle brigade (reinforced by a combined company of the headquarters guard of the commander-in-chief) captured the heights after an action lasting from 8 to 11 a. m.; the Turkish left wing fell back behind the Osma. The Reval Regiment was brought forward from the reserve to support General Dobrovolski; it turned to the left, where meanwhile the attack on the "Red Hill," the chief point of the hostile position, had been preparing.

After the great Russian battery on both sides of the road had continued its fire against the Turkish position until 2 p. m., the Kazan Regiment advanced, with band playing, to the attack on the "Red Hill," and captured it. Two batteries from the reserve were at once dragged to the top of the hill, whence they opened fire against the line of redoubts on the left bank of the Osma, whose central stronghold was a formidable redoubt. On the right of the Kazan Regiment, north of the road, the regiments of Kaluga and Libau crossed the marshy bottom intervening between the Russian and Turkish positions, and captured the heights north of the

"Red Hill," leaving the whole right bank in the hands of the Russians.

4. Action on the Left Bank of the Osma.

Upon the capture of the "Red Hill" the 1st Kazan Battalion took post there, while the remaining 2 battalions of the regiment crossed the river, penetrated into the town, and captured its farther edge after a brief action.

In addition to the 2 batteries posted on the "Red Hill" itself, 2 more were posted on the highroad farther to the north, so that 32 guns brought their fire to bear on the entrenchments of the left bank. The regiments Pokof, No 11, Estland, No. 8, Reval, No. 7, and the 1st Shuja Battalion crossed the river, so that, inclusive of the 2 Kazan battalions already there, 12 battalions stood in readiness for attack.

Eight battalions of these troops advanced at 5:30 p. m. against the right of the enemy's position, while the Kaluga Regiment, No. 5, together with detachments of the Libau Regiment, No. 6, and the Rifles, crossed the river lower down and attacked the left of the Turkish position. The latter was taken after a furious hand-to-hand conflict; the retreating Turks were pursued by the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which advanced from the right wing across the Osma. Two Turkish battalions were cut off and destroyed by the Cossacks after brave resistance; the fire of the Cossack horse battery which had accompanied the Cossacks made great havoc among the fleeing Turks.

5. Losses.

The losses of the Russians were:

Killed.....6 officers, 313 men.

Missing.... .52 men.

Wounded.....33 officers, 1,112 men.

Total.....39 officers, 1,477 men.

On the part of the Turks neither the number of troops engaged nor the losses can be ascertained. According to Russian accounts, 2,200 Turks were buried within the captured entrenchments, not counting those killed by the Cossacks during the pursuit. It seems very probable, under the circumstances described, that the latter number was very great. The statement of Prince Imeretinski at the conclusion of his report, that 3,000 Turks (the number occurs more than once, and is therefore not a misprint) were cut down in their flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration to be of any value whatever, the more when it is considered that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered more than 1,000 horses.

6. Events on the 4th and 5th of September.

Late on the evening of September 3d reports were received from the headquarters of the IV. Corps that strong bodies of the enemy had marched from Plevna in the direction of Lovtcha; soon afterward patrols reported the appearance of strong hostile detachments.

On the morning of September 4th this column moved on the position of Lovtcha, and tried to gain the Russian left

flank by continued maneuvering to the right. The conflict, however, was limited to a wholly ineffective artillery combat, and toward noon the Turks withdrew in the direction of Mikren (12 miles southwest of Lovtcha).

On the 5th of September Prince Imeretinski left the 2d Brigade of the 3d Division at Lovtcha and marched to rejoin the main body of the West Army, whose left wing he reached in the evening at Bogot (about 12 miles).

Comments.

1. A surprising feature of the order of march of the corps from Selvi to Lovtcha is, that the Rifle Brigade, although intended to form the right of the attack, marched at the rear of the column, and that the troops intended for reserves marched in front. It is also surprising that the unity of the 2d Division was broken up on the march by sandwiching a brigade of the 3d Division between the two brigades of the 2d.

2. As the corps had 76 guns, there must have been present a number of field officers of artillery and certainly *one* (probably *two*) brigade commanders; yet it was not an artillery officer, but *Captain Kuropatkin** of the general staff, who was charged with posting the artillery on the heights on both sides of the highroad.

The same Captain Kuropatkin traced the lines for the rifle-trenches to be constructed on the left, and the execu-

*In view of the fact that Kuropatkin, though only a captain, was Skobelev's chief of staff, the author's comments seem somewhat severe. Kuropatkin afterwards became a lieutenant-general and Governor of the Trans-Caspian Provinces. He is a soldier of distinguished ability, and is regarded by many as Skobelev's natural successor.—A. L. W.

tion of these pioneer works, including the construction of emplacements for 48 guns, was directed by an infantry lieutenant of the Kazan regiment. On the right of General Dobrovolski's position the construction of rifle-trenches and gun-emplacements was superintended by an ensign of the sapper battalion of the Guard, who, with his small detachment of sappers, belonged to the combined Guard company which formed the commander-in-chief's headquarter guard. This corps, therefore, although consisting of 26 battalions, seems to have been practically without special troops.

3. The attack on the Turkish position of Lovtcha was purely frontal, and its preparation and inception was left to the artillery, which, to be sure, was very much superior to that of the enemy. Not a musket seems to have been discharged on the Russian left, before the infantry advanced to the decisive attack on the "Red Hill," in doing which it had to traverse a distance of not less than 1,000 yards from its sheltered position to that of the enemy.

4. It would appear from our description that the unsuitable position of the rifle brigade on the right made it almost helpless against the enemy's infantry entrenched on the right bank of the Osma. Instead of opposing the troublesome and destructive infantry fire of the Turks with musketry, the Russian right wing was unable to help itself except by an attack, which was contrary to the programme and insufficiently prepared, but which succeeded through the bravery of the troops and their superior numbers.

5. The vigorous advance of the Cossack Brigade

against the defeated enemy's line of retreat resulted in considerable loss for the latter. The question seems not inappropriate here, whether, in view of the great and undoubted numerical superiority of the Russians in this action, a turning movement below the position by a strong infantry detachment, say a brigade, might not have been decisive and entailed less loss? It appears from the description that the Osma could be crossed with little trouble and without using the bridge.

6. The headquarters of the IV. Corps, which formed the left of the Russian army before Plevna, discovered in the course of the afternoon that a strong Turkish column was marching from Plevna against Lovtcha, where it was known that Prince Imeretinski was engaged in battle. A report was accordingly sent to him. It does not appear, however, that the IV. Corps made any movement of troops in indirect support of the corps engaged at Lovtcha. An advance of the cavalry and horse artillery posted on the Russian left against the flank of the hostile column would certainly have seriously delayed or stopped that movement.

7. The constant maneuvering to the right by the Turkish column which appeared before Lovtcha on the morning of September 4th is explained by the Russians as an attempt, threatened but not carried out, of turning their left. The movement is, however, susceptible of a different explanation. The Turkish column from Plevna (whose approximate strength is not known) reached the vicinity of Lovtcha at a time when the garrison of that place was in full flight, proba-

bly toward Mikren, in the opposite direction, on account of the turning movement of the Cossacks in the north. Under the circumstances, it is not improbable that the Turkish column had good reason to consider the direct road to Plevna, leading as it would past the left of the Russian main position, too dangerous for its retreat, and therefore executed a sort of flank march past the Russian position under the cover of a rather harmless cannonade, with a view of gaining the road to the upper Vid by way of Mikren. Nor should it be overlooked that the movement was best calculated to cover the road to the Tetewen and Jablonitza passes, which were now endangered by the capture of Lovtcha by the Russians

PART VIII.

ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PLEVNA. FROM SEPTEMBER 7TH TO 11TH.

1. Dispositions for the Night of September 6th-7th.

At 6 p. m. on the 6th the troops left their encampments and took up the following position against the south front of the Turkish entrenchments:

(a) General Krüdener with the IX. Corps between the Bulgareni and the Pelishat roads, where emplacements were constructed for the artillery and trenches for the infantry. Three infantry regiments and the 6 batteries were placed in first line; 3 infantry regiments with 4 batteries formed the corps reserve; 1 regiment and 1 battery formed part of the main reserve; 1 regiment with 1 battery was at Nikopolis.

In addition 20 siege guns in 2 batteries were established in the front line of the corps.

(b) General Kryloff with the IV. Corps was on the left of the IX. on the so-called "heights of Radischevo," and here also emplacements and trenches were constructed. The corps had 3 regiments of the 16th Division and 5 batteries in first line; the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division with 4 batteries formed the corps reserve; the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division with 2 batteries were assigned to the main reserve; 1 regiment (Kazan) and 1 battery were as yet with Prince Imeretinski.

(c) General Prince Imeretinski with his detachment of the 2d Infantry Division and its artillery, the 3d Rifle Brigade, 3 batteries of the 3d Artillery Brigade, and 4 siege guns was posted at Tutchenitza, in rear of the left of the IV. Corps. The detachments from the IV. Corps rejoined their own corps.

(d) The 4th Roumanian Division was posted north of the highroad, abreast of the IX. Corps. Three regiments of irregular Roumanian cavalry guarded the space between the right of the division and the Vid.

(e) General Loshkareff with the 8th and 9th Dragoons, the 9th Lancers, and the 9th Cossacks-with 2 horse batteries was posted on the highroad in rear of the Roumanians and the IX. Corps.

(f) General Leontieff with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division and a horse battery covered the left of the IV. Corps and maintained communication with the 2 Cossack brigades of the Don and Caucasus which were observing the Lovtcha road.

(g) The general reserve consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division, the Galitz Regiment, No. 20, of the 5th Division, 3 batteries, the Hussar regiments Mariopul, No. 4, and Kieff, No. 9, and a horse battery. It was posted west of Pelishat at the junction of the Grivitza—Tutchenitza and Pelishat—Plevna roads.

(h) Three sotnias of the 34th Don Cossacks formed the headquarters guard of the commander of the West Army, who took post with the main reserve.

(i) Packs were left behind in the camps; each man carried two pounds of cooked meat and four pounds of hard bread. Each regiment formed a detachment of convalescents to guard the packs and train.

(k) The light baggage followed the troops. The flying park of the IX. Corps at Zgalevitza, of the IV. Corps between Tutchenitza and Bogot. Reserve park of the IX. Corps at Bulgareni, of the IV. Corps at Leshan. Baggage of the IX. Corps in rear of Karagatch, of the IV. Corps in rear of Poradim.

(l) The dressing station of the IX. Corps at the "Three Wells," 2 miles in rear of the IV. Corps on the Tutchenitza brook. As many country carts as possible were collected at the dressing stations.

2. Erection of Batteries during the Night of September 6th-7th.

Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the whole movement was carried out with rapidity, order, and silence, the leaders having previously familiarized themselves with the positions to be taken and roads to be followed. The troops carried gabions, fascines, and entrenching tools, and constructed emplacements for field and siege guns 2,000 to 2,500 yards from the enemy's works.

One company of the 3d Sapper Battalion was assigned to each corps, and a detachment of 40 sappers to the Roumanian Division; 2 sapper companies were charged with the establishment of the siege artillery—one for 12, the other for 8 twenty-four-pounders. Four infantry battalions furnished the working parties and 4 other infantry battalions brought up gabions, fascines, and other material.

The entrenching tools had been issued to the troops from the field engineer park.

The earthworks were completed by 6 a. m. and armed with the nine-pounder field batteries and the 20 siege guns. In each of the 2 great batteries an observatory 95 feet high was constructed of ladders.

3. The 7th of September.

At 6 a. m. the battery of 12 siege guns fired a salvo as a signal, whereupon all the batteries—numbering altogether 20 twenty-four-pounders and 88 nine-pounders—opened fire, which was briskly answered by the Turks.

The Russian infantry lines, posted under cover, were in complete readiness for battle. Wherever water was near, the infantry cooked a meal at noon.

The cannonade was continued throughout the day.

4. Dispositions for September 8th.

In the course of the night the artillery was moved closer to the enemy's works and brought into action some four-pounder batteries, which heretofore had not taken part on account of the long range.

The 3d Roumanian Division crossed the Vid at Riben at daybreak, closed up on the right of the 4th Division, and brought its artillery into action.

The Roumanian Reserve Division moved to Verbitza and formed the special reserve of the Roumanians.

General Loshkareff with his 4 Russian cavalry regiments, reinforced by 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments,

crossed to the left bank of the Vid at Riben and moved to Lower Dubnik on the Sophia road; his task was to cut the enemy's communications and to fall upon him in case of his retreat from Plevna.

General Prince Imeretinski moved during the night from Tutchenitza to the Lovtcha road to gain the wooded ridge south of Plevna.

5. The Artillery Combat on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September.

The dispositions for the 8th of September were carried out with precision; the batteries were advanced during the night to within 1,600 yards of the enemy's works; in addition to those previously engaged, 5 Russian and 5 Roumanian batteries took part; the fire was chiefly directed against the Grivitza redoubt and the Radischevo redoubt. At first the Turks answered briskly, but toward 2 p. m. their fire diminished, and ceased toward evening altogether.

In order to disturb the Turks in repairing their works, the Russian artillery maintained a slow fire throughout the night.

Eight of the siege guns which on the 8th had confined their fire to the Grivitza redoubt, were shifted during the night to the position of the IV. Corps to bring their fire to bear on the middle group of redoubts.

The cannonade was maintained along the whole front on the 9th. The artillery conflict of the past few days had cost the Russians about 300 men.

On the 10th of September the bombardment of the Turkish position was at first continued as heretofore, but it soon

became evident that it could not continue much longer for lack of ammunition. Prompt replenishment could not be hoped for, as the fine weather suddenly changed on the evening of the 10th, and the ensuing rain quickly rendered all roads impracticable.

The uninterrupted fire of several days had also damaged several carriages of the siege guns and quite a number of those of the field guns.

Under these circumstances it seemed unwise to continue the artillery combat, and the assault, which was to be prepared by the cannonade, had to be abandoned or made at once. The latter alternative was decided upon.

6. *Preparatory Actions of the Left Wing on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September.*

During the artillery combat on the 8th of September, Prince Imeretinski moved his corps from Tutchenitza to the Lovtcha road and took position on both sides of the road. General Skobelev commanded the advance guard—consisting of the regiments Kaluga, No. 5, and Estland, No. 8, 2 rifle battalions, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, 4 batteries, and the 4 heavy guns. He occupied Brestovetz with the 3d Estland Battalion, placed 2 nine-pounder batteries and the 4 heavy guns in action on the height in rear of the town, and opened fire on the Krishin redoubt.

After the artillery fire had been continued until 3 p. m., the Kaluga Regiment was ordered to take the so-called "second knoll" of the "Green Hills." The regiment advanced to

the attack with 2 battalions in first line, the 3d Battalion following as reserve with a distance of 500 yards; 9 companies of the Estland Regiment were told off as the general reserve of this attack, and 6 companies occupied Brestovetz. The Kaluga Regiment captured the "second knoll"; carried on by its ardor, it continued the attack, took the "third knoll," and penetrated to the rifle-trenches between that knoll and the Krishin redoubt; here the regiment was assailed by Turkish reserves and driven back to the "second knoll," where it was supported by the previously mentioned 9 Estland companies. The pursuing enemy was then himself driven back. The 3 sotnias attached to the advanced guard had taken an active and skillful part in the infantry action, and proved very useful in seeking out and removing the wounded.

The Russian losses in the action amounted to 900 men, 700 of which fell on the Kaluga Regiment.

For the present the "second knoll" was held by the Russians; but when informed during the night that the general assault which he expected for the following day would not take place until some later day, General Skobelev considered his advanced position as too risky and withdrew his right from the captured "second knoll" to the "first knoll," which was strengthened by a double line of rifle-trenches. An attack on the "first knoll," attempted by several Turkish battalions at 5 a. m., was repulsed chiefly by the fire of the artillery. At 8 a. m. the attack was renewed with increased numbers; this time the Turks penetrated to within 60 paces of the rifle-trenches, but were again repulsed.

Anticipating a renewal of the attack,—which, however, did not take place,—Skobelev remained in his position with the Estland and Libau Regiments (the latter from the reserve having relieved the Kaluga Regiment) and 3 rifle battalions. His right was on the “first knoll,” his center was formed by the village of Brestovetz and the height in rear with 28 guns, his left by a series of rifle-trenches to the west of the village of Brestovetz. In rear of the position stood Prince Imeretinski with the Kaluga and Reval Regiments, a rifle battalion, and 3 four-pounder and 1 nine-pounder batteries as general reserve.

In the course of the night of the 9th-10th, Prince Imeretinski received orders from General Zotoff, chief of staff of the West Army, to gain possession of the “third knoll” of the “Green Hills” next morning. He was reinforced for that purpose by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division (of the IV. Corps), which crossed the Tutchenitza ravine at daybreak and took post on the right of the corps.

Prince Imeretinski entrusted General Skobelev with the direction of the attack and placed at his disposal the 2d Brigade of the 2d Division, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, and 4 nine-pounder batteries. As additional support the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division was placed in readiness; the remaining troops of the corps—1st Brigade of the 2d Division, 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, 3 four-pounder batteries—were posted in rear of Brestovetz as general reserve under General Dobrovolski. At daybreak (September 10th) the Estland Regiment captured the “second knoll” almost

without resistance, and Skobeleff had it fortified at once; in the construction of the rifle-trenches the lack of entrenching tools was sensibly felt and part of the men used the lids of their cooking-pots and their bare hands. To ensure the best possible field of fire to the front, the vines in the vineyards were pulled up.

Skobeleff had the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division brought up at once, and took post with the troops under his command on the "second knoll" between the road and the Tutchenitza ravine; 16 nine-pounders were placed in battery in the center; the Susdal Regiment was posted in rear on the "first knoll" as reserve.

Not deeming it advisable to attempt the capture of the "third knoll," Skobeleff postponed it till the general attack ordered for the morrow.

To support the contemplated attack 2 companies of the Susdal Regiment escorted 12 nine-pounders and the 4 siege guns to the east side of the Tutchenitza ravine, where they were so posted as to sweep the slopes of the "third knoll" as well as the "third knoll" itself with their fire.

Comments.

1. The fact that the carriages of all the Russian guns were damaged by the fire of several days' duration was also met with in the siege of Kars. There it was attributed to the excessive elevation given to the guns on account of the great range.

2. The number of technical troops employed before

Plevna was altogether insufficient; there was but 1 sapper battalion with 5 infantry divisions, not counting the Roumanians. But 35 sappers were at the disposal of Prince Imeretinski's corps, consisting of 2 infantry divisions; moreover, no entrenching tools were issued to that corps, while the IV. and IX. Corps, as well as the Roumanians, received at least a few hundred tools each from the field engineer park.

PART IX.

THE ASSAULT ON PLEVNA ON THE 11TH AND 12TH
OF SEPTEMBER.*1. Dispositions for the Assault.*

The hour for the assault was selected at 3 p. m. of September 11th, instead of at daybreak, for two reasons: first, to spare the troops a half-day of battle; second, to allow the artillery to use the forenoon in preparing the assault by its fire. In order to keep the Turks as much as possible in the dark as to the time of the assault, to exhaust their attention, and to keep up their suspense, it was ordered that the artillery should open the heaviest possible fire at daybreak, pause all along the line at 9 a. m., to resume its fire at 11, and again suspend suddenly and simultaneously at 1 o'clock. The fire was to be resumed at 2:30 p. m. and continued until further orders; those batteries alone whose fire should be masked by Russian troops, suspending their fire for the time.

The attack was to be directed on three points: the Grivitza works, the Radischevo works, and against the Krishin works.

The Grivitza redoubt was to be attacked from the northeast by the Roumanians, and on the south by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division with 2 four-pounder batteries.

Against the Central redoubt the 1st Brigade of the

30th Division and the 2d Brigade of the 16th Division were told off.

The Krishin redoubt was to be attacked by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, the 3d Rifle Brigade, the entire 2d Division, and 9 batteries.

The 1st Brigade of the 31st Division was charged with the protection of the entire line of the artillery from Grivitza to Radischevo; the 2d Brigade of the same division and 2 batteries formed the special reserve for the 1st Brigade, and was posted on the right edge of the Radischevo ravine.

The main reserve was posted in rear of the center, and consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division and 1 regiment of the 2d Brigade of the 5th Division, 3 batteries, and the 4th Hussars with a horse battery.

The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, with the 2 Cossack brigades and 2 horse batteries, all under command of General Leontieff, had orders to cross the Vid if possible and gain the Sophia road, as well as to establish communication with Loshkareff's cavalry.

The 9th Hussars were posted on the Bulgareni road between the IX. Corps and the Roumanians.

A brigade of Roumanian cavalry covered the right of the Roumanians as far as the Vid.

General Loshkareff, who already had 4 Russian and 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments on the left bank of the Vid in the vicinity of Lower Dubnik, sought to establish communication with Leontieff's cavalry.

The rain, which began to fall on the evening of the 10th, continued without interruption until September 12th.

On the early morning of the 11th of September a dense fog covered the entire field; the ground was thoroughly soaked, and everywhere men and horses moved with difficulty. Still any further postponement of the assault was not advisable.

2. Attack of the Right Wing on the Grivitza Works.

The double attack on the Grivitza redoubt—from the north by the Roumanians, from the south by the Russians—was carried out without any tactical combination whatever; the final meeting of the Russians and Roumanians in the captured redoubt appears in the descriptions of both parties more like an accidental meeting than the result of a bloody struggle carried out according to a common plan.

According to Roumanian accounts, parts of the 3d and 4th Divisions advanced to the attack from the north at 3 p. m. as ordered, and were three times repulsed. At 6 p. m. there was a lull in the fight, and at 7:30 p. m. the 2d Rifle Battalion and the 16th Dorobanzenes (militia) Regiment renewed the attack and captured the redoubt, assisted by the Russian Archangel Regiment. The losses of the Roumanians—56 officers and 2,500 men dead and wounded—give clear proof of the bravery and contempt of death with which that young army had here undergone its baptism of fire; the tactical decision of the attack, however, was probably brought about by the advance of the Russian brigade from the south.

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division under Major-General Rodionof, the Archangel Regiment, the Wologda Regiment, and 2 batteries crossed the Grivitza brook, passed through the village, and formed for attack to the west of the latter. Both batteries were in the center, on the right the Archangel Regiment, on the left the Wologda Regiment. Each regiment deployed a rifle company as skirmishers in front and formed the three battalions in rear in three lines, the first two in company columns, the rear one in battalion column.

Immediately upon crossing the brook the brigade received severe artillery fire from the works on the left bank of the Grivitza brook, slightly to the left of the direction of attack; a caisson of the 6th Battery was blown up.

The brigade now advanced to the attack: the Archangel Regiment straight on the redoubt; the Wologda Regiment, advancing slightly its left shoulder, past the redoubt and against an entrenched camp 500 yards farther in rear and connected with the redoubt by trenches.

Twice during the advance General Rodionof halted the troops in sheltered depressions to restore order in the battalions. On approaching the redoubt the interval between the regiments, through which the two batteries had kept firing, was closed. The Archangel Regiment threw itself on the redoubt from the front, passed the deep, steep ditch, and climbed the breastwork, which was 10 feet high and slippery from the rain. At the same time a portion of the Wologda Regiment, which had overlapped the redoubt on the

left, entered the work from the gorge; the rest of the regiment advanced past the redoubt against the camp, engaged the troops posted there, and prevented them from coming to the support of the garrison of the redoubt, which was cut down after a furious resistance. From the north, Roumanian troops—particularly the 2d Rifle Battalion—also penetrated into the redoubt. Five guns were captured. The Colonel of the Archangel Regiment and the commander of the Roumanian brigade were killed near the works.

At 7:30 the Russian brigade was assembled at the redoubt. Colonel Rykatschef relinquished his attack on the west camp, assumed command in place of General Rodionof, who had been wounded, re-formed the disordered battalions, and posted them partly in the redoubt, partly in the adjoining trenches. During the night the Turks make three attacks to recover the redoubt, but were repulsed by fire and bayonet.

The loss of the brigade was 22 officers and 1,300 men killed and wounded.

A sapper company, an improvised sapper company formed of men of both regiments, and on the extreme right, as outer flank guard, the 6th Sotnia of the 34th Don Cossacks had a part in the action.

3. The Attack of the Center on the Radischewo Works.

The troops in the center, between the Bulgareni and Lovtcha roads, may be divided into four groups according to their tasks:

(a) To attack the Radischevo works: the regiments Uglitz, No. 63, Kazan, No. 64, Jaroslaf, No. 117, Shuja, No. 118, all under the command of Major-General Schnitnikoff, commander of the 30th Division;

(b) To protect the batteries: the regiments Penza, No. 121, and Tamboff, No. 122;

(c) Special reserve of the center: the regiments Kosloff, No. 123, and Woronesh, No. 124;

(d) Main reserve: the regiments Galitz, No. 20, Koloma, No. 119, Serpuchoff, No. 120. An unfortunate accident disarranged the combination from the beginning. The dense fog, brisk infantry fire on the extreme left (Skobelev), and an insignificant movement in the Turkish trenches caused one battalion of the Uglitz Regiment to attack prematurely at 11 a. m., drawing after it the rest of the regiment and also the Jaroslaf Regiment. After a severe action, the two regiments captured the rifle-trenches of the enemy in front of the redoubt, but were compelled to retire on the arrival of Turkish reinforcements, after losing half of their men and nearly all their officers.

Though deprived by this accident of half of his troops, General Schnitnikoff deemed it advisable to adhere to the original disposition and advanced at the appointed time with the Kazan and Shuja Regiments. On the march he met the retreating Uglitz and Jaroslaf Battalions, which carried disorder into his ranks. It was in vain that the Kosloff and Woronesh Regiments and the Galitz Regiment of the main reserve were brought forward in support of the attack.

The attack was finally repulsed with enormous loss: the 7 regiments engaged lost altogether 110 officers and 5,200 men killed and wounded; the greater part of the losses falling on the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments.

4. Attack by the Left Wing on the Krishin Works.

The task set General Skobelev was to capture the so-called "third knoll" of the "Green Hills" and the line of redoubts in rear of Krishin, which formed the direct protection of the camp of the Turkish reserves.

To enable him to accomplish his task, the following troops were placed at his disposal: the regiments Vladimir, No. 61, Susdal, No. 62, Reval, No. 7, the 3d Rifle Brigade, 3 nine-pounder batteries, 1 four-pounder battery, and 4 siege guns.

Skobelev resolved on the immediate capture of the "third knoll" and to attack the redoubts in rear simultaneously with the general attack at 3 p. m.

After the 16 guns, posted previously at the east of the Tutschenitza ravine, had taken the northern slopes of the "Green Hills" for some time under fire, Skobelev, at 10 a. m., advanced and occupied the "third knoll" with the following troops: in the center 2 Vladimir battalions in two lines of company columns, on their right the 10th Rifle Battalion, on the left 3 Estland companies, in rear as special reserve the 3d Vladimir Battalion and 3 batteries. The "third knoll" was deserted by the enemy, but he was annoyed by fire from Turkish infantry in the trenches between this knoll and the redoubts.

The 3d Vladimir Battalion having been brought to the front to reinforce the fighting line, its place as special reserve was taken by the Susdal Regiment, formed in battalion columns in rear of the fighting line under the best cover obtainable. About 2 p. m. strong lines of Turkish skirmishers advanced up the slopes of the "Green Hills" against the troops on the top; the fire of the Turkish infantry increased more and more in strength and inflicted sensible losses not only on the troops in the firing line, but also on the first echelon of the reserves posted 1,000 yards in rear.

In view of these circumstances and of the fact that the general attack was soon to begin, General Skobelev ordered the Susdal Regiment to drive back the Turkish skirmish lines. This was done; the Turks did not withstand the attack and fell back on their redoubts; from there and from the adjoining rifle-trenches they maintained a brisk and galling fire against the Russian troops.

About 2:30 p. m. Skobelev's troops had approximately the following position: on the "third knoll" in the firing line next the enemy the Vladimir and Susdal Regiments and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions; in the depression between the "third" and "second knoll" the Reval Regiment; in the entrenched position on the "second knoll" 2 Kaluga and 2 Estland battalions with 3 batteries; in the depression between the "first" and "second knoll" the Libau Regiment and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions; 1 Kaluga battalion held the village of Brestovetz.

At 2:30 p. m. the batteries on the "second knoll" opened over the heads of the troops on the "third knoll."

At 3 p. m. Skobelev gave the order to attack: the troops in first line descended from the "third knoll," crossed the deep depression between the knoll and the height beyond, and began to ascend the steep height on whose crest lay the three strong redoubts, the western one of which was known as the "redoubt of Krishin." The redoubts were connected by trenches and on the slopes in front were a series of rifle-trenches.

The attack, which was directed at first against the eastern and middle redoubt, was received by a murderous musketry fire from the rifle-trenches and redoubts, and also by artillery fire from the redoubts. The attack of the IV. Corps on the entrenchments north of Radischevo having meanwhile failed, the artillery of the western portion of these fortifications then directed its fire across the Tutchenitza ravine against the troops of Skobelev, which were attacking the Turkish right.

The efficacy of this severe fire and the ensuing losses brought the attack to a stop; part of the attacking troops halted in the depression, and those which had begun to ascend the further slope tried to find cover, and opened a rather ineffective fire against the well-covered adversary.

Skobelev now ordered the Reval Regiment to advance to the support of the troops engaged, and the Libau Regiment and 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, posted as reserves between the "first" and "second knoll," to take the place of

the Reval Regiment in the depression between the "second" and "third knoll."

The Reval Regiment advanced with firm order, crossed the brook, ascended the bare slope beyond, and carried forward with it parts of the troops engaged there, but the attack of this regiment was also stopped half way up, and the remnants of the Vladimir and Susdal Regiments and 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions began to fall back—singly at first, then in crowds.

Skobelev now had to decide whether to throw in his last reserves for a decisive attack, or, in view of the failure of the attack of the IV. Corps, to order the retreat of the troops engaged, under cover of part of his reserves.

He decided for the former: the Libau Regiment (leaving 3 companies in rear) and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions were ordered forward, and were joined by those remnants of the Vladimir, Susdal, and Reval Regiments and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions which were still in the firing line; the whole line advanced with a cheer in the direction of the middle redoubt and captured the rifle-trenches in front, the Turks withdrawing within the line of redoubts.

Encouraged by their first success, the Russian battalions continued the attack with great determination, though in disordered crowds; the nearer they approached the enemy's position, the less effective became the enemy's fire; the Turkish line wavered and the foremost Russian detachments penetrated into the trenches between the eastern and middle redoubts. At 4:25 p. m. the middle redoubt was in the hands

of the assailants, who seized almost the entire line of trench up to the eastern redoubt. One gun was abandoned in the redoubt.

Several thousand men of various organizations soon filled the interior of the captured redoubt and trenches; those arriving later found no shelter from the fire from the other positions of the Turks; the captured middle redoubt was, moreover, open to the rear and its interior exposed to the fire from the western (Krishin) redoubt, which was making great havoc among the Russians crowded together in the interior. At the same time strong Turkish reserves advanced to the counter-attack from the entrenched camp in rear of the line of redoubts, partly against the left, partly against the front of the Russians.

Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff gathered some 300 men from those inside the redoubt, and, moving 200 paces to the left, led them against the enemy; this nucleus was joined by other crowds of assailants arriving at this time, and about 5:15 p. m. the counter-attack against the Russian left was repulsed, though not without great loss.

At 5:30 p. m., when the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, the Russians began to entrench the captured position on the side toward the enemy; the almost total absence of entrenching tools was painfully felt.

The rapid retreat of the Turks who had advanced from the Krishin redoubt against the Russian left had been influenced to a certain extent by the appearance of General Leontieff's cavalry in the vicinity; a horse battery opened



fire on the redoubt and a detachment of dismounted Cossacks occupied the village of Krishin, thereby making the Turks uneasy for their own right flank and preventing an energetic execution of the counter-attack against the Russian left.

Meanwhile a brisk fire was maintained from the east-ern against the captured middle redoubt, and part of the connecting trench was still in the hands of the Turks. An officer collected a detachment of about 100 volunteers to drive them out, seized the trench, and, carried away by success, advanced against the east redoubt, where most of the men fell under the murderous fire of the Turks.

Meanwhile Colonel Shestakoff of the general staff, acting under orders from Prince Imeretinski, was busy in rear of the front collecting the scattered men and forming them into detachments. Thanks to his efforts, the following detachments formed of scattered men arrived in line of battle at 5 p. m., in addition of the 3 Libau companies which had been held back at first: 2 Susdal companies, $\frac{1}{2}$ Reval company, $2\frac{1}{2}$ Vladimir companies, and 1 company of the 12th Rifle Battalion. The detachments belonging to the Vladimir and Reval Regiments and 12th Rifle Battalion reinforced the defenders of the middle redoubt, over which Major-General Dobrovolski, commander of the rifle brigade, and, after he was mortally wounded, Major-General Tebjanik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, assumed command.

The 5 Libau and Susdal companies were led forward against the east redoubt, supported by mixed detachments

from the middle redoubt; at 5:30 p. m. the east redoubt fell into the hands of the Russians; Lieutenant-Colonel Moszewoi, of the Susdal Regiment, assumed command there.

With the approach of darkness the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, but never died out completely throughout the night.

5. The Night of September 11th-12th.

As darkness settled down, the troops of the Russian left wing occupied about the following positions:

Fractions of the Vladimir, Susdal, Reval, and Libau Regiments and of the 4 rifle battalions held the two captured redoubts and the trenches between them; opposite their front was the entrenched camp of the Turks between the town and river; on their left the Krishin redoubt was still in the hands of the Turks; on their right, beyond the Tutchenitza ravine, were the western works of the Radischevo entrenchments.

In the rear of the line of battle the "third knoll" was not occupied; on the "second knoll" 2 Estland battalions and 2 very weak Kaluga battalions covered the great artillery position of 24 guns; 1 Kaluga battalion held the village of Brestovetz.

To guard the intermediate space of almost 2,000 yards between the captured redoubts and the artillery position on the "second knoll," General Skobelev personally took position at dark with 2 weak battalions in the middle of this space at the northern foot of the "third knoll" and deployed

2 companies to cover his right and left, one fronting east, the other west; the remaining 3 companies halted with Skobelev and faced north.

Scattered men, singly and in groups, moved about everywhere—some of them returning from the redoubts, where they could no longer find cover, and some coming from the rear and endeavoring to find their organizations in the line of battle. Skobelev had as many of them as possible collected by members of his staff and formed into a battalion, without regard to the organizations to which they belonged. After some hours, the battalion had reached a strength of more than 1,000 men, when a new subdivision was made, the men of the several regiments and of the rifle brigade being each formed into a separate company.

The 2 companies mentioned had hardly deployed on the flanks when Turkish detachments advanced on the left from the direction of Krishin, but were repulsed by the company deployed on that flank.

Soon afterward volleys were fired against the Russian position from the right and the bullets fell near the reserves. The darkness prevented the firing troops from being recognized, but patrols reported them to be Russians. Deeming it possible that detachments of the IV. Corps may have crossed the Tutchinitza ravine to make a night attack, Skobelev forbade his men to fire. Patrols were again sent out and made a positive report that the firing troops were Turks some hundred paces in front of the Russian skirmish line.

Fire was opened on both sides, but, on account of the darkness, nothing but the flash of the guns could be seen.

To get his main body out of the line of the Turkish flanking fire, Skobelev led it about 1,000 paces to the rear in the utmost silence, and prolonged his skirmish lines, which had remained in place, by adding a deployed company to each. The fatigue of his men had become such that they would fall asleep as soon as halted; to be prepared for an emergency, Skobelev had them waked up from time to time and formed.

By accident a sotnia of Caucasian and half a sotnia of Don Cossacks arrived at Skobelev's position at midnight, whereupon he immediately sent patrols to the right and left beyond the skirmish lines; 60 of the Cossacks he retained, resolved to oppose them to any sudden attack by the enemy.

Upon report that the firing line was getting short of ammunition, Skobelev had ordered up ammunition-carts; two of them reached his position and he sent the ammunition to the firing line by special detachments. The difference in the armament caused some difficulty: the infantry was armed with the Krenka, the Rifles with the Berdan rifle, and the latter were therefore unable to use the infantry ammunition, which alone was contained in the two carts. A Cossack non-commissioned officer, who with 20 Cossacks was sent after Berdan cartridges, finally brought a small supply in the nosebags of his detachment; thus relieving the want to some extent.

While the events just described were taking place in rear of the line of battle proper, the utmost activity was maintained in the latter throughout the night.

The open gorges of the two captured redoubts had to be closed, the enemy's rifle-trenches had to be arranged for cover from the opposite side, and some new trenches had to be made to cover the left against the Krishin redoubt, the lines having been marked out during daylight by Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff. The execution of the work was extremely difficult, owing to the almost total absence of entrenching tools; the Russian soldiers well understood the importance of the task in view of the murderous character of the enemy's fire, and worked for dear life with bayonets, side arms, camp-kettle lids, and bare hands.

With the beginning of darkness the Turkish fire had considerably slackened; but toward 10 p. m. strong Turkish bodies rushed on the Russian position with much yelling and a severe fire, but in this, as well as in several subsequent attempts, they were repulsed by the fire of the Russians. In one of these attempts the retreating assailants were mistaken for Russians by fresh Turkish reserves which were coming up, and subjected to a severe musketry fire.

6. *The 12th of September.*

Toward 6 a. m. the Turks opened a severe artillery fire from the Krishin redoubt, the entrenched camp, and the works beyond the Tutchenitza ravine, and caused at once considerable losses to the Russians. To engage the Krishin

redoubt Skobelev ordered 4 nine-pounders to be brought inside the middle redoubt and to open fire, which served to encourage the troops in the redoubt.

Soon afterward large bodies of Turks, preceded by dense swarms of skirmishers, advanced against the Russian left and penetrated to within 300 yards of the Russian position despite the severe fire with which they were greeted. There the attack was checked and soon converted into a retreat; at 900 yards from the Russian position the Turks halted and opened a severe fire.

At 8 a. m. a second Turkish attack began, which was chiefly directed against the left flank of the Russian first line; Skobelev, who was on the "third knoll," dispatched from there a skirmish line, which opened fire at 900 yards against the right flank of the attacking Turks; a battery was brought up to the "third knoll" to fire also against their right. Notwithstanding the effective cross-fire of the 12 guns (8 on the "third knoll" and 4 in the middle redoubt), the Turks approached the Russian rifle-trenches to within 500 yards, came to a halt, maintained a brisk fire for some time, and then fell back with great loss.

Meanwhile the defenders of the east redoubt had been engaged since early morning with the enemy's detachments posted on the outskirts of Plevna and attempting to turn the Russian right.

Convinced of the importance of the advantages gained by General Skobelev, Osman Pasha utilized the inactivity of the Russians opposite his left and center to send all troops

that could possibly be spared to reinforce his threatened right.

Leaving a thick skirmish line, which maintained a severe fire, in a well-covered position opposite the two redoubts in the hands of the Russians, the Turks assembled their main force near the Krishin redoubt, to advance from there against the Russian left. The reinforcements, withdrawn from the east, moved partly through Plevna against the right of the line of captured redoubts, partly in the Tutch-enitza ravine against the position of the Russians on the "third knoll."

At 10:30 a. m. the third attack began, at first from front and left against the middle redoubt. After two Turkish batteries had caused great havoc among the defenders crowded together inside, these men, after an uninterrupted exposure to severe fire for thirty hours, began to waver and to leave the redoubt—singly at first, afterward in crowds. The defenders of the east redoubt followed the infectious example, but when Skobelev came galloping up from the "third knoll" and spoke words of admonition and cheer, all turned about and reoccupied the redoubts before the Turks were able to take possession of them. Isolated Turkish detachments which succeeded in penetrating into the redoubts were cut down.

On returning to his position on the "third knoll" Skobelev sent forward some companies, formed of dispersed men, to support the troops engaged at the redoubts.

Meanwhile Turkish troops were forming partly in the

Tutchenitza ravine itself, partly on its eastern edge (north of the Radischevo ravine), for the purpose of attacking the "third knoll." A company formed of dispersed riflemen was deployed for the defense of the western edge, while two guns attempted to enfilade the ravine; the Turks nevertheless succeeded in ascending the western edge of the ravine and driving back the Russian riflemen, and it was only when assisted by two Liban companies (which had been detached yesterday and had very insignificant losses) and a Caucasian Cossack sotnia that the Turks were driven back into the ravine. The Turkish reserves in the ravine at the southern exit of Plevna fell back into the town.

Skobelev had become convinced on the 11th that the capture of the entrenched height between town and river would decide the victory, and, on the other hand, that he was too weak to gain that result. Having asked for reinforcements on the 11th, General Skobelev expressed to Colonel Orloff, who arrived from Grand Headquarters to inform himself of the state of affairs, his opinion that without reinforcements he would be unable to maintain his position.

Early on the morning of the 12th Skobelev received a copy of the following order addressed to General Prince Imeretinski:

"By direction of the Commander-in-Chief, I order you and General Skobelev to entrench and maintain yourselves in the positions captured to-day. We cannot send reinforcements, because we have none.

(Signed) "*Zotoff, Lieutenant-General.*"

Notwithstanding this discouraging order, Skobelevff hoped for a favorable turn, since the entire IV. Corps stood east of the Tutchenitza ravine, apparently in readiness for battle, but inactive.

At 10:30 a. m., as the third Turkish attack began, Colonel Orloff delivered to General Skobelevff the following order:

“By order of the Commander-in-Chief, if you cannot hold the captured positions, you are to fall back—if possible, not before evening—in the direction of Tutchenitza, covered by the cavalry of General Leontieff. Communicate this order, which is to be kept secret otherwise, to General Prince Imeretinski. The Grivitza redoubt is in our hands, but the attack is not to be continued, and we are to fall back slowly.
8:30 a. m.

(Signed) “Zotoff, *Lieutenant-General.*”

Even after the receipt of this order Skobelevff did not give up hope of a general turn for the better; he hoped at any moment to see the IV. Corps advance to the attack to the east of the Tutchenitza ravine.

The situation of the defenders in the redoubts was becoming more and more critical, receiving fire not only from the Krishin redoubt in front, but from the Radischevo works in rear. At 1 p. m. 2 of the 4 guns in the middle redoubt had become useless and the other 2 were almost without men and teams. Skobelevff ordered these guns to be relieved by 3 guns of the 5th battery of the 3d Brigade posted in rear of the “third knoll.” The movement having attracted the attention of the Turks, they increased their fire, causing con-

siderable loss to the newly arrived guns in the redoubt, but the latter now opened on the Krishin redoubt; the one ammunition-wagon brought along was posted between the breastwork and traverse, the only comparatively safe place in the redoubt. It was nevertheless blown up by a hostile shell, killing and wounding many men in the narrow space of the redoubt; among the wounded was Major-General Tebjanik (who had assumed command in the redoubt after the wounding of General Dobrovolski) and Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff.

At 2 p. m. the last available troops, sent by General Prince Imeretinski, arrived. Two exceedingly small Kaluga battalions (heretofore retained as protection for the artillery position) and a detachment made up of 200 dispersed riflemen were disposed as follows: 4 Kaluga companies proceeded to the redoubts, 3 companies covered the right on the "third knoll" against the Tutschenitza ravine, 3 companies took post in rear of the left. The combined rifle detachment was at first posted in rear of the "second knoll" as a last general reserve, but was soon ordered forward to the left, where Skobelev also ordered 4 guns to proceed and to take up a covered position.

Soon afterward the fourth attack began from the Krishin redoubt. This time Skobelev allowed the Turks to approach to within 500 yards and then greeted them with rapid musketry fire from his infantry, and canister from his 4 concealed guns. The Turks halted and replied to the fire, but their fresh reserves were not able to carry the attack

forward; after three-quarters of an hour of very costly fire action, the Turks fell back.

At 2:30 p. m., when Skobelev arrived at the redoubts to examine personally how matters stood in his first line, the fortifications presented a ghastly spectacle. The interior of both redoubts and the trench connecting them were filled with corpses; the gorge of the east redoubt, open toward Plevna, was closed by a breastwork made of corpses; the 3 guns of the 3d Brigade in the middle redoubt were dismounted, the cannoneers killed or wounded. The 2 dismounted guns of the 2d Brigade were removed, and the abandoned Turkish gun was rendered unserviceable by the removal of the breech-block.

The movements of the Turkish troops were plainly visible as they assembled from all directions at Plevna against Skobelev's right. Those Turkish troops which had heretofore made several attacks from the Krishin redoubt against the Russian left departed for the same point.

Upon his return from the redoubts to the "Green Hills," Skobelev was informed that the Shuja Regiment, numbering 1,300 men, had come from the center to support him. He retained the regiment in reserve and sent several hundred dispersed men to reinforce the defenders of the redoubts.

At 4:30 p. m. the Turks advanced in several lines to make the fifth attack simultaneously on both redoubts. The severe fire which greeted them did not check them; though the leading columns resolved themselves into disordered swarms, still they continued to advance with determination, and were followed in rear by fresh troops.

Before this overwhelming attack the defenders of the middle redoubt began to give way and abandoned the redoubt in swarms; the small body of brave men which faced the attack fell after a furious hand-to-hand struggle, among them Major Gortaloff, who had greatly distinguished himself on this bloody day.

Despite the loss of the middle redoubt, Lieutenant-Colonel Moszewoi held out in the east redoubt against the attack which was now directed against him from the front and both flanks. To prevent the useless sacrifice of the brave garrison of this redoubt, Skobeleff ordered Moszewoi to fall back, and in order to make the withdrawal possible he advanced in person with the Shuja Regiment and a battery, covering the retreat of all troops engaged in front. An attempt at pursuit on the part of the Turks was frustrated by a splendid charge of 2 sotnias of Cossacks.

A battery of 24 guns on the "second knoll," guarded by some detachments formed of dispersed men of the Vladimir, Susdal, and Reval Regiments, covered the further retreat, the troops carrying their wounded along as best they could.

On the 13th of September Skobeleff remained almost the entire day on the "first knoll," and at 7 p. m. fell back by order to Bogot.

7. Losses.

The total loss sustained by the Russians in the attacks on Plevna from the 7th to the 12th of September is stated in round numbers at 300 officers and 12,500 men, including 60 officers and 3,000 men killed.

According to the special lists of losses, the 2 regiments of the right wing which captured the Grivitza redoubt lost 22 officers and 1,305 men; the 7 regiments which vainly attacked the Radischevo works in the center lost 110 officers and 5,249 men. Adding about 300 for losses sustained during the artillery attack on the first days of the attack, we have for the troops of the left wing under Skobelev—6 regiments and 4 rifle battalions—a loss of 160 officers and 5,600 men.

Individual losses cannot be accurately ascertained from the available data; still some figures may be given as accurate.

The Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments, which attacked prematurely in the center, lost respectively 370 and 300 killed. Of Skobelev's troops, the Vladimir Regiment lost 200, the Susdal Regiment 150 killed; the former regiment lost 36 officers killed and wounded, the latter 15 officers.

The 3d Rifle Brigade, consisting of 4 battalions, which had entered upon the theater of war barely 3,000 strong and had lost at Lovtcha 1 officer and 132 men killed and 17 officers and 400 men wounded, lost here its commander, Major-General Dobrovolski, 3 officers and 177 men killed, and 20 officers and 666 men wounded.

Of the superior leaders, Major-General Dobrovolski, of the rifle brigade, was among the killed, as already stated; Major-General Rodionov, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division, and Major-General Tebjanik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, were wounded. The loss

of the Roumanians—56 officers and 2,500 men—has been previously stated.

The losses of the Turks are not accurately known; opposite General Skobeleff they must have been very heavy.

Comments.

1. The above description of the attack on the Grivitza redoubt is based on the official Russian report; other accounts state that two attacks were repulsed and that the third succeeded. The difference may be explained by the two halts made by the assailing troops, which practically did interrupt the advance, though it does not imply that the attack was repulsed.

There was no preparation by infantry fire; the tactical form of the attack was about the same as that of the unsuccessful assault on the same works on July 30th, but in this instance the real result was gained by the advance of portions of the Wologda Regiment past the flank of the redoubt, for it seems that the entrance of portions of the regiment through the gorge of the redoubt, and the engagement of the Turkish reserves in rear by other detachments, brought the attack to a successful issue.

It is not quite clear whether in forming for the attack the first and second line of each regiment consisted of one battalion each, or whether two battalions were formed abreast, each in two lines of company columns; in view of the formation used on other occasions where they are clearly described, the latter seems more probable.

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Since the two first lines are expressly stated to have been formed in company columns, it may be assumed that in the third line the battalions were formed in mass. It would seem, however, that all three lines started at the same time with comparatively short distances; the two halts seem to have diminished the distances between the lines, the whole in the further course of the attack formed a single mass of unequal depth; special tactical employment of the lines and reserve was out of the question. All reached the enemy about the same time.

Although the faulty coöperation of the two columns who were attacking the same work may be attributed to several causes, it nevertheless remains reprehensible from the professional point of view; proper combination and coöperation of the double attack would no doubt have accomplished its object more quickly and with less loss.

2. The details of the failure of the attack of the center are still enshrouded in obscurity; no tactical details are known and the whole thing seems to have been a wild chaos from the beginning.

The fact that an unfortunate accident caused the premature advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments does not provoke criticism; but it may well be asked whether the procedure after that event might not have been better contrived. Obeying the letter of his orders, General Schnitnikof held back the two regiments still in hand until 3 p. m.; for three hours he allowed the regiments who had advanced prematurely to fight single-handed. It might have been

assumed as certain that these two regiments alone would not be able to take the enemy's works; on the other hand, it could not be presumed that these regiments would be really effective after fighting single-handed for three hours against great odds. Hence, after the advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments, General Schnitnikof should either have pushed the Kazan and Shuja Regiments also forward at once, or the Koslof and Woronesh Regiments should have been brought up in order to undertake the attack with sufficient strength from the very beginning; for, as above stated, the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments could, under the circumstances, not be counted upon at 3 o'clock.

Under the circumstances, there was no good reason for postponing the attack until 3 o'clock pursuant to the disposition, for not only had the advance of those two regiments compelled a large part of the Russian artillery to cease firing, but the Turks had long been alarmed and prepared for the assault; hence the contemplated surprise could under no circumstances be realized.

Did the commander-in-chief, posted in rear of the center, receive any information whatever of the premature attack? If yes, when? Did he express no opinion whatever to General Schnitnikof as to what he should do? In what formation was the attack made? When and in what direction did the regiments from the reserve advance? These are questions which can not as yet be answered, but which are indispensable for any real criticism of the bloody events in the center.

3. In turning now to the events on the Russian left, the peculiar mode of command obtaining here attracts our attention. Prince Imeretinski was the senior general, but he played an entirely subordinate rôle by the side of the younger Skobelev, and was pushed altogether into the background by the latter.

During the initiatory actions on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September Imeretinski officially had the command of all troops of the left wing. Skobelev was subordinated to him, but acted independently as commander of an advance guard, which was increased to a strength equal to two-thirds of the whole corps. Since a very small part of the troops under Imeretinski's command was not engaged on the 10th, his total subsidence is less striking. But on the 11th of September matters were different: on this day Skobelev was charged direct from the headquarters of the West Army with the conduct of the attack on the south front of the enemy's position, and was reinforced by part of Imeretinski's troops; the latter was left in command of the remaining troops, and ordered to support Skobelev if necessary. In the course of the action Prince Imeretinski gradually sent all his troops to General Skobelev's assistance, so that in the end he had not a company under his command and was a mere spectator on the battle-field, and was even favorably mentioned in the junior's direct report to the commander-in-chief for making himself useful in collecting the dispersed men and looking after the sanitary service. These are conditions for which our conception lacks understanding and expression!

4. Skobelev's method of conducting the action exhibits the traits discussed in connection with the events of July 30th; on a larger scale; careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position; general preparation of the attack by concentrated artillery fire, careful formation of the infantry in the fighting line, special reserves in rear of the flanks, and a general reserve in two lines; special preparation of the attack by brisk fire of strong, well-covered skirmish lines, increased wherever possible by that of some batteries or at least some guns brought into the front line; advance of the infantry by stages, occupation of the new line reached, and renewed preparation by infantry and artillery fire from that point; great care for the safety of the flanks; wise husbanding of the reserves; wherever practicable, new reserves were formed from troops heretofore engaged; notwithstanding the unfavorable condition of the ground for cavalry, the latter was at the right place at the decisive moment, was properly employed, and took a decisive part in the action; lastly, the indefatigable efforts in collecting scattered men, which alone made it possible again and again to lead formed and half-fresh detachments into the action. To be sure, mistakes may have been made in the details of tactical employment of the individual bodies of troops, but the conduct of the battle as a whole presents a brilliant picture, interesting and fascinating in its smallest details.

5. It was only by their utmost efforts that the Turks succeeded on the 12th of September in recapturing the redoubts lost on the preceding day, when the complete inac-

tivity of the Russians opposite the Turkish left and center left the latter free to use most of their available troops for support of their right. Had the Turks failed to drive Skobelev from the position he had captured—and there can be little doubt that this would have been the case, had the Russian right and center shown any activity whatever—had the Russians permanently ensconced themselves on the heights south of Plevna and posted their numerous artillery there, the remaining portions of the Turkish position would, it is presumed, have become untenable.

That the supreme command failed to appreciate the importance of the advantages gained by Skobelev, or to do anything for their completion, preservation or retention, is probably due to the fact that the supreme command, posted in rear of the center near Radischevo, was so struck and influenced by the defeat inflicted under its own eyes as to be unable to divert its mind to any other thought.

The complete inaction of the Russian center on the 12th at a time when but a short distance away the furious action on the "Green Hills" was fought out, does not admit of explanation by the theory of exhaustion and losses on the previous day; there can be no doubt that the defeat witnessed on the preceding day had deprived the supreme command of confidence in a happy result, and that the only thought was to find some honorable way out of the battle.

At the time when Skobelev's request for reinforcements was denied, 4 entirely fresh regiments were available in the center, not to mention the Ingermanland Regiment (of the

3d Division), which was not mentioned in the disposition and seems to have been the special escort of headquarters.

The Shuja Regiment, which came to Skobeleff's assistance at noon on the 12th and covered the retreat of the other troops by an offensive movement, was one of the 7 regiments which on the preceding day had suffered defeat in the center; it may therefore be presumed that the other regiments (excepting perhaps the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments) were again fit for action; at any rate, they would have been capable to undertake the protection of the artillery positions, thus setting those 4 fresh regiments free.

It should be stated, however, that the Shuja Regiment was sent to Skobeleff's assistance not by the supreme command, which was opposed to any continuation of the battle, but by the commander of the IV. Corps, from courtesy, as it were.

PART X.

WORK OF THE CAVALRY ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE VID.

1. General Loshkareff from the 7th to the 19th of September.

On September 7th General Loshkareff, commander of the 9th Cavalry Division, was posted on the highroad east of Grivitz, between the IX. Corps and the Roumanians, with the Astrachan Dragoons, No. 8, Kazan Dragoons, No. 9, Bug Lancer Regiment, No. 9, Don Cossacks, No. 9, and the 16th Horse and 2d Don Cossack Battery. He was ordered to move to Riben, pass the night there, to draw to himself both regular Roumanian cavalry regiments, the 5th and 6th irregular cavalry regiments, and 1 Roumanian horse battery, to cross the Vid on the next day with the united cavalry corps, to make an energetic advance toward Dubnik, and to threaten the communications of Osman Pasha's army by taking suitable position on the left bank.

Pursuant to this order, the 8 regiments of cavalry and 3 batteries were assembled by 9 p. m., September 7th, at Riben, on the right bank of the brook which there emptied into the Vid.

At 6 a. m. September 8th the Vid was crossed, and at 11:30 a. m. Smaret-Trestenik was reached, 8 miles west of

Riben and about the same distance to the northwest of the bridge over the Vid at Plevna.

Wheeling to the left, the cavalry corps took front toward the southeast against Plevna. Thence the Roschiori (Regular) Brigade with the battery moved to Dolni (Lower) Netropolie with instructions to observe Plevna and the road leading thence to Rahova. The main body of the corps marched through Gorni (Upper) Netropolie to Dolni Dubnik, where it went into bivouac at 1:45 p. m. On the march the Cossacks of the advance guard captured a small herd of cattle, whose armed escort fled to Plevna; nothing further was seen of the enemy.

The line of outposts of the Roumanians at Lower Netropolie extended from the Vid opposite Bivolar to the Sophia road, facing the west front of the Plevna position. At the Sophia road began the Russian outpost line, formed of 2 Lancer squadrons and a sotnia of Cossacks, which extended at first southward along the heights between the Vid and highroad, turned off to the west half way between Lower and Upper Dubnik, crossed the road, and fronted toward Upper Dubnik; the length of the entire line was about 13 miles. A separate detachment was posted in rear of the whole position in observation of the road from Lower Dubnik to Rahova. The distance between Lower Dubnik and Lower Netropolie is about 6 miles; the former place is 4 miles from the bridge over the Vid at Plevna, the latter about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

At 4 p. m. reports were received from the outposts that

from 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry, followed by 3 battalions of infantry, were approaching Lower Dubnik from Plevna; at the same time the Roumanians reported that about 4 battalions of infantry with some cavalry were approaching Lower Netropolie, and that the works of the west front of the Plevna position had opened an artillery fire.

The Roumanians were ordered to maintain themselves at Lower Netropolie as best they could; the balance of the 9th Lancers (1st and 2d squadrons), a sotnia of Cossacks, and 4 Cossack guns were dispatched to support the Russian outposts; the main body was posted in readiness at Lower Dubnik.

The Turkish infantry halted within the range of protection afforded by the works; the 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry advanced against the Russian line of outposts, which fell slowly back on its supports. Of the latter, one-half of the 1st squadron, supported by the formed detachments of the outpost squadrons (3d and 4th), advanced against the Turks from the front; the other half of the 1st squadron took them on the left flank, a platoon of the 2d squadron on the right flank; after a brief hand-to-hand conflict, the Turks fell back on their infantry, and the pursuing Lancers were received with infantry fire and retired. The Turkish cavalry left 70 dead on the ground. The Turkish detachments, which had been advancing against the Roumanians, retired to the works after a brief artillery fire, without having made a real attack. After the outposts had taken their former positions and the 4 Cossack guns had been posted under cover to one side

of the highroad, the Turks again advanced to the attack at 6 p. m. with infantry. At 1,500 yards the Turks were greeted with shrapnel fire from the heretofore concealed guns, and retired at once.

The total Russian losses on this day were 3 men and 9 horses killed, 9 men and 22 horses wounded. The Roumanians suffered no loss.

Early on the 9th of September patrols were sent out westward toward the Isker, southeastward along the highroad, and southward up the Vid. Upon report of the appearance of Tcherkesses west of Upper Dubnik, 2 sotnias of the 9th Cossacks were dispatched in that direction at 2 p. m.

At 3:30 p. m. the outposts reported the approach of strong hostile bodies against the position of the Roschiori at Lower Netropolie, and that bodies of hostile troops were assembling at the bridge over the Vid, opposite the Russian position. Upon receipt of this report the whole corps was placed in readiness.

At 4:30 p. m. bodies of hostile troops appeared on the heights on the left bank of the Vid, and farther to the south dense skirmish lines, cavalry on the flanks, closed infantry and artillery in rear, amounting to about 6 battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, and 4 guns. The attack was supported by artillery fire from the works of Opanetz, and was made with great determination. The Regular Brigade retired from Lower Netropolie. With a view of utilizing the favorable situation for a successful attack, General Loshkareff

ordered the Roumanians to fall back to the heights of Upper Netropolie, in order to entice the Turks as far as possible from their works; as soon as the main body took the enemy in flank, the Roumanians were to attack in front.

The 8th Dragoon Regiment, on outpost south of Lower Netropolie, was to push 2 dismounted squadrons under cover of the high corn and a depression of the ground against the left flank of the Turks advancing on the Roumanians; the attack was to be supported on the left by 2 mounted squadrons of the 9th Dragoons with 2 guns of the 16th Horse Battery; 2 Lancer squadrons and the remaining 4 guns of the horse battery were posted on the right as protection against any Turks who might advance from the bridge over the Vid. Two sotnias of Cossacks having been dispatched to Upper Dubnik, and 2 squadrons of the 8th Dragoons (and probably also a sotnia of Cossacks) having been deployed on the extensive outpost line, there remained in general reserve 4 squadrons of Dragoons and Lancers, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, the Cossack battery, and probably the 2 Kalarashi (Irregular) Regiments, of whose special employment nothing is known. The attack directed simultaneously against their front and flank caused the Turks to fall back to their works about 6 p. m., whereupon the troops at the bridge also withdrew.

While this engagement was in progress, the detachment of Cossacks dispatched to Upper Dubnik reported that it had encountered Tcherkesses, and that an infantry camp of some 10,000 men had been observed in rear of the wood west of Upper Dubnik.

Loshkareff now ordered his outposts into their original positions and moved with his main body to Lower Netropolie; the 9th Cossacks remained at Lower Dubnik with instructions to light a large number of camp-fires, with a view of deceiving the enemy at Upper Dubnik as to the strength of the troops at Lower Dubnik, and at the same time to lead the Turks in Plevna to believe that reinforcements from Riben had arrived at Lower Netropolie in the evening.

The aggregate loss of the Russians and Roumanians on the 9th of September was: 1 man and 11 horses killed, 1 man missing, and 25 men and 31 horses wounded.

Early on September 10th the corps took up the following position: the Regular Brigade between Upper and Lower Netropolie, facing Plevna; all 4 Russian regiments with both batteries and the 5th Militia Regiment at Lower Dubnik, their right resting on the highroad, their front facing the south, covered by the Dubnik brook, a branch of the Vid; the 6th Militia Regiment, south of Upper Netropolie, connecting the two bodies.

The Turks could be plainly observed increasing and strengthening the works of their west front; a number of guns were placed in battery. The Turks were evidently expecting the beginning of a serious attack from this direction.

Besides several small patrols which reconnoitered the ground on both sides of the highroad between the Vid and Isker, as well as the ground beyond the Isker, two strong patrols were dispatched with instructions to seek communication with the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army

and to cross to the right bank of the Vid above Plevna if necessary for the accomplishment of their object. The 4th squadron of the 9th Lancers crossed to the right bank of the Vid at Medivan (6 miles above the bridge) and scouted in an easterly direction as far as Kebel (2 miles southeast of Medivan), without meeting either Turks or Russians. A sotnia of Cossacks which attempted to cross at Dessewitzza (3 miles above the bridge) found the village held by Turkish infantry and cavalry, and fell back. The reports of all the patrols agreed that small bodies of Tcherkesses were roaming between the Vid and Isker, and that beyond the Isker they were in greater force.

On September 11th a squadron of regular Roumanian cavalry was ordered to cross the Isker at Magaletta (west of Lower Dubnik) and to send patrols as far as possible in the direction of Rahova—Widdin. For the purpose of establishing communication with the left flank of the West Army, a second squadron of the 9th Lancers was sent out with orders to find the Russian troops under all circumstances, and, if possible, to communicate directly with the commander-in-chief. The squadron accomplished its object and returned next day by the same route, capturing a Turkish officer on the road. Moreover, a squadron of the 4th Dragoons dispatched by General Leontief, commanding the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army, arrived during the day.

During the night of the 11th-12th skirmishing took place along the entire line of outposts with small bodies of

Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who endeavored to steal through to the west and south and lost some killed and prisoners in the attempt. At the same time many Bulgarians with empty wagons were leaving Plevna.

On the 12th of September the Turks began the construction of a new battery along the highroad to sweep the approaches of the bridge; at Opanetz also a 4-gun battery was built against the Roumanian battery at Lower Netropolie.

On September 13th the Roumanian squadron dispatched to Magaleta reported that the patrols on the previous day found the neighboring villages full of Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks. The total loss of the Roumanians in this reconnaissance consisted of 1 man wounded.

A detachment of 2 squadrons of Lancers, which advanced on the highroad toward Telis and dispatched small patrols to the right toward the Isker and on the left to Rakita and Radomirtza, found in all the villages plundering Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who retired on the appearance of the Lancers.

Patrols sent out on the 14th and 15th of September rendered similar reports. On the latter day 7 sotnias of the Don Cossack Brigade of General Shernosuboff, with the 15th Don Cossack Battery, arrived at Lower Dubnik, and brought an order for the 9th Cossacks to move to Bogot (south of Plevna on the road to Lovtcha).

The patrols sent out on the 16th everywhere had skirmishes with Tcherkesses and armed inhabitants; the Roumanians at Magaleta lost 1 man and 1 horse killed.

During the night an attack was made from Plevna against the 5th Irregular Regiment, which was on outpost along the Vid. The attack was repulsed without loss to the Roumanians.

The patrols sent out southward on the 17th and 18th of September no longer met with hostile detachments; in the evening an attack on the outposts north of the highroad was repulsed with a loss of 1 man wounded; the Turks had 2 men killed.

The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division having arrived on the evening of the 18th of September, General Loshkareff started for Bogot at 10 o'clock next morning with the rest of his division, the 9th Lancers, the Dragoons, and the 9th Cossacks preceding him there; the 9th Hussars had throughout this period been at the east of Plevna.

General Loshkareff then with his (9th) Cavalry Division guarded the left of the West Army.

2. *General Kryloff from September 19th to October 7th.*

General Kryloff, the newly appointed commander of the "Combined Cavalry Corps" on the left bank of the Vid, arrived at Lower Dubnik on the 19th of September. Reinforcements, consisting of a Don Cossack brigade, a Caucasian Cossack brigade, and part of the 4th Cavalry Division, which had heretofore been posted on the left of the West Army near Bogot and toward Lovtcha, arrived at Lower Dubnik partly before, partly at the same time with Kryloff.

The task of the corps was to cut off all supplies from

the Turkish army at Plevna, to save the troops as much as possible, to prevent entirely any coöperation of the troops in Plevna with operations on the left bank of the Vid, or to entice the troops from Plevna to such a distance as to temporarily weaken the garrison.

About the time of the arrival of Kryloff and the main body of his corps at Lower Dubnik reports came in of the approach of hostile columns from Magaleta; these reports proved erroneous, but still Kryloff bestowed special attention to the country of Magaleta and west of the Isker.

On September 20th Colonel Stakelberg, with 2 squadrons of Hussars, 2 squadrons of Irregulars, and 2 guns, scouted toward Telis in order to reconnoiter the country between the Isker and the highroad as far as Rakita. Near Telis he encountered strong hostile detachments, and fell back after a brief engagement.

In order to more accurately ascertain the strength and position of the enemy, Colonel Tutolmin, with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, 2 squadrons of regular cavalry, and the 8th Don Battery, was again dispatched toward Telis. His vigorous attack developed about 10 Turkish battalions entrenched in rifle-trenches, and about 2 regiments of cavalry; 3 guns were covered by entrenchments and several others were in the open. While the action was taking place, a general staff officer made a sketch of the enemy's position. The enemy's strength was estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men.

On the 22d of September the outposts reported that considerable hostile forces were approaching Lower Dubnik

from Upper Dubnik, and that the strong Russian patrols were falling back fighting to Lower Dubnik.

General Kryloff at first decided to make a stand at Lower Dubnik; but, on receipt of information from Loshkareff on the right bank that he was marching on Telis, Kryloff decided to attack the enemy in front, while Loshkareff, as he supposed, was attacking in rear.

After Kryloff had opened the action by a brisk artillery fire, the sound of the guns of Loshkareff's detachment was heard at 3 o'clock—not, however, in the enemy's rear, but in prolongation of the Russian left; at the same time reports came in from the outposts at Lower Dubnik that strong bodies of hostile infantry were advancing from the bridge-head against the Russian position. In view of these circumstances, Kryloff led his corps to Smaret-Trestenik, leaving a strong advance guard (the Don Cossack Brigade and the Irregular Brigade) at Netropolie. The infantry advancing from the bridge-head retired within the works toward evening.

On the morning of the 23d of September the advance guard at Netropolie reported that the hostile forces at Upper Dubnik had marched into Plevna during the night under the fire of the 15th battery attached to the Don Cossack Brigade.

On the 24th Kryloff was ordered to cover the right of the army by taking position abreast of Brestovetz (midway between the lower Vid and lower Isker), and to fall back in case of necessity to Riben. At the same time reports arrived

from the west of the presence of bodies of Tcherkesses collecting provisions for the Turkish Army.

On the 25th of September Kryloff marched to Rahova with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, the Roumanian Regular Brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, the 8th Dragoons, and 3 batteries. A flank detachment marched to Bieloslatina. Bodies of Tcherkesses were driven from several of the villages of that vicinity; the telegraph line between Widdin and Plevna was cut.

On the 26th of September the 3 redoubts covering Rahova were bombarded and 1 Turkish gun dismounted. Kryloff made no attempt to capture Rahova, since he would not have been able to hold it; nor did he desire to set it on fire by shells, as the village was chiefly inhabited by Bulgarians.

On the 28th Kryloff retired to Riben to replenish his provisions and ammunition, and on the 30th the corps again stood at Smaret-Trestenik.

During the absence of the main body the detachment at Netropolie captured 2 wagon-trains, of 20 and 100 wagons loaded with flour and barley respectively, and on another occasion relieved a Turkish foraging party of part of the hay collected.

On the 30th of September Colonel Levis advanced with 4 sotnias of the Vladi Caucasian Regiment, 2 squadrons of Charkof Lancers, 2 squadrons of Mariopol Hussars, and the 8th Horse Battery on Telis and Radomirtza. He reported on October 1st, that he had encountered Bashi-bozouks and pursued them to Lukovitza, that his detachment had cap-

tured 1,000 head of beef cattle, 80 horses, and a wagon-train loaded with salt and quinine, and that the bridge at Radomirtza and the telegraph line had again been destroyed as far as Lukovitza.

On the 1st of October General Tchermat, commander-in-chief of the Roumanian Army, appeared and informed General Kryloff that he had arranged for a reconnaissance in force on the next day by a body of Roumanian troops against the position of Opanetz, and requested support.

In compliance with the request, General Kryloff ordered the detachment at Netropolie to advance on October 2d against Opanetz. Learning of the advance of a strong Turkish corps of all arms from the bridge-head against Lower Netropolie, he sent forward all the troops at Smaret-Trestenik.

On reaching the detachment, General Kryloff found the 15th Don Battery engaged with Turkish infantry and artillery, which had advanced to Lower Netropolie; the Roumanian and 8th Don Batteries came at once into action on the right of the engaged battery, and took part in the conflict. One of the enemy's guns was dismounted, an ammunition-cart blown up, and Netropolie was set on fire by shells. The 15th Don Battery being seriously molested by the fire of Turkish skirmishers ensconced in the outskirts of the village, 2 squadrons of the 4th Dragoons dismounted and drove them away. The retreat of the Turkish infantry was covered by an attack of a body of Tcherkesses, and to cover the dismounted Dragoons 2 sotnias of the Kuban Regiment advanced and threw the Tcherkesses back on their infantry.

At 1:30 p. m. the Roumanian Colonel Tcherkass reported that the reconnaissance against Opanetz could not take place, and as it would have been to no purpose under these circumstances to continue the action, General Kryloff withdrew to his right about 3 p. m. An attempt of the Turks to take the Russian detachment in left flank was frustrated by a counter-attack of the Kuban Regiment.

Meanwhile the detachment of Colonel Levis had advanced southward, and its patrols had established communication with General Loshkareff's cavalry scouting on the right bank of the Vid.

Having burned the bridge at Shervenibreg on October 2d while *en route* from Radomirtza to Sumakova, Colonel Levis moved from Sumakova on October 3d, and assembled at Lukovitza in the evening, having skirmished with Tcherkesses on the way. The bridge at Lukovitza was demolished; some mail was captured and sent to Kryloff, and by him to the commander of the West Army.

On the 4th and 5th of October Levis remained at Radomirtza with the main body, and sent patrols in all directions; on the 6th of October he was attacked by some 4,000 or 5,000 infantry and Tcherkesses from Lukovitza. Up to 2 p. m. he repulsed the attacks on his front, but at this hour an equally strong body, which left Plevna in the morning, appeared in his rear. Covered by the fire of his artillery and Dragoons, Levis withdrew, crossed the Isker, and moved to Sumakova.

On the 7th of October Levis moved to Magaleta, from which point a detachment sent against Telis reported Upper and Lower Dubnik occupied by the Turks.

By entrenching Lukovitzza, Telis, and Upper and Lower Dubnik the Turks protected their line of communication from Orkhanie to Plevna so effectively that the Russian cavalry was compelled to abandon for the present all attempts to cut the line. The investment at the West of Plevna, which for a time seemed successfully established, was completely broken.

Comments.

The task of the Russo-Roumanian cavalry was to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Plevna. The task might be accomplished by defensive or offensive means—*i. e.*, the cavalry might bar the road to an approaching relief corps in some favorable position, or it might go to meet the relieving troops and try to overthrow them by a vigorous and unexpected attack. The latter method is more in keeping with the tactical ideas of cavalry than a pure defensive in which the inherent strength of the arm, modern armament and training notwithstanding, cannot be fully developed.

In the period described above the Russian cavalry made no attempt whatever to solve the problem by offensive action, and the very weak defensive attempt failed completely.

The work of the Russo-Roumanian cavalry may be divided into two portions: the period of the attempted investment up to the successful movement of the Turkish relief corps September 23d, and the period of simple observation subsequent to that day; within the latter period fall

the movement on Rahova from September 25th to 28th, and the expedition of Colonel Levis to Lukovitza from September 30th to October 7th.

On the 8th of September, the day when Loshkareff was dispatched to the left bank of the Vid, the artillery prelude to the great attack on Plevna was beginning; at this moment it was not so much Loshkareff's task to cut Plevna from relief without as to facilitate the attack on the east by demonstrations on the west, and, in case of the capture of Plevna, to cut off the retreat of the fleeing Turks on the left bank. It is evident that the appearance of the strong body of cavalry opposite the west side of their position attracted the attention of the Turks in no small degree, but we fail to note any sensible effect on the events of the east front.

On the receipt by Loshkareff on September 9th of information that a hostile corps of some 10,000 men was in the vicinity of Upper Dubnik, it was to be expected that a strong advance would be made at once in that direction to verify the correctness of this important information. Loshkareff, however, contented himself with taking up a defensive position so close to Plevna as to expose himself to the danger of being attacked simultaneously by the relief corps and by the garrison of Plevna itself.

Upon the abandonment of the idea of a capture of Plevna by assault after the failure of the attack on September 11th, the investment, particularly on the west, became the important feature. Loshkareff with part of the cavalry was withdrawn from the left to the right bank, where

he covered the left of the army. In his place Kryloff made his appearance with considerable reinforcements, so that the total strength of the cavalry corps operating on the left bank must be put down at not less than 6,000 or 7,000 effectives.

Kryloff had very pertinent instructions from the commander-in-chief to meet any relief corps at as great a distance as possible from Plevna, yet when the approach of a strong hostile corps from Telis became known, Kryloff remained close to Plevna, and, upon the appearance of the enemy, fell back without offering any serious resistance, so that the Turks had no difficulty in getting their large train of provisions and ammunition into the town.

The task demanded of General Kryloff and his cavalry was a cavalry task of the most common sort. He failed completely, and made no attempt to solve the problem by force of arms. The passage in Kryloff's orders "to save his troops as much as possible in the solution of his task" may perhaps be admitted as an explanation—though by no means as an extenuation—of his feeble action. That phrase was not well chosen and served no clear purpose. That a general should save his troops "as much as possible" is so elementary a rule that it would be trivial and unnecessary to call attention to it; if it is used, it is apt to lead a careful and prudent man into such exaggerated caution as to render any success impossible, because real success against an active enemy will rarely be gained without bloody sacrifices.

If Kryloff had been compelled to leave the road open to

the Turks after losing a few hundred of his horsemen in a fruitless defensive action or in a vigorous though hopeless charge, the Russians might have consoled themselves with the idea that the fortune of war is variable; but it is hardly to be assumed that the Russian commander-in-chief was satisfied when the Turks were able to accomplish their object almost without any shedding of blood, in the face of 6,000 to 7,000 eager horsemen.

It is interesting to note how Kryloff in his report seeks to vindicate, not to say excuse, his action. In the first place, he claimed credit for delaying the arrival of the relief corps in Plevna by forty-eight hours; since no decisive events were taking place in Plevna at the time, it was a matter of indifference whether the Turkish corps arrived forty-eight hours sooner or later.

He justified his retreat from Lower Dubnik to Smaret-Trestenik on September 22d by stating, "that that point was but little farther from the highroad than Lower Dubnik, and much closer to the line of retreat of the corps (Riben); and that the posting of the detachment at Netropolie furnished the means for observing everything that passed in and out of Plevna." To watch the Turks from a distance carrying provisions into Plevna did not, we should say, require the presence of a body of 7,000 cavalry.

If the entire affair could be repeated with the difference of having Skobeleff or Gourko at the head of the cavalry corps, a comparison between their action and that of Kryloff would be as interesting as it would be instructive.

The very interesting events during the first week of October could, unfortunately, not be described in full, owing to the lack of reliable information.

The expedition of Colonel Levis was the first attempt, though undertaken with insufficient force, to accomplish the investment of Plevna by offensive movements, and the idea of opposing an attempt at relief at Lukovitzza rather than at Dubnik was certainly correct; but there is a certain obscurity in the accounts before us as to what the main body of some 40 squadrons was doing while Levis advanced southward with 12 squadrons and 8 guns, and how a comparatively small Turkish force should find it possible under his very eyes to advance against Levis's rear.

The numerous tactical details which it was possible to interweave in the description are of interest in judging the tactics of the Russian cavalry. It is much to be regretted that information as to tactical details and losses in the two most important actions—at Netropolie on the 2d and at Lukovitzza on the 6th of October—are scant in the case of the former and lacking altogether in the case of the latter.

PART XI.

INVESTMENT OF PLEVNA FROM THE WEST.

1. The Communications of Plevna to the Rear.

As early as the beginning of hostilities an army of newly formed reserves was assembled at Sophia. About the time of the Russian passage of the Danube part of it was put in motion and effected its junction at Plevna with Osman Pasha's army from Widdin.

When, after their repeated failure to capture Plevna by force, the Russians threatened to cut the communications of the army posted there, it became the duty of the force at Sophia to keep the communications with Plevna open, and to look to the safety of the trains of provisions and ammunition destined for that place.

Crossing the Balkans with part of the army assembled at Sophia, Chefket Pasha moved to Orkhanie, and thence with about 10,000 men to Telis, and, after some slight engagements with reconnoitering Russian cavalry, succeeded, on September 22d, in driving back General Kryloff and getting his large convoy of provisions and ammunition into Plevna, where the greater part of his troops remained; he himself, however, returning to Orkhanie.

At the beginning of October Chefket again started out with a large convoy and 5,000 men, a corps of equal strength

marching from Plevna to meet him. Colonel Levis, who blocked the road at Radomirtza, was driven back on the 6th of October, and the convoy of 2,000 wagons succeeded in reaching the left bank of the Vid opposite Plevna on October 8th, the lighter vehicles crossing at once by a ford above the bridge, while the heavy wagons waited for the damaged bridge to be repaired.

In order to protect the march of further convoys against Russian scouting parties, the Turks fortified three stations on the northernmost part of the road between Plevna and Orkhanie, Dolni Dubnik, Gorni Dubnik, and Telis. These stations were garrisoned by a division consisting of 20 battalions and 15 guns (according to other accounts, 18 battalions and 24 guns) and a number of Tcherkesses under Chifsi Pasha, who established his headquarters at Gorni Dubnik. Other bodies of troops stood echeloned on the section from Lukovitzza to Orkhanie.

Very considerable supplies were collected at Sophia and Orkhanie for Osman Pasha, between whom and Chefket Pasha there was an agreement that every two weeks a convoy with provisions for a month should be dispatched.

2. *General Gourko's Task and Disposition for the 24th of October.*

The arrival of the Guard having considerably increased the number of available troops, it was decided to adopt the plans of General Todleben, now appointed "assistant" to the commander-in-chief, and to undertake the investment of Plevna from the west in a manner that would ensure success.

General Gourko, heretofore commanding the 2d Cavalry Division of the Guard, was entrusted with the task and given the greater part of the Guard in addition to the masses of cavalry on the left bank of the Vid.

At this time—about the middle of October—the following troops under General Arnoldi (Kryloff having been relieved) were on the left bank of the Vid, northwest of Plevna, in the vicinity of Trestenik and Riben: the 4th Cavalry Division, numbering 18 squadrons and sotnias with 12 guns; a Don Cossack brigade of 12 sotnias* and 6 guns; lastly, 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments (the two regular and the 5th and 6th militia regiments) of 16 squadrons and 6 guns; total, 62 squadrons and sotnias with 30 guns.

At the south of Plevna, on the right bank of the Vid, was Loshkareff with the 9th Cavalry Division (18 squadrons and 12 guns), scouting southward on both banks.

In addition to these bodies of cavalry, the following troops of the Guard were placed at the disposal of General Gourko to enable him to accomplish his purpose: the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions with 32 battalions, the Rifle Brigade with 4 battalions, the battalion of sappers, the 2d Cavalry Division with 24 squadrons, the personal escort of the Emperor with 4 squadrons, 12 foot batteries with 96 guns, and 3 horse batteries with 18 guns; all these troops were south of Plevna, between the Vid and the highroad to Lovtcha. In addition, General Arnoldi's cavalry was reinforced by 7 battalions of Roumanian infantry and a Rou-

*This is the organic strength; on their arrival on the left bank of the Vid the account mentions but 7 sotnias.

manian foot battery, while the 4th Don Cossacks, though belonging to the 4th Cavalry Division, were attached to the Guard Corps to serve as guides, on account of their knowledge of the terrain gained from their protracted presence in the locality.

On the 22d of October each of the 6 cavalry regiments of the Guard sent a platoon to the left bank of the Vid to reconnoiter; at the same time General Gourko was reconnoitering in the direction of Telis, accompanied by the superior officers of cavalry of the Guard and escorted by 2 squadrons of the Emperor's escort and 1 sotnia of the 4th Cossacks. From that point he rode forward on the high-road toward Gorni Dubnik, accompanied by a few officers, and reconnoitered the enemy's position under a brisk fire.

As a first step in the accomplishment of his task, Gourko decided upon the seizure of the fortified position of Gorni Dubnik. While the main attack was to be directed against that point, the enemy's forces at Telis and Dolni Dubnik were to be kept busy, and a sortie from Plevna as well as the approach of reinforcements from Orkhanie had also to be provided against.

The disposition drawn up to this effect by General Gourko for the 24th of October divided his forces into five groups:

(a) The following troops were to make the direct attack on Gorni Dubnik: the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard with 15 battalions, the rifle brigade of the Guard with 4 battalions, the sapper battalion of the Guard, 2

squadrons of the imperial escort, 4 sotnias of the 4th Don Cossacks, and 6 foot batteries of the Guard with 48 guns. In addition, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade (12 sotnias with 6 guns) was to advance from Abaskoi and take post west of Gorni Dubnik to prevent any retreat westward.

One battalion of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard and a foot battery of the Guard were to remain at the ford of Medivan to cover the passage there.

(b) The following troops were detailed to make a demonstration against Telis and repulse any troops of the enemy that might be advancing from Orkhanie: the Chasseur Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard with 4 battalions, the 1st and 2d Brigade of the 2d Cavalry Division of the Guard with 16 squadrons, 1 sotnia of the 4th Cossacks, and 1 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guard with 20 guns. In addition, Formak's militia brigade—8 squadrons—was to move from Magaleta, partly on the right bank of the Isker to Shervenibreg, partly on the left bank to Sumakova, forming as it were the western flank guard of the detachment operating against Telis.

(c) The following troops under General Arnoldi were told off for the demonstration against Dolni Dubnik: the 4th Cavalry Division (without the 4th Cossacks and another squadron detached with 2 guns) with 11 squadrons and 10 guns and the militia brigade with 8 squadrons, 6 guns, and 2 battalions of Roumanian infantry.

In addition, a detachment was to be dispatched by the 9th Cavalry Division from Medivan against Dolni Dubnik to establish communication with General Arnoldi.

(d) To meet any sortie from Plevna, General Shernosubof was to occupy the position of Netropolie with 7 sotnias of his brigade, 5 battalions of Roumanian infantry and 6 Russian horse and 6 Roumanian foot guns.

(e) The general reserve was posted between Upper and Lower Dubnik, and consisted of: the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard with 12 battalions, the 3d Brigade of the 2d Cavalry Division of the Guard with 8 squadrons, 2 squadrons of the imperial escort, 1 sotnia of the 4th Cossacks, and 4 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guard with 44 guns.

3. *Capture of Gorni Dubnik on October 24th.*

Gorni Dubnik is situated on the Dubnik brook, about 1,000 yards west of the highroad. At the highest point west of the road and south of the village a spacious redoubt was built with a cavalier in the interior; a smaller redoubt lay east of the great redoubt; both redoubts were surrounded by rifle-trenches.

On the north the level and open ground sloped almost insensibly toward Dolni Dubnik; toward the east the slopes were gentle and covered with a young and very dense growth of timber; the distance of the smaller redoubt from the edge of this wood was about 400 yards. To the south and west the ground sloped steeply into a depression about 200 yards wide. About 1,800 yards south of the small redoubt there was a clearing in the wood which the Turks had begun to fortify.

The troops detailed for the direct attack on Gorni Dub-

nik crossed the Vid during the night near Shirakova by three fords with knee-deep water, and were divided into three columns as follows:

Right column under Major-General Ellis—4 rifle battalions, 2 batteries, 2 squadrons, and 1 sotnia—on the road from Shirakova to Krushevitza, 2,000 yards from the former place.

Middle column under Major-General Baron Zeddeler—1st Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard with 7 battalions, the sapper battalion of the Guard, 2 batteries, and 1 sotnia—on the road from Shirakova to Sumakovitza, 500 yards from the former place.

Left column under Major-General Rosenbach—2d Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division of the Guard with 8 battalions and 2 batteries—was the last to cross the Vid, and took position 3,500 yards west of the river in the ravine of Swinar.

Two sotnias of Cossacks can not be accounted for.

The two flank columns, which were to advance from the north and south against the enemy's position were to start at 6:15 a. m.; the middle column, which was to attack from the east and had the shortest route, was to start at 6:45 a. m. The latter column entered the action at 8:30, the two flank columns at 9 a. m., their movements having been somewhat delayed.

The artillery of the middle column was posted about the center of the position of that column; on the left of the artillery was the Body Guard Grenadier regiment with its

4th battalion in first line, the 2d and 3d battalions in second line; to the right of the batteries was the Body Guard Moscow Regiment in the same formation; the 1st battalion of the Grenadiers and the sapper battalion formed the reserve.

At 8:30 a. m. both batteries came into action in the clearing above referred to and opened fire at a range of 1,600 yards. The Grenadier regiment, advancing through dense undergrowth, lost direction, went too far to the left, and touched the left column, whereupon General Zeddeler moved the regiment some distance to the rear and then to the right-oblique to approach the batteries. The gap caused by the oblique movement had meanwhile been filled from the reserve by the 1st battalion of the regiment.

On renewing the advance the Grenadier regiment reached the western edge of the wood and was about abreast of the Moscow Regiment on the right of the artillery.

At this time (9 o'clock) the two flank columns appeared before the enemy's position and opened fire from their artillery. At 9:30 o'clock the Caucasian Cossack Brigade appeared west of Gorni Dubnik and also opened fire from its battery, so that the Turkish position, where there were but 4 guns, was receiving a concentric fire from 54 guns.

Shortly after 10 o'clock the Grenadier regiment attacked the east redoubt, which was captured in spite of the murderous fire from this as well as from the main redoubt. The garrison of the east redoubt fell back on the main redoubt; an attempt of the Grenadiers to enter the main redoubt at the same time with the retreating enemy was frus-

trated by a severe fire, whereupon the Grenadiers ensconced themselves in the captured redoubt.

While the attack of the Grenadiers was in progress, Major-General Zeddeler ordered the batteries and the Moscow Regiment to go forward. The 1st Battery approached under a severe infantry fire to within 800 yards of the main redoubt, but, being unable to maintain itself, fell back to its original position after firing a few rounds. The Moscow Regiment advanced until abreast of the Grenadiers and ensconced itself in the rifle-trenches to the right (north) of the captured redoubt.

Meanwhile the right column had gained the highroad leading from Dolni to Gorni Dubnik, and advanced against the Turkish position from the north; the two Kuban squadrons of the imperial escort marching at the head drove bands of Tcherkesses before them and cut the telegraph line which ran by the side of the road.

Leaving 1 battalion opposite Dolni Dubnik, General Ellis formed his remaining 3 battalions for the attack: 1 battalion on each side of the road, the 2 batteries in the center, 1 battalion in reserve.

At 1,700 yards from the main redoubt the artillery opened fire, the rifle battalions continuing the advance. In consequence of the loss of the east redoubt, the Turks also abandoned the northern line of advanced trenches; the Rifles of the Guard took cover in them and opened fire at a range of from 600 to 700 yards. As the Rifles were directly in front of their artillery and masking their fire, both bat-

teries, notwithstanding the severe fire of the enemy, came up almost to the position of the Rifles and again opened fire at 800 yards. The 1st Division of the Guard having meanwhile arrived between Gorni and Dolni Dubnik and having deployed with front toward the latter place, the rifle battalion heretofore opposite Dolni Dubnik was ordered to join its brigade.

Gourko had ridden to the foremost line of the Rifles of the Guard to reconnoiter the great redoubt, and there about noon received report of the failure of the attack of the left column.

The left column started about 6:15 o'clock from the ravine of Swinar, and was considerably delayed in crossing a narrow but deep water-course. It advanced on the road leading from Telis to Gorni Dubnik, and did not arrive before the enemy's position until 9 o'clock. Two batteries placed in the center opened fire at a range of 1,800 yards, but soon closed to 1,500 yards, and were reinforced by the 5th Horse Battery of the Guard.

The Finland Regiment advanced on the left (west) of the road against Gorni Dubnik through dense underwood; the Pawlof Regiment to the right (east) of the road, on open ground. After crossing the ravine in front, both regiments moved to the attack on the main redoubt, but were repulsed by a severe fire and rallied in several places where the terrain afforded cover in rear.

The rifle battalions meanwhile, utilizing the depression opening into the valley of the Dubnik brook, were obliquing

more and more to the right so as almost to face the west front of the Turkish position. Gourko ordered forward 2 battalions of the Ismailof Regiment to fill the gap between the Rifles and the artillery on the road, which belonged to the right column; at the same time he reinforced the middle and left column each by 1 battalion of the same regiment. Having made these arrangements, Gourko repaired in person to the batteries of the middle column, at about 2 p. m.

Having learned that the Chasseur regiment of the Guard had been repulsed at Telis and was retreating, Gourko feared the arrival of Turkish reinforcements from that direction, and decided to bring the affair before Gorni Dubnik to a conclusion by a simultaneous assault from all sides; the middle column received verbal instructions to that effect; a written order was dispatched to the right flank column.

The following arrangement was made to ensure a simultaneous attack: as soon as the left column had completed its arrangements and stood ready to attack, its artillery was to fire three salvoes; the same was to be done by the middle column when everything was in readiness there, and lastly by the right column. As soon as the artillery of the right column fired the last salvo, the assault was to begin from all directions. The space to be crossed by the assaulting troops differed at the various points from 100 to 400 paces.

Having himself seen to the arrangements of the middle column, Gourko went to the left column to personally see to what was needful; but before this was accomplished, the

salvoes of the right column resounded and its troops advanced to the assault, which misunderstanding rendered a simultaneous attack impossible.

In order to support the assaulting troops of the right column as much as possible, Gourko dispatched orderlies in all directions with orders for every detachment to advance to the attack without waiting for the signal—with the natural result of provoking a series of individual attacks which were anything but simultaneous. Received by a murderous infantry fire, none of the detachments was able to reach the redoubt, and the assailants ensconced themselves at various distances from the redoubt where they found shelter; the Finland Regiment, finding no shelter at all, fell back to its original position on the rear slope of the hill.

The attack came to a standstill about 4 o'clock. Gourko decided to leave his troops in their positions for the time being, and to renew the attack at dusk.

The artillery was compelled to suspend its fire everywhere in order not to fire on its own troops.

As darkness set in, 2 battalions of the Ismailof Regiment advanced creeping to within about 50 paces of the redoubt and threw themselves on it simultaneously from all sides. After a brief struggle, the redoubt was taken; the Turkish commander, Ahmed Chifsi Pasha, surrendered with his whole garrison, which still numbered 53 officers and 2,235 unwounded men; 4 (Krupp) guns and large quantities of cartridges were also captured.

The main body of the general reserve did not become engaged.

4. Events at Telis on October 24th.

To the troops detailed to operate against Telis, and which crossed the Vid at Shirakova toward morning, the tasks were assigned as follows: the 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard to block the communication between Telis and Gorni Dubnik; the 2d Brigade, the Chasseur regiment of the Guard, and a battery to move to the direct attack of Telis.

The latter detachment started at 6:15 a. m. from the ravine near Swinar, where it had remained for some time after crossing the Vid; at its head the Dragoon regiment with 2 horse guns moved to the height of Rakita to cover the left and rear of the troops on their march to Telis; the Hussar regiment with 4 horse guns moved to the left in order to advance against Telis from the south, and the Chasseurs with the foot battery advanced from the east.

The works of Telis consisted of a large redoubt built across the highroad, a smaller redoubt more to the west, and a series of rifle-trenches in front.

The detachment arrived before Telis at 9:30 a. m., and the 8 foot and 4 horse guns opened fire at a range of 1,000 yards; the Chasseur regiment having been drawn up in two lines of 2 battalions, the first line advanced across the perfectly level and open ground to attack the foremost rifle-trenches. The latter were captured with the bayonet about 10 a. m., but, unfortunately, they offered no shelter whatever from the fire from the enemy's main position in rear, so that the Chasseurs suffered great losses in the captured position.

In order not to expose themselves idly and uselessly to this murderous fire, the 2 battalions of the first line tried to attack the main redoubt, and were followed, without orders, by the 2 battalions of the second line not heretofore engaged, but the attack did not approach the redoubt closer than within 100 paces, where the assailants sought such cover as they could find.

A sortie of the Turks was repulsed by a brisk fire, but as the capture of the redoubt proved impracticable, and as report was received from the Dragoons at Rakita that bodies of hostile infantry and artillery were approaching Telis from the south, the order to retreat was given.

During the unsuccessful attack of the Chasseurs, the Hussars advanced on Telis from the south; some of their detachments galloped into the foremost rifle-trenches and drove out the Turks. An attack made by a strong body of infantry from the Turkish main position was repulsed by the fire of the horse artillery and the dismounted fire of some of the Hussars. The retreat of the Chasseurs was covered by the Hussars.

The Dragoon regiment dispatched to Rakita was skirmishing with swarms of Tcherkesses; bodies of infantry with artillery appeared near Radomirtza, but did not advance further.

Subsequently the regiment joined the retreat of the troops that had been engaged at Telis; part of the regiment, in conjunction with a squadron of Hussars, assisted in the removal of the wounded.

At dusk the 2d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard halted in touch with the enemy.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard started from the Vid about 7 o'clock and reached the highroad between Telis and Gorni Dubnik at 10 o'clock; communication was established with the column moving on Telis and with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which had arrived west of Gorni Dubnik. The 2d Horse Battery of the Guard, which belonged to the brigade, was dispatched in support of the left column moving on Gorni Dubnik, and took part in the fire against the Turkish position.

On learning about noon of the failure of the attack on Telis, the regiment of Mounted Grenadiers was dispatched to meet and support the retreating troops, but no assistance was required, as the enemy failed to pursue.

During the night the brigade remained in its position between Telis and Gorni Dubnik.

5. Events at Dolni Dubnik on October 24th.

Leaving Trestanik early on October 24th with his detachment, consisting of 19 squadrons, 2 battalions, and 16 horse guns, General Arnoldi arrived 3,000 yards north of Dolni Dubnik about 7 a. m. Being greeted with artillery fire from two redoubts in front of the place, Arnoldi moved to the southwest, turning Dolni Dubnik, and continued the march under cover of the 4th Dragoons, whom he left opposite the town.

When the detachment had almost reached the high-

road, a third redoubt was encountered. Covered by the 4th Hussars and the 2 militia regiments, the Roumanian and 1 Russian battery came into action against this redoubt and opened fire. Meanwhile the 4th Lancers with 4-horse guns advanced at a trot on the highroad toward Gorni Dubnik, where the rifle brigade of the right column arrived about the same time.

A hill which commanded the redoubt was captured by some dismounted Dragoons and occupied at once by the Russian artillery. A daring charge of the Russian cavalry against Dolni Dubnik was repulsed by infantry fire.

The 2 Roumanian battalions arrived and threw up entrenchments on the left of the artillery position. The cannonade was kept up by both sides until late in the evening, without visible result.

The Turks in Dolni Dubnik numbered 6 battalions and 4 guns.

While the action of General Arnoldi's detachment against Dolni Dubnik was in progress, General Loshkaref ordered 6 of his squadrons and a horse battery from Medivan to cross to the left bank. Dashing against Gorni Dubnik without result, the action of the detachment was thereafter limited to maintaining communication between the troops of General Arnoldi, the general reserve, and the troops on the right bank of the Vid.

6. *Capture of Telis on October 28th.*

After the capture of Gorni Dubnik, the 1st Division fronted toward Dolni Dubnik, covering the 2d Division and

the sapper battalion while they entrenched the captured position of Gorni Dubnik on the side toward Plevna.

Meanwhile Arnoldi's cavalry was watching Dolni Dubnik and the bridge-head of Plevna. The Cavalry Division of the Guard was south of Gorni Dubnik toward Telis.

Dolni Dubnik and Telis were each occupied by 6 or 7 battalions of infantry, a few hundred Tcherkesses, and 4 guns. The guard-house on the highroad 3 miles south of Telis was also entrenched, surrounded by rifle-trenches, and occupied by infantry. At Radomirtza there were strong bodies of infantry and cavalry, under Chefket Pasha, who was approaching from Orkhanie with 20 battalions, 10 guns, and several thousand horsemen to succor the "etappen" posts, and who had halted and faced about on learning of the capture of Gorni Dubnik.

From the 25th to the 28th of October the 2d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard was stationed at Rakita with outposts toward Radomirtza, the guard-house, and the south side of Telis; the outpost service was very exacting, and skirmishes with the enemy were incessant; the horses of the 2d Brigade remained saddled for almost three times twenty-four hours. The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard was in the ravine of Swinar with outposts toward the east side of Telis, the 3d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard at Gorni Dubnik with outposts toward the north side of Telis; the Caucasian Cossack Brigade was farther to the west on the Isker, and observed Telis from the west.

On October 28th Gourko advanced to the attack on

Telis. While the 1st and 2d Cavalry Brigade were observing toward the south, Telis was surrounded on all sides by 16 battalions of infantry and the 3d Cavalry Brigade, and subjected to a concentric fire from 6 foot and 2 horse batteries between 11 a. m. and 2 p. m. Gourko then sent some Turks, captured at Gorni Dubnik, into Telis, with a demand for immediate surrender and the threat that he would destroy everything with his artillery if the surrender did not take place within half an hour. Ismail Haki Pasha now surrendered with his garrison of 7 battalions, still numbering 100 officers and 3,000 men. Four guns and very large quantities of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians, whose entire loss consisted of 1 man killed and a few wounded; while, on the other hand, many dead Turks lay about in the badly damaged works.

We now turn to the events of the 1st and 2d Cavalry Brigades of the Guard, which during this time were posted at Rakita to check the approach of reinforcements from that direction and to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Telis to the south.

The Dragoon regiment was at Rakita, fronting south; on its right the 5th Horse Battery, escorted by a squadron of mounted Grenadiers, came into action against the guard-house; the 2d Horse Battery, escorted by 2 squadrons of Lancers, was firing against the south front of Telis. The rest of the 2 brigades—i. e., 3 squadrons of Grenadiers, 2 of Lancers, and 4 of Hussars—were posted in reserve in rear of the Dragoons.

The 5th Horse Battery opened fire about 10 a. m., and soon compelled the Turks to leave the rifle-trenches in front of the guard-house. At the same time the Caucasian Cossack Brigade advanced from the west against Radomirtza under a brisk engagement with Turkish infantry and cavalry, and was joined by 2 squadrons of Lancers sent toward them from the reserve; the brigade was, however, ultimately forced to fall back, followed by the Lancers, who thus became separated from the main body of the cavalry of the Guard.

Having repulsed the attack on their left, the Turks advanced against the enemy opposite their right. Turkish infantry began to advance from the guard-house through the brush against the 5th Horse Battery, and dense swarms of mounted Tcherkesses threatened the 2d Horse Battery, which was firing on Telis. The 2 squadrons of Lancers which formed the escort of this battery and were posted with front toward Telis changed front against the Tcherkesses, and the 7 squadrons posted in reserve at Rakita also advanced against them in the space between the batteries.

The Lancers charged before the arrival of these reinforcements. The 3d squadron followed in second line at a trot; the 4th squadron charged at full speed against the Tcherkesses, who received the charge with a brisk fire from their magazine rifles, and, suddenly wheeling to the right and left, unmasked a line of infantry which had been posted under cover and now greeted the Lancers with a severe fire. The Lancers galloped around the flanks of the infantry, charged from the flank, and cut down the greater part.

On proceeding further in the direction of the guard-house, the Lancers received fire from the infantry posted in the dense brush, and, turning about, regained their original position at a short trot.

Meanwhile the main body of the cavalry reached the highroad between Telis and the guard-house, when the news of the capture of Telis arrived. Small detachments of the garrison, attempting to escape to the south, were overtaken and cut down by the cavalry.

The 2d Horse Battery now also directed its fire on the guard-house, which was soon after abandoned by the Turks; all Turkish troops that had come under observation so far were withdrawing southward. The 3d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard, arriving from Telis, relieved the outposts toward Radomirtza and Lukowitza; the 1st and 2d Brigades were assembled at Rakita.

The Turkish brigade at Dolni Dubnik evacuated the place on October 31st and withdrew without further action into Plevna. Dolni Dubnik was occupied on November 1st by the Russians, who advanced their lines 2,000 yards beyond the village toward Plevna, and at once entrenched their position.

Plevna was now completely invested on the west side, and deprived of all communication with the army posted at Orkhanie and Sophia.

7. *Losses.*

The accounts of the losses of the Guards in the actions on the left bank of the Vid toward the end of October are very complete.

(a) Capture of Gorni Dubnik, October 24th:

Killed: 18 officers, 811 men.

Wounded: 3 generals, 95 officers, 2,384 men.

Total loss: 116 officers and 3,195 men.

(b) Action of Telis on October 24th:

Chasseur Regiment of the Guard: 26 officers and 907 men killed and wounded.

2d Cavalry Brigade of the Guard: 1 officer, 1 man, and 2 horses killed; 1 officer, 15 men, and 18 horses wounded.

(c) Action of Telis on October 28th:

Infantry: 1 man killed and 15 men wounded.

Lancers of the Guard: 5 men and 14 horses killed; 4 officers, 11 men, and 31 horses wounded.

No special data are given for the losses of the 4th Cavalry Division, the Cossacks, and Roumanians, during this period, particularly in the action of Dolni Dubnik on October 24th; the losses, however, were very slight.

Nothing accurate is known of the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in these actions. The garrisons of Gorni Dubnik and Telis contained 13 battalions of infantry and about 2 regiments of cavalry, or 8,000 men at the most. Since not less than 5,500 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians and a few hundred men seem to have

escaped from Telis, the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in the two actions of the 24th and 28th of October were probably not much in excess of 2,000 men.

The losses of the Turks engaged at Radomirtza on the 28th can not have been heavy.

Comments.

The actions described above are in more than one respect worthy of attention.

1. In the first place, they were the result of a correct strategic idea after repeated previous mistakes; then, as regards tactics, they were planned with great prudence and skill and executed with much awkwardness; lastly, the Russian Guards appeared for the first time, which apparently very indifferent fact is of importance for an understanding of many features.

The strategic importance of the operations described we will not discuss here, as considerations of this character will find a place later. We turn to the conception of the operations directed by Gourko up to the investment of Plevna on the left bank of the Vid.

The enemy's troops encountered here numbered 12,000 men at the most, about equally distributed among the three fortified "etappen" stations, Dolni Dubnik, Gorni Dubnik, and Telis. Under certain circumstances, they might hope for assistance from Plevna or Orkhanie. The insufficient supply of artillery with these troops deserves special mention; there seem to have been but 4 guns in each of the fortified places.

To overcome these three points General Gourko was given considerable forces: 36 battalions of the Russian Guard, 7 battalions of Roumanian infantry, about 80 squadrons and sotnias of Russian and Roumanian cavalry, and 150 guns—a total of not less than 32,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. Leaving out a few small detachments, we find about one-half of the cavalry, the 7 Roumanian battalions, and 30 guns employed to observe Dolni Dubnik and Plevna; one-quarter of the cavalry, 20 battalions, and 60 guns were detailed to attack Gorni Dubnik; one-quarter of the cavalry, 4 battalions, and 20 guns observed Telis; lastly, 12 battalions and 32 guns stood as general reserve between Upper and Lower Dubnik.

The force detailed against Gorni Dubnik was so large in comparison with the garrison of that place that the defeat of the latter, as long as it had to depend on itself, could not be doubtful. The general reserve may therefore from the beginning be considered as intended for use against Dolni Dubnik and Plevna; any attack from Plevna in the direction of Dolni Dubnik would therefore encounter not less than 4,000 cavalry, 19 battalions, and 62 guns. The enterprise against Gorni Dubnik may therefore be considered as well covered on the side of Plevna.

To be sure, considerably smaller forces were posted toward Telis; but, in the first place, the appearance at this point of superior forces of the enemy was much less probable; in the second place, the approach of such a force would have been discovered at quite a distance, so that the proper

counter-measures might have been taken; the enterprise against Gorni Dubnik may therefore be considered as sufficiently covered toward the south also.

When we consider that, according to the disposition, Dolni Dubnik and Telis were to be merely observed, and not attacked, it is safe to say that the plan was bound to succeed, and that there was no reason to fear a check. The large number of troops available for these operations might have been a source of temptation to make a decisive attack against all three points at the same time, and the relative strength of the opponents would justify the Russians in expecting certain success in that case also. Gourko restricted himself to the attack on one point in order to make it with an overwhelming force, and this extreme prudence, which approaches timidity, may be explained in several ways; in the first place, the confidence of the Russians in their own strength was undoubtedly weakened after the many failures suffered before Plevna; and, in the second place, it was his intention to prevent any failure of the Russian Guards in their first action, and to preserve their unshaken self-confidence.

2. Gourko's plan bore within it all the conditions for certain, quick, and easy success; and it is solely due to the awkward tactical execution that the success, though ultimately attained, was gained only after a protracted, variable, and bloody action.

A field entrenchment held by 4,000 men and 4 guns was surrounded by 20,000 men, subjected for half a day to a con-

centric fire from 60 guns, and, after repeated failures, ultimately captured, with a loss to the assailant almost equaling the total strength of the defenders. This cannot be explained by the single assumption of extreme bravery and skill on the part of the defender, and any one is warranted in saying that great tactical mistakes were undoubtedly made by the assailant.

In turning to the details of the attack on Gorni Dubnik, we miss uniformity of instructions as to the method of execution of the attack by three infantry columns advancing separately against the Turkish position. Each of the three detachments moved to the attack without regard to the other two. Moreover, the attack was fairly executed only on the part of the right column; the conformation of the ground was here utilized and the advance made by rushes, and an attempt was made—though without much success—to prepare the attack by infantry fire.

The attack of the middle and left column makes the impression of having developed itself not in accordance with some well-defined plan, but under the influence of a precipitate advance from the beginning, and of an irrepressible ardor on the part of the troops.

At any rate, all the troops were almost simultaneously engaged, and there was practically no preparation of the attack by infantry fire. The attack itself was made without a formation of several lines and without utilizing the terrain; the dense masses threw themselves, with a bravery which despised death, from a great distance (1,000 paces), against

the murderous frontal fire, and, of course, suffered terrible losses.

It is surprising that the middle column failed to utilize the small eastern redoubt, which was captured at the beginning, as an intermediate position from which to prepare the further attack by artillery and infantry fire. It is stated (in extenuation, as it were) that the captured position afforded no shelter from the fire from the main position in rear. To be sure, this is a notable proof of the skill of the Turks in planning and locating the fortifications (which also becomes manifest at Telis), but would not the entire sapper battalion, which accompanied this column and was undoubtedly equipped with entrenching tools, have supplied the means for converting the captured position into good cover? The employment of the sapper battalion, which seems to have been held as a closed reserve to the last like ordinary infantry, must certainly be set down as unusual.

In view of the noise and excitement of battle, it is not surprising that Gourko's attempt to secure combination in the renewed attack, by a seemingly very well devised though complicated signal, failed in execution; it might have been better to fix a certain hour, not too near the time of the order.

In the attack of the Chasseurs of the Guard on Telis we miss plan and direction even more than in the attack on Gorni Dubnik. Not only was the attack of the first line made without due reflection and contrary to the general disposition, but the second line—the last available body of infantry—ran away from the superior leader and threw it.

self into the action without orders. The detachment was sufficiently strong, but the attack was contrary to programme and premature, and its severe loss diminished the defensive strength of the detachment to such an extent that a vigorous counter-attack of the Turks from Telis might have exercised a bad effect on the entire enterprise against Gorni Dubnik.

Nearly all the defects in the Russian attack may be somewhat extenuated by the fact that the troops were on that day under fire for the first time, and that they felt that, being a specially privileged corps, they were expected to do something quite extraordinary. The Russian Guards may certainly point with pride to the fact that they failed in no enterprise, and that upon their appearance the war took a brilliant turn; nevertheless a little more steadiness and coolness on the day of their baptism of fire would certainly not have diminished the success, while, on the other hand, it would have greatly reduced the losses.

3. The behavior of the Turkish garrisons in Gorni Dubnik on the 24th, and in Telis on the 28th, shows a striking contrast. On the 24th Gorni Dubnik was cannonaded for half a day by 60 guns, yet the garrison repulsed several furious assaults of a greatly superior enemy and did not succumb until after a protracted struggle. On the 28th the garrison of Telis surrendered, though its tactical situation was exactly the same as that of their brethren at Gorni Dubnik, after being cannonaded for two hours, and without waiting for an assault.

On the part of the Russians the reason is assigned that the garrison of Telis was so disheartened by the fall of Gorni Dubnik as to lose all heart for resistance; but that fact alone is not sufficient to explain the striking contrast.

If on the 24th Gourko had demanded the surrender of the garrison of Gorni Dubnik after a cannonade of five or six hours, without moving his infantry to the attack, I believe that very probably the garrison would have surrendered. On the other hand, if on the 28th Gourko had sent his infantry to the attack instead of opening negotiations, I believe it very probable that the garrison of Telis would have offered an obstinate resistance.

PART XII.

THE FALL OF PLEVNA.

1. General Measures for the Investment.

It having been determined by the Russians to avoid any attack entailing useless loss, and to overcome Osman Pasha's army by a close investment, all requisite steps were taken with great care under the direction of General Todleben.

The line of investment was strengthened by a series of rifle-trenches and artillery emplacements; the most important points were secured by lunettes or redoubts; between the positions of the investing troops commodious communications were constructed and their use facilitated by sign-posts; lastly, the line was connected throughout by a line of telegraph.

The line of investment, which measured 44 miles, was divided into six separate and to a certain degree independent sectors.

The first sector extended from Bivolar on the Vid to the Grivitza redoubt; commander, General Tschermat; troops, the main body of the Roumanian Army, exclusive of the 4th Division.

The second sector extended from the Grivitza redoubt to the Galitz redoubt near Radischevo; commander, General Krüdener; troops, 31st Infantry Division with 31st Artillery

Brigade and 2d Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with 4 batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade; total, 18 battalions and 10 batteries.

The third sector extended from the Galitz redoubt to the ravine of Tutchenitza; commander, General Zotoff; troops, 2d Infantry Division, 12th Rifle Battalion, and 30th Artillery Brigade; total, 13 battalions, 6 batteries.

The fourth sector extended from the ravine of Tutchenitza to that of Kartuschaven; commander, General Skobeleff; troops, 16th and 30th Infantry Division, 9th, 10th, and 11th Rifle Battalions, and 16th and 2d Artillery Brigades; total, 27 battalions, 12 batteries, and a Cossack regiment.

The fifth sector extended from the Kartuschaven ravine to the right bank of the Vid at Tyrnen; commander, General Kataley; troops, 3d Infantry Division of the Guard, 2 squadrons of Cossacks of the Guard, 3d Foot Artillery Brigade of the Guard, and 10th Don Horse Battery; total, 16 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 7 batteries.

The sixth sector extended from the left bank opposite Tyrnen to opposite Bivolar; commander, General Ganetzki; troops, 2d and 3d Grenadier Divisions with the 2d and 3d Grenadier Artillery Brigade, 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with 2 batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade, 4th Roumanian Division with its artillery, 9th Dragoons, 9th Lancers, 9th Hussars, and 4th Cossacks, 7th Horse Battery, 2d Don Horse Battery, and a regiment of Irregulars; total, 30 battalions, 18 squadrons, 16 batteries, besides the Roumanians.

The commanders of sectors had exact instructions in the various possible cases of an attempt on the part of the Turks to break through; some days before the sortie of the Turks took place the marches prescribed were carried out under Todleben's direction in the fifth and sixth sectors, in order to ascertain the amount of time requisite to carry out these concentrations.

The remainder of the troops heretofore belonging to the West Army—1st and 2d Infantry Division of the Guard, the Rifle Brigade of the Guard, Cavalry of the Guard, part of the 4th Cavalry Division, several Cossack regiments, and some Roumanian detachments—were united under Gourko's orders, pushed to the south and west, and engaged in seizing several passes over the Balkans and opening communication toward Servia.

*2. Signs of the Impending Attempt to Break Through;
Russian Dispositions for December 10th.*

From the reports received on December 9th from all parts of the line of investment, and from the statements of numerous deserters, it appeared that Osman Pasha was preparing for a decisive attempt to break through. The fire from the Turkish works had been quite weak on the 8th, and almost completely silent on the 9th. Deserters stated that shoes and a supply of hard bread, as well as 150 rounds of ammunition per man, had been issued, and that the rifles had been inspected. Much movement was discernible on and along the highroad between town and river; large bodies bivouacked there and large trains were parked.

Since all these statements and signs pointed to an attack against the sixth sector, General Todleben, in concert with the Prince of Roumania, made the following dispositions on the evening of December 9th:

1. At daybreak on the 10th of December General Skobelev to cross the Vid with 1 brigade of the 16th Division and 3 of its batteries, and 1 brigade of the 3d Division of the Guard; the Brigade of the 16th Division with the artillery to move to Dolni Dubnik and remain in readiness to support Ganetzki's troops; until the situation should be cleared up, the brigade of the Guard to remain close to the river on the left bank, so as to be available for reinforcing either in the fifth or sixth sector.

2. The fifth sector to remain occupied by a brigade of the 3d Division of the Guard, the fourth by a brigade of the 16th Division and the whole of the 30th Division. General Schnitnikof to assume command in Skobelev's place.

3. No changes in the troops holding the third sector.

4. The three rifle battalions belonging to the garrison of the fourth sector to move to the village of Grivitza to reinforce the second sector.

5. The main body of the Roumanian Army to occupy the first sector; early in the morning 4 battalions and 3 batteries to cross to the left bank and move to Demirkioi to support the troops of the sixth sector; 4 battalions and 2 batteries to remain in readiness to follow.

3. The Events on the Left Bank of the Vid.

On the morning of December 10th the following was the situation on the left bank of the Vid:

The line of Russian entrenchments began near Tyrnen and extended east of Dolni Dubnik and Gorni Netropolie to the ground opposite Bivolar. In addition to a number of connected rifle-trenches, it seems there were two redoubts east of Dolni Dubnik, three east of Gorni Netropolie, and a sixth redoubt north of Gorni Netropolie.

The entrenchments of the right wing of this position, including the first and second redoubts, were held on the morning of December 10th, by the Grenadier Regiment Kieff and the 3 nine-pounder batteries of the 2d Grenadier Artillery Brigade; in their rear was the Grenadier Regiment Tauris as first reserve; the second reserve posted at Dolni Dubnik consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division—the Samogitia and Moscow Regiments—and the 3 four-pounder batteries of the 2d Grenadier Artillery Brigade.

The entrenchments of the center, including the redoubts, were held by the Grenadier Regiment Siberia and 3 nine-pounder batteries; in rear stood the Russia Minor Regiment as reserve. The Fanagoria and Astrachan Regiments and the 3 four-pounder batteries were posted at Gorni Netropolie as second reserve.

The left wing of the entrenchments north of Gorni Netropolie was held by the Archangel Regiment and two Roumanian divisions; in their rear were the Wologda Regiment and two Russian batteries as first reserve; farther to

the rear, near Demirkioi, the 4th Roumanian Division was posted as second reserve.

One brigade of the 16th and another of the 3d Guard Division were expected to arrive in rear of the right of the entire position; the reserves in rear of the left were to be reinforced by four Roumanian battalions from the right bank.

During the night cavalry patrols reported the concentration of Turkish forces on the banks of the Vid; under cover of a dense fog the Turkish masses crossed to the left bank at daybreak over the main bridge, a newly constructed bridge near Opanetz, and several fords. The Turkish troops deployed in a large fold of the terrain, the artillery took position on the high ground and opened fire, and at 7:30 a. m. the attack began in the direction of Gorni Netropolie.

A dense skirmish line was closely followed by small closed bodies, the main body following at a greater distance; the artillery, keeping up its fire, advanced abreast of the infantry, the guns halting to fire one round and then galloping forward again.

On the part of the Russians a nine-pounder battery posted in redoubt No. 3 opened fire; General Daniloſſ, commander of the 3d Grenadier Division, ordered the Russia Minor Regiment closer up to the line of entrenchments and also directed the brigades at Gorni Netropolie to advance.

Meanwhile the Turkish masses, projecting a terrible hail of bullets to their front, reached the Russian position about 8:15 a. m. The losses of the 6 companies of the Siberia

Regiment, which held redoubt No. 3 and the rifle-trenches in the vicinity, were very great; the trenches on either side of the redoubt were lost first; the battery in the redoubt had lost nearly all its men and horses; and when the redoubt had to be abandoned, but 2 guns could be removed, the remaining 6 falling into the hands of the Turks.

At this time—about 8:30 a. m.—the Turkish attack was directed against redoubt No. 4, which was held by the rest of the Siberia Regiment; the nine-pounder battery posted in the redoubt continued to fire for some time; but when the Turks, after the capture of redoubt No. 3, turned the right of the position and at the same time attacked in front, the remnants of the Siberia Regiment fell back, and redoubt No. 4 with the adjoining rifle-trenches was lost with 2 guns, which could not be removed because the teams had been killed.

At this hour the Russia Minor Regiment reached the battle-field; formed in two lines of company columns, it advanced in the interval between the redoubts Nos. 3 and 4 and checked the attack of the Turks, but not without very great losses; within a few minutes all three battalion commanders and more than half of the company commanders were killed or wounded.

The situation of the two Grenadier regiments, which, though almost annihilated, were alone opposed to the vigorous attack of the hostile masses, was very critical. About 10:30 a. m. the 2d Brigade of the 3d Grenadier Division arrived from Gorni Netropolie in support of its 1st Brigade,

and the 2d Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division posted in reserve at Dolni Dubnik approached the battle-field. The 1st Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division still held the entrenchments on the right, east of Dolni Dubnik.

The débris of the Siberia and Russia Minor Regiments joined in the advance of the Fanagoria and Astrachan Regiments; the attack of the division was successful, and the two redoubts and adjoining rifle-trenches were recaptured, as well as the lost guns; the Astrachan Regiment, moreover, captured 7 Turkish guns and a stand of colors.

During this successful attack 2 Wologda battalions arrived from the left and attacked the Turkish right; at the same time the Samogitia Regiment of the 2d Grenadier Division appeared from the right and took part in the recapture of the lost entrenchments, taking 3 Turkish guns.

Having recovered all the lost positions, the Russian battalions halted and re-formed.

It was about noon when the Turks finally gave up the attack and fell back toward the bank of the Vid.

All the batteries of the 3d Grenadier Artillery Brigade were now placed in the front line with the infantry and covered the retreating Turks with a brisk fire; the lost and recaptured guns were being served by men from the infantry.

General Daniloff now advanced to the attack with the entire 3d Grenadier Division, followed on the left by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division and on the right by the 2d Brigade of the 2d Grenadier Division. The 1st Brigade of the latter division, heretofore holding the entrenchments of the

right, was also brought forward and took the Turks in left flank; one battalion each of the Taurida and Kieff Regiments of this brigade forded the Vid, the water reaching to their waist-belts, and seized the height of Blasivatz; the garrison of the Turkish redoubts at this point surrendered without firing a shot.

Upon request of General Ganetzki, the 6 battalions of the 3d Infantry Division of the Guard under General Kourloff, having crossed to the left bank by a pontoon bridge, started at 10 a. m. for Dolni Dubnik; arriving there, the brigade received orders to advance against the left of the Turks. General Skobelev, however, who arrived at this moment, ordered the brigade to delay its advance until the arrival of the brigade of the 16th Division; having given the order, General Skobelev repaired elsewhere. Neither the brigade of the 16th Division nor further orders having arrived by 2 p. m., Kourloff on his own responsibility advanced along the highroad; when the brigade reached the bridge over the Vid, the battle was already at an end.

4. The Events on the Right Bank of the Vid.

In the course of the night of the 9th-10th of December General Skobelev was informed by outposts that the Krishin works had been abandoned by the Turks. A party of volunteers was dispatched at once to investigate, and found the redoubts and trenches in rear of Krishin empty; they were at once occupied by troops of the 30th Infantry Division.

Simultaneously with the report of the occupation of the

Krishin works, information was received at headquarters at 9 a. m. that the so-called "second Grivitza redoubt" had been abandoned by the Turks and occupied by the Roumanians. General Todleben immediately ordered all the troops on the east front of Plevna to move to the attack on the Turkish works; the brigade of the 16th Division, which was still on the right bank in the fourth sector, as well as the 3 rifle battalions which had been ordered to the village of Grivitza, but had not yet reached their destination, were directed to cross to the left bank as quickly as possible and to place themselves under Skobeleff's orders, who, we know, had been sent with 2 brigades to support Ganetzki.

Advancing on Plevna from all directions, the troops found a large portion of the works evacuated by the Turks; others were held weakly to deceive the enemy, and were easily taken.

The Roumanians approaching from the north found the works of Opanetz still occupied; after a brief engagement, the Turkish garrison of 2,000 men surrendered; 3 guns were captured in these works.

On perceiving the withdrawal of the Turks toward the river, General Kataley, commander of the fifth sector, led those battalions of his division of the Guard which were still on the right bank against the Turkish entrenchments to the west of Krishin; by 1 p. m. all the works of the entrenched camp between Plevna and the river were in his hands: 1 pasha, 120 officers, 3,600 men, and 4 guns were captured here by the Russians, whose losses did not exceed 3 killed and 15 wounded.

5. The Surrender.

Crowded together from all sides against the banks of the Vid, and helplessly exposed to the fire of the Russian guns, the Turks had to give up not only the idea of renewing the attack, but of prolonging the resistance. Osman Pasha dispatched officers in all directions to seek the Russian commander-in-chief and to inform him of the cessation of resistance on the part of the Turks.

General Ganetzki, riding toward the bridge over the Vid, met Osman's chief-of-staff and demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole army. Osman, who was wounded, having acceded to the demand, the Turkish troops everywhere laid down their arms.

Exclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded, the army surrendering here to Russian captivity still numbered 40,000 effectives, among them 10 pashas, 128 field officers, and 2,000 officers of lower grade; 77 guns, 70,000 rifles, and a great quantity of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians. A number (about 30) of heavy guns, which were buried by the Turks before the beginning of their attempt to break through, were not discovered until later.

6. Losses.

The losses of the two Russian Grenadier Divisions were as follows: killed 2 field officers, 7 company officers, 409 men; wounded, 1 general, 3 field officers, 47 company officers, and 1,263 men. By far the greater part of these losses fell on the Siberia and Russia Minor Regiments. The next

greater loss was suffered by the Astrachan Regiment: 1 officer and 72 men killed, 12 officers and 346 men wounded.

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost 1 officer and 47 men wounded; the 3d Division of the Guard lost 3 men killed and 15 wounded.

The losses of the two batteries posted in the redoubts which were for some time in the hands of the Turks must have been heavy, but can not be ascertained.

The loss of the Roumanians was trifling. The Turks lost about 6,000 men, killed and wounded.

Comments.

1. The troops available for the investment of Plevna during the last six weeks numbered 8 Russian Infantry Divisions (3d Division of the Guard, 2d and 3d of the Grenadier Corps, 2d, 5th, 16th, 30th, and 31st Infantry Divisions) and 1st rifle brigade, some cavalry and Cossack regiments, and 48 foot and 3 horse batteries; total, about 75,000 men with 400 field guns, to which should be added 25,000 Roumanians. The total strength of the investing army was therefore 100,000 men with about 500 guns, while the effectives of the Turkish Army during the last few weeks may be put down at 50,000 men with a little more than 100 field and position guns. The Russian line of investment measured 45 miles, the Turkish line of defense about 25 miles.

A brief comparison of the investment of Plevna with the successful investment of Kars by the Russians under Muravieff in 1855 is not without interest. The Russian

Army of investment numbered 30,000 men, the invested Turkish Army 20,000 to 25,000 men; the length of the Turkish line of defense was about 13 miles, that of the Russian line of investment 50 miles.

The methods of investment pursued in these two sieges differ materially. General Muravieff posted his entire infantry with some cavalry south of Kars on the line of communication with Erzeroum, and the investment proper was maintained by five strong detachments of cavalry (consisting each of one or two cavalry regiments with some artillery), which were posted in a circle around Kars and kept up communication with each other. After an investment of several weeks, the Turkish Army surrendered on account of lack of provisions, without making an attempt to cut its way out.

The investment of Plevna was of nearly equal strength at all points; the greatest importance attaches to the fourth and sixth sectors, which were traversed by the great roads which might be used by Osman on his retreat.

In comparing the extent of the line of investment of Plevna with the two great investments of the Franco-Prussian War, we find that the German line of investment of Metz had an extent of 25 miles, that of Paris of 53 miles. The circumference of the enceinte of Paris measured 19 miles, the line connecting the forts about 35 miles.

2. The sixth sector of the line of investment of Plevna, embracing the left bank of the Vid, was geographically the most important portion of the line, and had, from Tynnen to

Dolni Dubnik and from Gorni Netropolie to opposite Bivolar, a length of 12 miles. This portion of the line was held by 2 Grenadier Divisions which had not yet been engaged, 1 brigade of the 5th Division which had suffered considerably, and several thousand Roumanians; total, 25,000 to 30,000 infantry, giving about 5 men for every 3 yards of front.

As a matter of comparison, we state here the following:

About the middle of November, 1870, when the great sortie from Paris was expected, the investment was so arranged that the III. Army guarded the left bank of the Seine, extending 15 miles, with 100,000 infantry, and the Meuse Army guarded the right bank, which measured 37 miles, with 80,000 infantry, giving to the III. Army about 13 men for 3 yards of front, to the Meuse Army about 4 men for the same front.

3. The two points of Dolni Dubnik and Gorni Netropolie, where the main reserves of the sector were posted, were distant 6 and 4 miles respectively from the bridge over the Vid; the line of investment consisting of redoubts and rifle-trenches seems to have been 2,000 or 3,000 yards farther to the front.

The beginning of the Turkish attack was discovered by the Russians about 7:30 a. m., whereupon, it seems, General Daniloff at once issued orders for the two rear echelons of his division to move up to the line of defense held by the Siberia Regiment. As the Russia Minor Regiment did not reach the fighting line before 9 a. m., and the 2d Brigade coming from Gorni Netropolie not before 10:30 a. m., there

must have been delays whose nature cannot be ascertained with the lights before us; the distance was not such as to prevent these troops from arriving much earlier.

Peculiar ill luck also seems to have attached to the movements of the troops dispatched under Skobelev to the left bank in support of Ganetzki. Since both brigades were on the further bank of the Vid by 7 a. m., there is no reason why they should not have arrived in good time at the assailed front either in direct support or, still better, have advanced against the left flank of the Turkish attack; but it seems that, owing to some misunderstanding, the brigade of the 16th Division never reached Dolni Dubnik, and that Kourloff's brigade of the Guard was held at Dolni Dubnik by contradictory orders during the decisive hours.

Skobelev's order to Kourloff to wait for the arrival of the 16th Division is due to a justifiable desire to undertake the decisive attack of the day, not with an isolated brigade, but with all his available troops. On the other hand, Ganetzki's order to that brigade to advance along the highroad was perfectly proper, for he was in position to know that the attack of even a comparatively small detachment in the direction indicated would no longer encounter serious resistance.

4. The number of effectives of the Turkish Army on the morning of December 10th must be set down at 45,000 men, and the strength of the corps led to the attack on the left bank of the Vid at 30,000 to 35,000 men with 60 guns.

The passage of the Vid was effected before dawn with surprising rapidity, by means of two bridges and a few

fords; the deployment on the further bank was also effected with great rapidity, so that the attack, made in dense, closed formation, could be begun at 7:30 a. m.

The passage as well as the deployment for the attack challenge an interesting comparison with similar events during the investment of Metz.

During the night of the 25th-26th of August Marshal Bazaine issued the necessary orders for a sortie to be undertaken next day on the right bank of the Moselle against St. Barbe, with a view of marching thence along the river to Thionville. The troops encamped on the left bank of the Moselle were put in motion at 5 a. m., in broad daylight. Although four bridges were available for the passage of the Moselle, the crossing was not completed until 3 p. m. At that hour, when everybody was waiting for the beginning of the attack, Marshal Bazaine assembled his generals in council, and it was decided, after protracted consultation, to defer the attack, whereupon the troops returned to their camping-grounds.

The events of the 31st of August preceding the battle of Noisseville were of similar nature. Early on the morning of the 31st Bazaine ordered the army to deploy in front of the Forts Queuleu and St. Julien, the arrangements differing but little from those of the 26th; but although an additional bridge was thrown on that day near Fort Queuleu, it was 2 p. m. before the deployment on the left bank was completed. Again Bazaine assembled his lieutenants, this

time to communicate to them his orders for the attack; and it was 4 p. m. when the attack began.

Even making allowance for the fact that the number of French troops crossing the Moselle was three times that of the Turks crossing the Vid, still a comparison between the two leaders and the two armies, with reference to the point under discussion, is decidedly in favor of the Turks.

5. The Turks attacked the Russian position with a bravery that despised death, and at first with surprising success, considering that the Russians must have been more or less prepared for the attack; as soon, however, as the first check was suffered and the attack brought to a halt, the heretofore convulsive tension gave way to a total relaxation. The Turks ceased all resistance before the capitulation was officially concluded.

The feeble action of the garrisons on the right bank of the Vid is hard to understand, and must in part be called shameful. Though not strong enough to permanently hold their works, they might undoubtedly have checked the Russians for hours and inflicted on them very sensible losses. If those 30 guns, instead of being buried, had remained in the works on the right bank, they would certainly have paid for their ultimate loss many times over.

6. Lastly, a negative answer must be given to the question, Did the Turkish sortie have any prospect of success?

The garrison of a small place of a few thousand men, if led with determination and prudence, may cut its way through an investing enemy by piercing the line of invest-

ment by sudden attack and escaping through the gap (Mennin, 1795; Almedia, 1811). This method of escape, however, without assistance from without, is out of the question for an invested army. A merely temporary piercing of the line of investment will probably in most cases be followed by a defeat in the open field; escape is possible only if the investing army is beaten. On that eventuality the Turks could under no circumstances count; for, even if it had been possible to overthrow the Russian troops on the left bank, the Turks would beyond a doubt have been surrounded and crushed within twenty-four or, at the most, forty-eight hours. In this particular there is considerable similarity between the conditions at Metz and Plevna.

As long as a so-called relief army stood at Orkhanie, Osman's retreat, if difficult, was possible; but the fate of the army of Plevna was sealed as soon as Gourko's bold operations in the passes of the Balkans compelled the Turkish Army at Orkhanie to fall back to Sophia.

PART XIII.

COMMENTS.

1. *The Operations.*

By what plan of operations the Russian commander-in-chief was originally guided will probably never be known with exactness—at any rate, not until after a long time. It may be assumed that the programme of the campaign was carried out up to the passage of the Danube.

The forcing of the passage of the Danube with comparatively small difficulty, and still more, Gourko's unexpected passage of the Balkans undertaken with a bold appreciation of the situation, impressed upon the heretofore prudent and methodical leadership a new and somewhat hazardous character. It appears as if political considerations had previously exercised a greater influence upon the conduct of the war than purely military considerations.

The low estimation placed upon the opponent led to a precipitate advance and exacted a severe penalty. Successes easily gained, and existing more in appearance than in reality, produced a complete intoxication which made the most difficult objectives seem to be within easy reach.

It is interesting to draw a rough outline of the development things might have taken, with a high degree of probability, if the incident of Plevna had not happened.

The first possibility was that the sudden appearance of the Russians south of the Balkans would have created such consternation in Constantinople as to cause further resistance to be abandoned and the road of negotiations, attended by inevitable sacrifices on the part of the Turks, to be entered upon.

Should Turkey have made far-reaching concessions and placed the execution of the promised reforms in the hands of a European commission, Russia would to a certain degree have been disarmed. The object for which Russia had drawn the sword would, in appearance at least, have been accomplished, and rivers of Russian blood would not have washed out the peaceful protestations of unselfish and humane sentiments. Perhaps it might still have been possible to allay the justifiable impulses of Russian self-confidence with formal concessions. In one word, the solution of the Oriental question, that bugbear of the peace of Europe, might again have been postponed for a shorter or a longer period. But the events connected with the name of Plevna removed that possibility and rendered the long-impending Oriental catastrophe unavoidable. Therein lies the great political importance of the conflict which for five months raged around Plevna.

A second possibility is that of the war continuing after the Russians had passed the Balkans, when they might have been so carried away by the intoxication of easily gained successes at the beginning as to transfer the center of their

operations beyond the Balkans with their totally inadequate forces.

In that case the reverse might have come at Sophia or Adrianople, instead of Plevna, and would have been quite unavoidable, in view of the wholly inadequate Russian forces and the Turkish power of resistance, which surpassed all expectations. This result would have come independently of the numerous mistakes in the conduct of the war on the part of the Russians, which were counterbalanced by equally heavy errors on the part of the Turks. The new preparations to surmount this crisis, which entailed on the Russians such unusual difficulties and enormous sacrifices of treasure and blood before Plevna, would of course have been more difficult on account of the greater length of the communications and the obstacle presented by the Balkans, and it seems quite possible that the campaign of 1877 might have ended with a failure for the Russian arms.

The great strategic importance of the conflicts around Plevna lies in the fact that they opened the eyes of the Russians to the impending danger, caused them in good time to make a suitable change in their entire plan, and forced them, against their will, to employ the amount of force indispensable for decisive success.

The question then would be, Whether the Turks made a mistake in fighting at Plevna? since that campaign, notwithstanding its primary disadvantages, did certainly confer very considerable advantages upon the Russian cause. This point is worthy of reflection.

Upon the appearance of Osman Pasha on the right flank of the Russians the strategic situation of the latter was decidedly unfavorable, and it became highly dangerous by Krüdener's defeat at Plevna on July 30th.

Had Osman Pasha been able to follow up his victory with an immediate and vigorous pursuit, and to drive Krüdener's morally and materially weakened troops across the Osma, all conditions would have been favorable, in case of fairly proper and combined action on the part of the East and West Armies, to involve the Russian Army in a defeat which was bound to be decisive for the campaign of that year.

In that case the detention of the West Army at Widdin and its subsequent skillful advance on the decisive point at the right moment would justly stand as a brilliant and successful example of strategic calculation, and old Abdul Kerim Pasha's "secret plan," often derided and maligned to the extent of having its existence denied, would have been vindicated.

Yet these claims to consider the advance of the West Bulgarian Army from Widdin on Plevna as the efflux of a brilliant strategic reflection are seriously weakened, not by the ultimate failure, but by another factor.

The above described decisive rôle could not be played by Osman's army except by way of the most vigorous offensive. Osman's inactivity after his second victory at Plevna on July 30th proves that his army, however stout on the defensive, must have lacked every trace of offensive force. A

general as able as Osman Pasha would not have allowed the favorable situation, as it existed at the beginning of August, to slip by without turning it to account.

If Osman Pasha considered his army capable of carrying the offensive to the point of seeking a decisive battle, his advance from Widdin to Plevna was a well-planned operation. If he did not credit his army with this offensive capacity, his advance must be accounted an error. In spite of all defensive successes attributable in part to the lack of skill of the Russian leading, the mere stay of his army at Plevna was not only useless, but an advantage voluntarily conceded to the Russians; that they failed to turn the advantage to account until very late and after many mistakes and sacrifices, and that the tenacity with which the Turks held out at Plevna came near giving the whole campaign a turn unfavorable to the Russians, was due to circumstances which were beyond Osman Pasha's control.

2. Combat; Fire of Masses and Rifle-Trenches.

The great wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries bear to a certain degree a peculiar character in which the personality of one or several leaders is strongly impressed. To be sure, a long series of improvements has been made in the course of time, partly in armament and equipment, partly in tactical arrangement and employment of troops; still, grand innovations which influence the character of the whole method of fighting do not appear, and the technique

of fighting has remained essentially unchanged for a long time.

The period of the Napoleonic wars forms the transition from the period just mentioned to that of modern wars. It is true the introduction of the dispersed order of battle brought about a complete modification of the entire fighting technique, but the armament and equipment of Napoleon's infantry, cavalry, and artillery differed in nothing from the armament and equipment of his opponents; and, leaving out some trifling matters, it was not different from the armament of the times of Frederick, Eugene, and Turenne.

An entirely different picture is presented by the great wars of the quarter of a century just passed. Compared with former times, the individuality of the leaders, though still decisive of the final result of the war, is placed in the background. On the other hand, each of the great wars of recent times is characterized by improvements which mark an epoch in the character of weapons, and a resulting transformation of the methods of fighting.

The Oriental War produced the rifled musket, the Italian War the rifled gun, the American War the armored ship and monitor, the Austro-Prussian War the breechloader with moderate rapidity and range, the Franco-Prussian War the chasseur, a far superior rival of the old breechloader; lastly, the Turko-Russian War produced the new systems of rifles of surpassing rapidity of fire and range, up to the re-

peater, and, as a result, field entrenchments on a grand scale,* which are now not the exception, but the rule.

The waste of ammunition predicted by the opponents of the breechloader on its first introduction was happily prevented by the fire discipline of the Prussian troops. The surprisingly small consumption of ammunition (2 millions) in the campaign of 1866 proved conclusively that the capacity of the new arm as regards rapidity of fire needed to be fully utilized only in exceptional cases, and then for very brief periods; as a rule, the fire delivered was aimed fire at short range and of moderate rapidity.

Quite different was the use made in 1870 by the French Army, after a brief peace training, of the rapid-firing, long-range arm. Fire was opened at enormous ranges, in part before the opponent came in full view; the latter sometimes suffered considerable losses at very long ranges, but a real success was never gained by this kind of fire. It is not our intention to discuss here the much-mooted question of the long-range fire of masses, but we feel safe in stating that the procedure of the French in this particular was ill-adapted, and not based on clear reflection and calculation, but chief-

*It is surprising that a military writer of Von Trotha's attainments should speak of "field entrenchments on a grand scale" as an outgrowth of the Turko-Russian War. Had he given even the most superficial study to the War of Secession, he would have known that the great armies engaged in that contest made a more extended use of field entrenchments than was made by the Turks more than twelve years later. The battles at Kenesaw Mountain, and, indeed, the entire campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta; the battles of The Wilderness and Spottsylvania, and the long struggle at Petersburg, might be studied with profit by Von Trotha, Clery, and other European critics who labor under the delusion that "field entrenchments on a grand scale" were practically unknown until the Turks brought them to the attention of the military world. Moreover, the American War produced a breechloader which was superior in range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire to the Prussian "needle-gun" of 1866, and which was largely used by the Union troops, especially the cavalry, in the last year of the war.—A. L. W.

ly on lack of fire discipline and obscure conceptions of the real value of the new arm.

After the Franco-Prussian War, the long-range fire of masses became the frequent topic of theoretical disquisitions and practical experiments in the great armies of Europe; but while the contending parties were still deeply engaged in their controversies and no final settlement of the necessary transformation of fire tactics had been reached, the question had been very simply settled in Turkey, without much previous inquiry, and the most extreme conclusions had been drawn from the armament with long-range, rapid-firing arms.

At the beginning of the war the Turkish Army developed a system of fire tactics complete in its simplicity: as soon as the enemy was known to be within reach of the rifle, the space supposed to be occupied or about to be traversed by him was covered, without regard to distance and probability of hitting or consumption of ammunition, with a fire whose severity and duration were without example.

Intimately connected with this system of fire tactics is the use of field entrenchments, which were probably never heretofore employed to this extent or in this manner.

The Turkish method of fighting in this war rests, therefore, on two, to a certain extent new, factors, and although many objections may be raised or improvements suggested as to the application of the system in detail, still the soundness of these new factors and their influence on any change of fighting tactics cannot be denied.

In turning now to the active factor of the Turkish tactics we find that experience has silenced those objections which were formerly frequently raised against the practicability of such rapid fire.

The new and complicated systems of small-arms have proven efficient in the hands of untrained men, nor was there any difficulty encountered in the handling of the magazine rifles formerly condemned as a weapon in war. The supply of ammunition, which was consumed in incredible quantities, was effected on the part of the Turks without difficulty. To be sure, as regards the latter point, the Turks were greatly favored by the fact of being almost everywhere on the tactical defensive, but even in the rare cases where the Turkish infantry made great attacks, the thorough organization of the ammunition supply can be traced up to the very firing line.

In nearly all the Turkish positions which the Russians captured enormous supplies of cartridges were found, frequently spread out in shallow boxes for convenient use between the prostrate skirmishers. It was not at all rare to find 200 to 300 empty cartridge shells by the side of a dead Turk. Instances occurred when individual Turks expended as many as 500 rounds in a single action. Even in those cases where the Turks moved to the attack on the Russian positions, it has been proved that some Turkish skirmishers, covering themselves in front of the Russian line, fired away 120 to 150 rounds in a comparatively short time. We may supplement this by the assertion of the

Russians that in the course of the war they took altogether in the captured positions and in the several surrenders 500 millions of cartridges. It may be interesting to state here that the total supply of a German army corps, inclusive of the ammunition columns, amounts in round figures to $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions of cartridges.

Nor should the fact be overlooked that the distances in front of the Turkish positions were frequently measured by pacing, and marked.

We now turn to the passive factor of the Turkish tactics: the employment of field entrenchments.

Here we have to do with two things, which, though intimately connected, must be separately considered: the construction of entrenchments proper and the shelter afforded by rapidly constructed rifle-trenches.

Wherever the Turkish infantry took up a tactical position, it sought cover for deployed lines, utilizing to the fullest extent any advantages offered by the ground. Where it became necessary, a shallow rifle-trench was constructed. Wherever the ground permitted, tiers of fire were arranged for several lines of infantry covering themselves at short distances, one above the other, on more or less steep slopes. The Turkish infantry seems to have possessed great skill in the construction of these trenches; the first hasty construction was accomplished with great rapidity, and technical troops were not employed in this work. Where there was ample time, the shallow trench was deepened and the breastwork strengthened. If the position was to be occupied for

several days, traverses against enfilading fire were added and shelter for part of the men constructed by digging obliquely down under the counterscarp, thus obtaining better shelter, whenever the garrison of the trench was not engaged. As a very good arrangement we commend the placing of numerous vessels filled with water in the trenches, the latter in some cases being also fully supplied with provisions, so that neither hunger nor thirst would compel the men to leave the trenches even temporarily. The latter case happened several times on the Russian side, causing in some instances tactical disadvantages, and in every case useless losses.

When preparing to hold a position for some time, the lines just described were strengthened by redoubts constructed at the highest points of the position and armed with guns; they served particularly to sweep the front of the trenches.

In preparing the line of entrenchments great care was taken that the advanced line, when carried by the enemy, gave him no protection from the lines still held in rear.

Having endeavored to give a brief outline of the two new factors of modern fighting—fire of masses and field entrenchments—we will subject the tactical employment of the several arms to a brief consideration.

3. The Infantry.

The Russian infantry on the European theater of war is organized into regiments of 3 battalions of 5 companies

each; the fifth company of each battalion is styled "rifle company" and intended for skirmishing, although differing neither in armament nor equipment from the remaining companies. The regiments of the Guard have 4 battalions of 4 companies each; the rifle battalion has 4 companies. When preparing for battle, the battalion usually forms 4 company columns in two lines with short distances, the fifth ("rifle") company being deployed in front. A regiment formed for battle usually has two battalions abreast in the formation just described, and the third battalion is held closed in mass as reserve in rear.

From the description of the several actions it is plain that there was no preparation of the attack by the fire of skirmishers, and that all preparation was left to the artillery.

The attack was mostly undertaken from a great distance—1,000 paces and over—and carried out in such a manner that the skirmish line, the two lines of company columns, and frequently the reserve started almost at the same time and with very small distances, and became intermixed in the advance, so that the attack, in a favorable case, approached the enemy in the shape of a more or less disordered swarm.

If the first advance failed to bring the troops to the enemy's position, they found shelter on the ground and opened a lively, but for the most part ineffective, fire; the tactical arrangement was greatly loosened, and the tactical leading rendered difficult, frequently impossible; fresh reserves were required to get the halted lines again in motion.

The attacks on the enemy's positions were almost invari-

ably frontal and attempts to turn one or both of the enemy's flanks rare.

When on the defensive, the Russian infantry frequently advanced to the counter-attack too soon, without having fully utilized the destructive effect of rapid fire at short range. The pursuit of the defeated enemy also was sometimes made with the bayonet, though pursuit by fire would have been far more effective.

The tactics of the Turkish infantry on the defensive has been noticed in connection with the discussion of the Turkish fire tactics. In addition we note on the defensive a persistent holding back and usually a skillful employment of the reserves. On the offensive a dense skirmish line was followed by small closed detachments, which in turn were followed by larger bodies at greater distances. They opened a terrible fire and endeavored to utilize the terrain in delivering the decisive blow against the enemy. In most cases the flanks of the advancing infantry were covered by more or less cavalry.

A few words more on the armament of the opposing infantry.

The Russian Guards and Rifles were armed with the Berdan rifle, the remaining infantry on the European theater with the Krenk rifle; and the Turks with the Peabody-Martini and partly with the Snider.

The following table gives a comparison of the different arms:

	Berdan.	Krenk.	Peabo dy-Martini.	Snider.
Weight of rifle and bayonet.....	10.27 pounds.	10.84 pounds.	14.30 pounds.	11 pounds.
Weight of rifle without bayonet.....	9.37 pounds.	9.9 pounds.	9.5 pounds.	9.9 pounds.
Caliber.....	.42 inch.	.60 inch.	.44 inch.	.57 inch.
Weight of cartridge..	608 grains.	841 grains.	636 grains.	708 grains.
Initial velocity.	1450 feet per second.	1082 feet per second.	1349 feet per second.	1163 feet per second.
Dangerous spaces for infantry.				
At 600 paces.....	170 paces.	75 paces.	135 paces.	100 paces.
At 1200 paces.....	46 paces.	28 paces.	45 paces.	36 paces.
At 1600 paces.....	25 paces.	Disappears.	20 paces.	Disappears.

In connection with field entrenchments which we have discussed above and which have gained greatly in importance, and more particularly in connection with entrenchments thrown up in the course of the action, the entrenching tool comes to the fore as a point in the infantry equipment.

In the actions here described one becomes painfully aware of the frequent lack of entrenching tools on the part of the Russians; it is partially explained by the fact that in many cases the Russian foot soldier threw away his entrenching tool as a troublesome burden,*—but, leaving this out of consideration, the equipment of the Russian Army with entrenching tools seems to have been too small to satisfy the requirements of modern combat.

*After the bitter lessons of Plevna, the throwing away of entrenching tools by the Russian soldiers seems to have ceased. Referring to the march of Skobellev's division from Plevna to Constantinople, Greene says: "Every man carried an implement of some kind, about 85 per cent being spades or shovels, 10 per cent picks, and the rest axes, etc. His division marched with these on their backs from Plevna to Constantinople; they were slung over the back, the handle projecting above the left shoulder and the spade below the right hip, and were attached to the shoulder with a piece of string, a strap, a piece of old tent, or anything else that was available; they were heavy (weighing over 5 pounds), they were uncomfortable, they were in every way inconvenient, but each man had learned by hard experience to feel that his individual life depended upon his musket and his spade—and he took good care to lose neither the one nor the other."—A. L. W.

Several means are available for having the requisite entrenching tools on hand at the decisive moment: by an addition of special troops; by carrying the tools on wagons and issuing them to the troops as required; and lastly, by making the entrenching tool a permanent part of the infantry equipment.

The detail of special troops for the construction of such works would seem to be inadequate on account of the great extent to which hasty entrenchments have been and will be employed in modern war, and on account of the intimate connection of these works with the tactical action of infantry. Some one in the Russian Army has proposed to equip a company of each regiment with entrenching tools and to compensate the company for the extra weight by reduction in another direction—in other words, to give each regiment a pioneer company and to enormously increase the special troops. Aside from many disadvantages entailed, this plan would still fall short of its aim.

It is wholly impracticable to carry the tools on wagons, issue them to the infantry before the action, and to have them turned in afterward—so that nothing remains but to permanently equip the infantry with such a supply of entrenching tools as to enable it to meet any demands of battle; a supply of entrenching tools would of course have to be carried on wagons as a reserve and for the construction of extensive works. The infantry should be wholly independent of the assistance of special troops in the execution of all purely tactical trench work; and the Turkish infantry, in

spite of its defective training, has shown that this is feasible.

Some voices in the Russian Army oppose the permanent equipment of infantry with entrenching tools, on the ground that they are too heavy and are sure to be thrown away. Yet, a tool, suitably contrived and carried, aided by proper instruction of the men in the great value of the tool, supplemented by historical examples, would for the most part deprive these objections of their force.

It is a fact that the Russians were deficient in entrenching tools before Plevna.

Unfortunately, the author has no means for ascertaining what the supply of entrenching tools in the hands of the troops was, but the number must have been very small.

At the beginning of the great artillery attack in the early days of September, when emplacements for more than 100 guns had to be constructed, as well as advanced rifle-trenches and other trenches in rear as cover for 6 divisions, there were issued to the troops from the field engineer park 1,600 small spades, and several hundred large spades and picks. But the tools issued from the field engineer park formed the bulk of the tools on hand, for Skobelev's three brigades, which received none of these tools, were almost completely destitute of entrenching tools.

As a matter of comparison, we will state here that in addition to the tools carried by the cavalry, artillery, and trains, the German army corps of 25 battalions has immediately on hand for entrenching purposes 5,000 small spades, 3,000 large spades, 1,000 picks and pickaxes, and 2,500

hatchets and axes; the 5,000 small spades and part of the hatchets are permanently carried by the infantry.

4. *The Cavalry.*

Some adverse criticisms, commenting with some justification on the defective work of the cavalry in the first part of the campaign, remark that the work of the cavalry was all the more unintelligible, since the Russian cavalry was not only proportionately strong, but also superior to the weak Turkish cavalry. Both of these assumptions are wrong.

At the beginning of the war the proportion of cavalry to infantry in the army of operation was 1 to 6, which is about the normal proportion in the German Army and may be deemed sufficient, and not unusually large. The reinforcements brought to the theater of war in the course of the campaign amounted to 10 infantry divisions, numbering at least 100,000 men. The cavalry of the Guard and Cossacks—numbering not more than 8,000 men—changed the above proportion very much in favor of the infantry.

It is wrong to speak of a great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish cavalry. The so-called regular Turkish cavalry, to be sure, was not more than 8,000 strong, but 20,000 Tcherkesses formed not only the most numerous, but also decidedly the best portion of the Turkish cavalry. The relative strength of the Russian and Turkish cavalry is therefore approximately the same, and at first slightly in favor of the Turks, subsequently slightly in favor of the Russians.

Aside from the cavalry of the Guard, which had a special

formation, the entire Russian cavalry of the line and the 20 Don Cossack regiments in service were, under the most recent organization, formed in 15 permanent divisions: 14 divisions were composed each of one Dragoon, one Lancer, one Hussar, and one Cossack regiment. Two Cossack regiments did not form part of the divisions. In view of the experiences of the German Army in 1866 and 1870, it was deemed advisable not to organize larger bodies. The divisions were to be used independently and closed in one body, and their tactical training corresponded thereto. The service with the infantry divisions was to be performed by Don Cossack regiments, which did not belong to any cavalry division.

These principles were, however, soon deviated from. At the beginning of hostilities the 15 cavalry divisions were distributed among the fifteen corps, so that each cavalry division became an integral part of an army corps to the exclusion of all independence and the strategic usefulness of the cavalry divisions.

At the beginning of hostilities the army of operation numbered seven army corps and as many cavalry divisions, besides a Caucasian Cossack brigade and 10 Don Cossack regiments, which latter, not belonging to any higher unit, were intended to perform the service of divisional cavalry.

Immediately upon the passage of the Danube the divisional organization was wantonly destroyed for the purpose of forming a new and larger unit for General Gourko's advance across the Balkans.

The Caucasian Brigade and 3 combined brigades formed

this corps: the Dragoon Brigade, composed of the 2 Dragoon regiments of the 8th and 9th Divisions; the so-called combined brigade, consisting of the Hussar regiment of the 9th Division and a Don regiment; lastly, the Don Brigade, consisting of 2 regiments.

Three of the 10 Don regiments were thus taken up; and but 7 Cossack regiments remained for the 14 infantry divisions. This number of course proved inadequate at once; a large number of regiments belonging to cavalry divisions were thereupon taken from their divisions and attached to individual infantry divisions and brigades.

The cavalry divisions soon disappeared in name also and their commanders were assigned according to rank to the command of mixed bodies of troops.

On the other hand, a large cavalry corps under Kryloff was formed at the beginning of September for the purpose of investing Plevna from the west.

The strategic task of this corps was manifold: it was to observe the army of Plevna, reconnoiter the country to the west and south, and oppose any relief coming from these directions as far away from Plevna as possible.

The task necessitated a repeated division of the corps and proved that this clumsy mass-formation would have entailed difficulties of leading, even had the latter been more vigorous and appropriate than it was.

Two or three independent cavalry divisions with special instructions directly from the commander-in-chief of the West Army might perhaps have been better able to accomplish the object contemplated by the supreme command.

The idea of repulsing by cavalry alone any relief coming from the south or west implies an overestimation of the fighting capacity of the cavalry unsupported by infantry, and although in our above discussion we were bound to find fault with Kryloff's retreat with so little fighting, it is doubtful whether the cavalry could have succeeded in keeping an infantry corps of 10,000 men permanently from Plevna. None of the facts or statements point to any plan of giving Kryloff's cavalry timely support by infantry. The tasks imposed on the German cavalry in 1870-71 never implied the carrying through of a decisive action against large bodies of the enemy's infantry.

At this point the following reflection is, perhaps, not out of place:

The attitude of Osman Pasha at Plevna in July and August may have convinced the Russian leaders that Osman's army was incapable of a sustained vigorous offensive; it was therefore desirable for the Russians to entice the Turks in some way to leave the entrenchments of Plevna and fight the Russians in the open field.

Supposing the Russian West Army took post in September, not to the east, but to the west of Plevna, with two strong bridge-heads on the right bank above and below Plevna, perhaps at Medivan and Riben, while 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry were watching the east side, the following would have been the situation:

No relief army, coming either from the west (Widdin) or from the south (Orkhanie), could join hands with the army

in Plevna without first defeating the Russian Army; but the latter, wholly aside from proper entrenchments and a far superior artillery, was strong enough to repulse a simultaneous attack by the relief army and the army inside Plevna. Should Osman turn this position of the Russian West Army to account in order to march suddenly eastward and threaten the line of the Jantra, there was the greatest probability that he would be overtaken by the main body of the Russian West Army before reaching the Osma and forced to give battle in the open field under very unfavorable conditions.

Returning to the actual conditions before Plevna, we find that the investment on the west side did not become effective until General Gourko took command and considerable forces of infantry had reinforced the cavalry.

Lastly, in casting a glance over the tactical employment of cavalry, we notice the exaggerated use of dismounted fighting. Its modern rôle will certainly place cavalry often in positions where it must fight dismounted, and on that account it should be trained correspondingly; still dismounted fighting will and must be an unwelcome expedient and more or less opposed to the nature of the arm.

Not so in the Russian cavalry: dismounted fighting there has become a perfect mania; it is used on almost every occasion and even without cogent reasons. This is no doubt due to the peace training of the Russian cavalry, in which an exaggerated value seems to be placed on dismounted fighting; for exaggerated it must be called considering that in the

grand maneuvers of 1876 more than once entire cavalry regiments dismounted for village fighting, and that cavalry assaulted considerable towns held by strong infantry garrisons.

The Dragoons are still looked upon in Russia as real "double fighters" as in the days of Emperor Nicholas, who sought to realize the "centaur combination" of infantry and cavalry in the creation of his "Dragoon Corps." Although this creation of the Dragoon Corps failed completely at the first test—in the Oriental War—still the underlying idea has, within narrower limits, been preserved in the Russian Army up to this day.

The Dragoon regiment of each normal Russian cavalry division is to represent in a certain sense the infantry element of that division.

Dismounted fighting of the Russian cavalry is an essential factor of its action; the dismounted fighting of the German cavalry is never more than an expedient. The Russian cavalry division—viewed from the ideal standpoint—is intended to be a combination of all three arms, capable of any kind of action and equipped for the greatest possible celerity of movement; the German cavalry is meant to accomplish all that is possible for cavalry proper, while as a single arm it must renounce complete independence in battle.

These latter requirements are decidedly more in keeping with the law of the equal division of labor, which is becoming more and more predominant in every sphere, and which results in an increased efficiency of the whole. Many

features of war which according to our ideas are surprising and bewildering may be explained by the difference in principle just stated, between the Russian and German cavalry.

5. The Artillery.

The Russian field artillery was armed with breech-loading guns of two calibers: the so-called four-pounder had a caliber of 3.4 inches and fired a projectile of 11 pounds, the barrel weighed 614 pounds, the limber contained 18 rounds, and there were 2 ammunition-wagons for every gun; the so-called nine-pounder had a caliber of 4.2 inches, the projectile weighed 22 pounds, the barrel weighed 1,250 pounds, the limber contained 12 rounds, and there were 3 ammunition-wagons for every gun. Both these Russian guns surpassed the corresponding calibers of the German field artillery as regards weight of projectile and barrel; as regards weight of projectile, the nine-pounder was but little inferior to the German 4.7-inch gun. The entire field artillery was provided with wrought-iron carriages.

A gun was drawn by 6 horses; the batteries of the foot artillery consisted of 8 guns, half of them four-, the other half nine-pounders; the horse artillery had four-pounders only and 6 guns to the battery.

A brigade of 6 batteries with 48 guns was permanently attached to each infantry division; there were 4 guns for each infantry battalion, slightly more than provided in the normal strength of the German army corps. Each cavalry division had 2 horse batteries with 12 guns.

In view of the great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish artillery, it was to be expected that its influence in action would be dominant and that its effect would vigorously prepare and support the attack of the infantry, but we find little of the sort; most actions give the impression that the coöperation of the artillery had no influence on their course worth mentioning.

There are two reasons for this: first, the method of its tactical employment; second, the tasks devolving upon it in this war as compared with its inadequate effect.

In glancing back over the tactical employment of the artillery in the actions described, we find the following:

1. The available batteries were mostly, from the very beginning, evenly distributed over the line of battle; part of the artillery was not held back for the purpose of using it *en masse* at a certain point of the line of battle in the sense of a corps artillery.

2. Fire was opened on the enemy's position at very long ranges and was almost invariably frontal; seldom do we find an endeavor to flank a position. An exception is the position of the artillery taken by Skobelev's orders on the east side of the Tutchénitza ravine for the purpose of enfilading the Turkish position on the "third knoll."

3. In most cases the numerically inferior Turkish artillery soon gave up the fight against the Russian artillery and withdrew to cover, only to reappear in efficient condition the moment the Russian infantry moved to the attack.

4. The frontal position of the artillery compelled it to cease firing as soon as the infantry attack began.

5. Those cases are exceptions where batteries followed the attacking infantry and endeavored to support it from positions in front; the artillery remained for the most part in its original position and played an inferior rôle in the second phase of the action, while, on the other hand, the inferior Turkish artillery was very much in evidence in that second phase. A vigorous advance of the artillery to support the infantry attack is seldom found except under Skobeleff's direction; the battery attached to the Kostroma Regiment on July 20th furnishes an example of that kind, and so do some batteries of the Russian left under Shakofskoi on July 30th.

The batteries which advanced with the infantry under the enemy's infantry fire suffered such losses in men and horses as to be put, entirely or in part, out of action in a short space of time.

If we investigate the material effect of the Russian artillery, we fail to find any thorough and successful effect in any of the actions excepting that of Telis on October 28th.

The Russian artillery seldom found an opportunity to fire on troops not under cover; the fire was mostly directed against lines of infantry under natural cover, against rifle-trenches or more or less regular entrenchments, and the fire had hardly any effect. Despite its preparation, continued for hours, by the fire of a formidable mass of artillery, the infantry attack invariably encountered an unshaken opponent.

It is a fact that the small effect of the Russian field artillery in the actions of July and August, against the sheltered and entrenched Turkish position, shook the confidence of the troops in their field artillery so severely that 20 twenty-four-pounders from the siege park were used in the preparation of the great attack on Plevna in September; but the latter were likewise unable to produce a result in any way satisfactory.

The first fire was opened at an average range of 2,500 yards, at which distance the four-pounders were deemed inefficient and nine-pounders alone were used by the side of the heavy guns. Upon approaching to within 1,600 yards of the enemy's position some of the four-pounder batteries took part in the firing. The result of the bombardment of the Turkish position, which was carried on for several days with great energy, was almost *nil*, unless the fact of the Russian gun carriages becoming unserviceable is considered a negative and doubtful result.

The effect produced October 24th by the concentric fire of 60 guns on the redoubt of Gorni Dubnik can not be considered satisfactory; one would have thought that such an overwhelming fire—60 guns against 4—would speedily break any resistance. Having withstood this seemingly terrible fire for several hours, the garrison of the redoubt was still able to repulse several assaults made by superior numbers.

The surrender of the redoubt of Telis is the one success that is to be credited to the artillery alone.

Presuming that in the future extensive field entrenchments will play the same rôle as in the Russo-Turkish War, the following demands may be made on the artillery:

First: An appreciable portion of the field artillery must consist of considerably heavier calibers than are at present numbered among the field artillery, in order to sufficiently destroy the enemy's cover at greater ranges.

Second: The light calibers of the field artillery will be employed not so much in rearward positions as in direct connection with the attacking infantry. The task of the light artillery is partly to accompany the assaulting infantry in small bodies, partly by skillful and bold maneuvering in larger bodies to take important points of the enemy's position under a massed fire during a brief space of time.

In fulfilling these tasks great losses in men and horses, perhaps even of guns, become unavoidable, but the responsible leader, if aiming at decisive results, will not shrink from such losses.

A battery which fires at the decisive point with destructive effect for five minutes—or even for one minute—and is then lost, has done better service to the whole command than ten batteries which from well-chosen rearward positions have maintained a well-aimed, but in the end rather useless, fire.

6. *Fortresses and Field Entrenchments.*

Ardahan, Nikopolis, and Kars, all armed with numerous guns of the heaviest caliber, succumbed to the open attack; the field entrenchments of Plevna, built in the face of

the enemy and partly under his fire, armed with comparatively few guns of small caliber, held out for five months and ultimately succumbed to hunger alone. That contrast is naturally the first thought engendered by this war relative to fortifications.

To be sure, Ardahan, Nikopolis, and Kars did not fall so quickly because they were real fortresses, but in spite of that fact; Plevna did not offer such protracted resistance because its works were field entrenchments, but notwithstanding that fact; and lastly, these instances but serve to furnish additional proof of the old established fact, that a fortification receives its importance and value from its defenders alone. It cannot be denied that, as compared with fortresses, field entrenchments played a more important rôle in this war than formerly, and that the same condition will probably obtain in the next few wars. The principle of fortresses and entrenchments is the same—that is, to form a battle-ground strengthened by all available means; the difference lies in the means available in each case.


In the construction of fortresses the limits of these means are fixed by considerations of finance; in the construction of field entrenchments circumstances vary each case, the amount of available time being a very important item.

It is, of course, impracticable to convert into fortresses all points of a country which under certain circumstances may become decisive in the conduct of a war; that is rendered impossible not only by financial considerations, but by

many other conditions, military and non-military. Such places alone as possess a permanent strategic value under all circumstances can be taken into account, and it is left to field fortification to supplement this skeleton of defense formed by the fortresses, by additional fortifications closely conforming to the situation of the moment.

Greater demands than formerly are made on all fortifications in consequence of the great improvements in weapons and means of transportation, rendering it possible to rapidly bring up comparatively heavy guns and enormous supplies of ammunition. In the construction of fortresses in peace the element of time can easily be satisfied by utilizing all imaginable technical means; but in the construction of field entrenchments there will invariably be a dearth of time and in most cases one of hands, and it will become a question what preparations will best facilitate a suitable and rapid construction of field entrenchments when the moment for so doing arrives. These preparatory measures may be divided into two classes: intellectual and material.

To the former belong the preparations of plans of fortification for all such points as may easily become important in certain situations, and the practicing of troops in the construction of large fortifications; the material measures consist in a sufficient equipment of the army with entrenching tools and the preparation of all wood constructions required in such works, as block-houses, powder magazines, gun platforms, revetting material, bridges, ramps, and cantonments, the component parts of which should be kept in store in the great fortresses ready for shipment.



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